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Abstract
Resilience in transport services 
— focus on constraints
The Swedish industry needs fast and reliable goods transport services. In 
this study, data from transport buying companies are analysed to assess if 
Transport Providers are able to keep up with industrial Buyers’ demands of 
On-time, door-to-door service. Global coverage and competition are drivers 
not only for greater complexity, but also for the “leaning” of resources in 
organisations, both for Transport Buyers and Providers. How does this affect 
their interaction?
Since services are produced and consumed at the same time, service indus-
tries are particularly sensitive to imbalances between the demand for service 
and the supply capacity. This is especially visible in times when demand is 
increasing and service production already is at capacity, or in situations when 
unplanned disturbances occur. The resulting increasing work pressures have 
to be absorbed somehow, if business opportunities are not to be lost, or if 
quality is not to suffer.
However, to expand capacity takes time, and meanwhile service organisa-
tions have to have other ways to respond. They have to have high response 
flexibility. An option is to use the available capacity more, i.e. to increase 
work intensity, another is to spend less time to perform each order. To 
increase utilization of capacity too much, though, can lead to unwanted 
constraints, commonly referred to as “bottlenecks”, manifested as queues, or 
long waiting times, or fluctuating quality of performance.
The purpose of this study is thus to illustrate and discuss unintended con-
straints in a service industry in the light of a dominating and somewhat mis-
applied management trend that is likely to affect the long-term development 
of capabilities, resilience and competitiveness negatively.
Resilience is a property in both natural and man-made systems that can be 
described as the ability to bounce back in the face of adversity, a type of 
flexibility that is necessary for responding to increasing pressure and dis-
ruptive situations, and for company survival. Resilience is dependent on 
continual and long-term learning, and development of diverse capabilities, 
which I summarise as Problem-Solving Skills. I also discuss four principles, 
coherence, connectedness, control, and requisite variety, which have been 
described in literature as necessary for the formation of resilience. These 
first three can also be explained in the context of information retrieving and 
communicating, sense making of the system, and adjusting deviations. The 
fourth principle is the diversity necessary for dealing with complex distur-
bances.
The main conclusion from the findings is that it is primarily the ability to 
solve problems, probably in combination with unsatisfactory availability of 
relevant information and / or communication that lies behind many perfor-
mance problems. This indicates a “blockage” or bottleneck in the communi-
cation or information flow to the decision-makers, and reveals that there is a 
lack in understanding how the system operates or functions.
This finding is significant because it indicates that some Transport Providers 
might have a lack of response flexibility, adaptability, and resilience, which 
could cost them loss in competitiveness and long-term survival.
Key words: Resilience, constraints, bottlenecks, capacity use, reserve capacity, 
quality, coherence, problem solving, capability, customer satisfaction, produc-
tivity, information, communication, decision-making, policy, systems thinking, 
complexity, service industries, service operations, capacity management, sustain-
ability, resource-based competition
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1. Introduction
This study is about the balance between the use of capacity, quality, and 
resource productivity in service industries, and company survival. The 
importance of this is supported by the fact that companies today in general 
are quite short-lived. According to one assessment, the life expectancy of a 
firm is on average only 12.5 years in much of Europe and Japan (de Geus, 
1997).
To illustrate the core of the problem, which are constraints, I have chosen 
to use data from the goods transport industry, since it is a “pure” service 
provider, and also an integrated part in most of the world’s goods flows and 
product supply networks, in other words it has one “leg” in each “world”.
Constraints are the limitations of resources all of us face daily. They are 
the conditions, rules and resource boundaries of our businesses and organi-
zations, society, and our personal lives, that restrict our actions to certain 
domains. They help us to focus, give us opportunities to learn and develop 
deeper knowledge and wisdom, to find solutions to problems, to develop 
skills and capabilities. Rightly understood constraints can be the driver of 
innovation, new opportunities, and business development.
However, constraints can also be planned, and deliberate, such as to test 
something on a small scale, or to keep the price-level up1. But they can also 
be unintended, for example due to bad planning, decisions, design, or other 
inefficiencies. If constraints cause problems and limit progress they are gen-
erally referred to as “bottlenecks” since they can throttle flows. The indica-
tion then is that the situation is unwanted; there is some kind of unplanned 
limitation in the system that is causing a problem, as well as unnecessary 
costs, however, people might not even be aware of why it is there. Neverthe-
less, when we operate too near the limits or even cross over them there are 
consequences, just like breaking rules, laws of the land, or natural laws (like 
gravity). It is on these unintended and violated constraints and their conse-
quences that this thesis is focused.
It is almost a universally accepted axiom that high capacity utilization is eco-
nomical, i.e. that the more waste is eliminated in production, the higher the 
1 A good example of this is when coffee is destroyed in order to keep the world market price of 
coffee up.
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value is for a resource. For example steel industry in Sweden has had an aver-
age capacity utilization rate of 92% for the years 1995-2008, most industries 
are around 90 %, but fluctuations can be up to 97 % (SCB, 2011)2. This 
means that capacity utilization is very high, getting dangerously near the 
ceiling. When natural resources are scarce we learn not to waste the material 
so that as much as possible is coming to use. This makes sense to all of us, 
and is also a basic meaning of “economy”.
But there is a difference between utilizing as much as possible of the available 
resources in order to increase resource productivity, and to find ways to make 
better use of the resources, in other words, to use the resources so that they 
are more valuable and / or more sustainable. The first is the way of “work 
harder” (or faster), the other is the way of “work smarter”. Work harder gen-
erally has a short-term perspective, work smarter a long-term.
There can also be a development, which starts with “work smarter” then at 
some point shifts into “work harder”. One such example is lean production.
The lack of materials was for example one reason why lean management 
was developed by Taichi Ohno and others at Toyota (Hines, Holweg et al., 
2004). However, as factor costs increased the focus in lean has moved from 
using raw materials more efficiently to using the production resources, i.e. 
people and technology,3 more efficiently. A trend has thus been to focus 
on using such production capacity more, i.e. to consider non-value added 
time between processes as waste, in other words to activate the production 
resources more per time unit. It has been noticed, though, that this has 
increased interdependencies, complexity and vulnerabilities in operations 
(e.g. Perrow, 1999; Christopher and Lee, 2004; Peck, 2005; Zsidisin, Ragatz 
et al., 2005), which has not been totally without complications. Slimming 
time buffers between and within processes presupposes that operations can 
be planned, mistakes can be eliminated, in other words that predictability 
can increase by international standardization, and technology development. 
With the perfectly designed system no mistakes need to be made, no failures 
need to occur, and everything will be perfectly predictable.
In the best of worlds!
2 Capacity utilization rate defined as the quota between actual use and maximum capacity.
3 I use the concept technology to represent also other necessary physical resources, such as buildings, 
infrastructure, not just machines and software.
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Combining complexity with predictability is, however, a difficult art. Pre-
dictability implies that the future somehow can be foretold or planned with 
a degree of confidence. Predicting demand accurately is really only possible 
to do in a very stable environment, such as a highly regulated plan economy 
with no influence of competition and innovation.
Some things are easier to plan than others. For example the demand for 
daily, functional, products is generally much more stable than highly inno-
vative and fashion products (Fisher, 1997). Services, though, have even more 
volatile demand than products, which makes planning and capacity man-
agement more difficult (e.g. Armistead and Clark, 1994).
The point here is to illustrate and discuss the difficulty to predict, plan, 
and control in the context of complexity. Sometimes constraints give unin-
tended and unwanted side effects, such as too much inventory in a produc-
tion system, or flooding of a river in an ecosystem or an urban area4. It is 
easy to see why flooding is unwanted, but what about inventories? And what 
about services, what is flooding them?
1.1. Research area
Globalization and competition are drivers for companies to become more 
efficient. Lean thinking in production and distribution has been accepted 
as a management philosophy to enable businesses to adapt their processes 
to the increasing pressures of time and costs, not to mention the pressures 
from stakeholders, such as owners, who want higher dividends, employees, 
who want more pay, and society, which wants more taxes or regulations to 
be enforced. No wonder every stone has to be turned to squeeze out the 
“non-value waste”.
Even in services and the public sector like health care, geriatric wards, and 
schools lean thinking has entered management, and it appears that the main 
focus is on eliminating capacity, not only waste. Efficiency is no doubt 
important, but is high efficiency and optimised yields only measures of a 
healthy enterprise? Is it leading to long-term resilience and future earnings? 
What happens to quality?
4 Urban floods are generally ”manmade” and good examples of constraints and their bad economic 
(and social) consequences. It is common e.g. that drainages have too little capacity, since pipes, 
etc. are not updated when cities expand. See e.g. Gupta and Nair, 2010. 
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1.1.1. Going lean
Two forms of lean can be distinguished. The original “Japanese” form devel-
oped at Toyota, and the Western, Taylor’s Scientific Management (e.g. Hesse 
and Rodrigue, 2004; Hines et al., 2004; Chase and Apte, 2007), which is 
sometimes referred to as “Fordism” (e.g. Hesse and Rodrigue, 2004). Accord-
ing to Hines et al., 2004:1000ff, there has been a development of the lean 
concept from the Tayloristic philosophy of mass production towards a more 
“thinking organization”, however there are also signs that no such develop-
ment really has occurred, the underlying logic is still the same, even though 
the concept of lean is used (e.g. Hesse and Rodrigue, 2004; Hines et al., 
2004; Chase and Apte, 2007; Holweg, 2007).
The Toyota Production system (TPS) came about after the second world 
war as a necessity due to problems with inventories of unsellable cars, labour 
strikes, etc. (Holweg, 2007:421). Taichi Ohno developed ideas about small-
lot production of car engines in the 1940’s, with focus on reducing cost by 
minimising waste (ibid. p. 422). Later on he and others also studied the 
American car industry, and was influenced by some of their methods, but 
developed his own e.g. for swift change-overs of machines to allow low-
volume production and big variety. There was a clear quality focus in Ohno’s 
thinking5, which even started to influence Western productivity focused 
thinking in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. However, since then Western form 
appears to have returned to an underlying focus of productivity and mass-
production which thinking also has spread into service sectors (Hines et al., 
2004; Chase and Apte, 2007; Holweg, 2007).
1.1.1.1. Lean in services
Such companies as Walt Disney, Reader’ Digest, and McDonald’s have suc-
cessfully applied Taylor’s scientific management according to Chase and 
Apte, 2007. For example in the McDonald’s6 case the formula has been 
heavy standardization, process simplification, and control:
5 Inspired by Deming, who “targeted wasteful variation associated with non-conformance, reliability 
and inflexibility under the umbrella of continuous improvement” according to Stratton and War-
burton, 2006:669f.
6 There are those who mean the fast food industry like McDonalds maybe should not be classified 
as ”service”, since it actually operates with an inventory chain (push strategy), i.e. it is more like a 
manufacturing company, e.g. Anderson, Morrice et al., 2005.
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“Application of scientific management to every aspect of restaurant opera-
tion was the key factor underlying McDonald’s success. The main principles 
embodied in McDonald’s operation include: (1) standardizing and reducing 
the variety of products; (2) simplification, standardization and automation 
of processes so that workers with limited skills and training can reliably pro-
duce quality products and deliver high quality service; (3) monitoring and 
control of process performance. McDonald’s arguably exhibits better appli-
cations of Industrial Engineering to a greater degree than do many manufac-
turers.” (p 377f.)
Chase’s classification system of services according to the type of contact the 
service Provider and customer has, from low contact (self service) to high 
face-to- face, totally customized service (Chase, 1978; Jacobs and Chase, 
2008), is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure	1:	Degree	of	customer	/	server	contact	and	customization	
of	service.7
This model explains some of the quandary of interacting with customers 
and productivity (efficiency). High degree of standardization (such as auto-
mation) makes high productivity possible (assuming there are no dysfunc-
tions, breakdown of the system, etc.), whereas when there are services with 
face-to-face interactions and high degree of customization, reserve capacity 
7 After Jacobs & Chase 2008.
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is necessary since service time can vary. Jacobs and Chase, 2008, mention 
McDonald’s as an example of face-to face interaction with tight specs.
Chase and Apte, 2007, talk about “poka-yoke”8, fail-safe methods to avoid 
human error (p. 381). This is however mostly only applicable to simpler 
standardized tasks, not complex (p. 383).
“…the early applications of scientific management were not as successful in 
services as in manufacturing. Today, however, a number of service industries, 
from the customer contact factories of the call centers to the managed care 
organizations in the healthcare services, are well positioned to apply the prin-
ciples of scientific management (Head, 2003). The main difference now, of 
course, is the power of modern information technology. …The factor that 
limits the extent of service rationalization is the variation inherent in the 
human interactions, a hallmark of the service processes.” (p. 382)
So in their opinion “Fordism” had been made possible in the service indus-
tries due to the IT-development, on the other hand, development is still 
limited by the need for human interactions.
1.1.1.2. Lean in logistics
Hesse and Rodrigue, 2004, mean it is Taylor’s “Fordism” that is the model 
for modern logistics principles (p. 174). This is in a sense natural since in the 
past materials’ management and manufacturing mainly took place in local 
factories and regionally (Harrison and van Hoek, 2008), whereas in recent 
decades global production and distribution has increased the importance of 
geographical and temporal aspects of logistics in international transport in 
coordinating supply networks (Hesse and Rodrigue, 2004).
Goods transport services can of course be very varied, some are quite stand-
ardized, while others are totally customized. When volumes get big enough a 
certain amount of standardization can be done. With a number of customers 
and a large variation of shipments (sizes of shipments, different destinations, 
different products) one could safely say that most industrial shipments have 
a fairly high degree of customization. Some of the operative, face-to-face 
interaction, though, is automated by e.g. barcodes, EDI or Internet. As can 
be seen from Figure 1 the other trade-off of business opportunities decreases 
the more the degree of automation increases. This means that there is a risk 
that too much automation can lead to that companies get more distanced 
8 Japanese for ”mistake proofing” according to Wikipedia.
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from the customers, and thus miss chances for more business and possibly 
also pick up less cues about the customers’ opinions of the performance.
1.1.2. The need to be flexible
At the other end of the spectrum is the increasing demand for higher quality 
and time-dependent service, which could be one way of improving or keep-
ing competitive advantage, e.g. since it can cause delays, loss and damages, 
and extra process costs to customers (Morash and Clinton, 1997:7). How-
ever, according to Mentzer, deWitt et al., 2001, it is primarily a matter of 
more skill and flexibility, at the same time as it is a requirement:
“…companies in particular and supply chains in general compete more 
today on the basis of time and quality. Getting a defect-free product to the 
customer faster and more reliably than the competition is no longer seen 
as a competitive advantage, but simply a requirement to be in the market. 
Customers are demanding products consistently delivered faster, exactly on 
time, and with no damage. Each of these necessitates closer coordination 
with suppliers and distributors. This global orientation and increased per-
formance-based competition, combined with rapidly changing technology 
and economic conditions, all contribute to marketplace uncertainty. This 
uncertainty requires greater flexibility on the part of individual companies 
and supply chains, which in turn demands more flexibility in supply chain 
relationships.” (p. 2)
So how can these two extremes, the lean view of maximising the utilization 
of resources and standardization, i.e. a minimum of flexibility, and the agile 
view of customization and maximum flexibility, be reconciled?
1.2. The research question
From the above can be seen an apparent contradiction in the development 
of management in some industry sectors, such as goods transport services, 
where demand, on the one hand, increases pressure for more flexibility and 
time-constrained service, and on the other, increases pressure for leaner 
operations and lower costs.
Short term a service company in a competitive market could be up against 
such dilemmas. Long term such a company (or any company) also has to 
tackle disturbances and change. To do that resilience is needed, i.e. capacity 
to respond and to adapt to major changes.
22
Lean thinking seems to be a major driver in the development of the trans-
port industry, e.g. the concentration of fewer and bigger actors, both on the 
forwarding business level, and on the haulier business level9.
What we are looking at is an allocation problem of matching service capac-
ity with demand. Service demand is in general often hard to predict, reasons 
for that will be discussed in chapter 8 and 9. What long-term consequences 
have for example a lean strategy of maximising the use of capacity of produc-
tion resources (people and technical resources)? How does the short-term 
matching of demand and supply capacity affect the long-term development 
of resilience so that the company does not lose its competitive advantage 
over time?
  A relevant research question for this thesis is thus:
  In what way does high capacity utilization affect the development 
of long-term resilience and competitive advantage of a service com-
pany?
To answer this question I use and discuss primary data from two studies 
I have performed or been involved in, and literature. These studies were 
focused on Transport Buyers’ view on Transport Providers’ performance and 
capabilities10.
To “operationalize” the research question, which covers a lot of ground, I 
also want to formulate four sub-questions:
	 •	 How	do	Transport	Buyers’	pressures	affect	the	quality	of	service	Pro-
viders’ performance?
	 •		 How	can	constraints	of	the	service	Providers’	capabilities	/	resources	
explain performance quality problems?
  These two questions will be answered in the empirical section through 
the analysis of data. The following two I reserve for the discussion:
	 •		 Why	are	failure	rates	so	high	for	Transport	Providers?
	 •		 Why	are	Buyers	not	satisfied	with	Providers’	capabilities?
9 Bigger forwarders often subcontract hauliers to perform the actual transport, in other words the 
forwarder sells the door-to-door transport to the Transport Buyer, then hauliers carry out the actu-
al shipment. More about this in section 8.2. In this study it is the company that does the business 
transaction with the Transport Buyer that is called ”Transport Provider”. 
10 Definitions of Transport Buyer and Transport Provider is in Appendix 1.
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1.3. The purpose of the study
As implied above, lean thinking has had a momentous influence on how 
companies are managed, and short-term acting. However, despite its under-
lying sound principle of not wasting resources, there are signs that bottle-
necks easily form if there is too much “leaning”, which can have long-term 
consequences, such as quality problems, and deteriorating flexibility e.g. 
when disruptions occur (Zsidisin et al., 2005).
One reason for the concern with this development and influence of lean 
thinking and application in supply chain networks has been, according to 
Hines et al., 2004, the almost complete lack of strategic perspective in the 
discussion (p. 998ff). Focus for lean programmes and management princi-
ples’ discussion have been on the application of a number of tools and tech-
niques in shop-floor situations (ibid p. 1000), not on the strategic implica-
tions for the companies in the supply network.
Another aspect, argued by e.g. Leitch, 2001; Anderson et al., 2005, is that 
most research of lean principles and matching problems has been done on 
manufacturing companies with “push”-strategies, and same management 
principles are recommended for and applied in the service sector, even 
though their situation and “operational logic” usually is totally different.
Also in capacity research on services, especially with the effects on quality, 
not much research has been done (e.g. Armistead and Clark, 1994; Akker-
mans and Vos, 2003; Chase and Apte, 2007).
Constraints, as mentioned above, can be both good and bad. By looking at 
the bad, the failures, one can often learn something about the good. My pur-
pose with this study is thus to illustrate and discuss unwanted or unintended 
constraints in a service industry in the light of a dominating and somewhat 
misapplied management trend that is likely to affect the long-term develop-
ment of capabilities, resilience, and competitiveness negatively.
 More specifically, the purpose of this thesis is
 1)  to illustrate and discuss the consequences of operationally con-
strained capacity, commonly called “bottlenecks”, in a service indus-
try,
 2)  to discuss the relationship between the utilization of capacity and the 
quality of the service performance,
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 3)  to discuss a plausible relationship between constraints and resilience 
in the context of complex service operations, such as transport ser-
vices.
1.4. Some limits
Much of the data is from a cross-sectional study of Transport Buyers’ atti-
tudes. This obviously limits the interpretation of the data compared to a lon-
gitudinal study, where changes can be observed directly in the data, however 
extensive studies like the present can also be difficult to repeat, since they are 
time consuming for the respondents.
Another limitation is the selection of respondents. Primarily, respondents 
were the ones responsible for the purchasing of the transport solution, such 
as logistics, transport, distribution, or procurement chiefs. Most of these 
people were in some operative management position. Of course sometimes, 
e.g. in bigger international companies, the transport solution might be influ-
enced or decided also by others, e.g. the leadership group, and with different 
criteria, e.g. financial indicators, like cost, ROI, etc., however in this study 
that perspective was not possible to include.
There are obviously always limits to how much data can be retrieved, and 
what is necessary. The data for example contain some important aspects of 
flexibility, e.g. quality fluctuations, volume fluctuations, time flexibility. 
However, flexibility is a big subject, and there has been no attempt or possi-
bility to cover everything, e.g. concerning employees’ skill, their availability, 
and information quality. The same goes for collaboration in the dyad. It is 
also covered by two questions, and obviously there are nuances that will not 
be covered.
Another limitation is about the interpretation of the data. The findings only 
represent the Transport Buyers’ perceptions and opinions of the goods trans-
port industry. The bottlenecks found affecting certain industries could be 
located within the transport industry, but they could also partly be situated 
in the Transport Buying industry (or with the Receiver of the goods), since 
there are interactions involved. It is not possible to establish the exact loca-
tion of the bottleneck since several actors are involved. That is a question for 
further research.
Not all categories of services are the same, as will be shown. However, in 
chapter 8 and 9 my intention is to lift the discussion from debating specific 
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findings in the transport industry (which is used to show that the problem 
can be detected, a testing of the Theory of Constraints), to discussing the 
phenomena constraints and resilience in a broader context of service indus-
tries. This does not mean that all the conclusions are applicable to all kinds 
of service industries. The conceptual constraint – resilience framework mod-
elled in chapter 9 is also based on sources in the literature (discussed in chap-
ter 8 and 9), and has to be tested empirically for different types of industries.
1.5. Thesis structure
This study is divided into four parts:
PART 1 Background
The problem is introduced in the context of the dominating manage-
ment practice. The theoretical frame and the method for the study are 
presented.
	 •		 In	chapter 1 the subject of what the link is between constraints 
and resilience, and how this affects a company’s long-term devel-
opment and survival, is introduced. In this thesis the goods trans-
port service industry is the research area, and the Transport Buyers’ 
assessments of the Transport Providers’ capabilities the object of 
the study.
	 •		 In	chapter 2 relevant theories and concepts are presented. I start 
off with contextual theories of competitive advantage and service 
categories. The main focus of this chapter is on how capacity is 
used, its limitations, and a short introduction of the resilience con-
cept.
	 •		 In	chapter 3 the method I have been using is described in detail: 
Interviews and an extensive survey to goods’ transport service 
Buyers.
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PART 2 Observations
In this part the results of the data analysis are presented:
factors from the factor analysis, and an effect analysis to find signs of 
constraints.
	 •		 Chapter 5 and 6 present the main findings of the data analysis.
	 •		 In	chapters 4 - 6 I present some contextual data, then the factors 
from the “Principal Component Analysis”. The analysis of con-
straints is done in two steps:
 1)  31 questions to the transport Buyers are reduced to nine factors.
 In section 5.3. these factors are reduced further to five “grouped factors” 
representing capabilities (Shipping Capacity, Ability to solve prob-
lems, Information & Communication System, On-time delivery, and 
Financial factor) sorted into three main categories (people-focused, 
technical, and financial). There is also a factor representing the Trans-
port Buyer’s Overall Satisfaction. Levels of actual error rates (customer 
statistics of shipments “not on time” and damages) are also analysed.
 2) The grouped factors, pressures, and performance data are analysed 
together in an effect analysis (partial least square) to find constraints. 
In chapter 6 the main findings from that analysis is presented.
 These findings are the signs of failures and bottlenecks (i.e. “bad” con-
straints).
 PART 3 Discussion
The purpose of the discussion is to answer the research question in the 
light of the assumptions. The discussion is lifted by Allison’s decision 
perspective theory to focus on the relationship between constraints and 
resilience as a resource allocation problem affecting the capability to 
process information and to communicate. A conceptual framework is 
proposed. This explains the relationship between constraints and resi-
lience as a learning and adaption process to change.
	 •		 In	chapter 7 the research model is derived. This is developed fur-
ther in chapter 9 into a constraints-resilience model.
	 •		 In	chapter 8 the stage is set by describing the Buyer’s and the Pro-
vider’s perspectives and their interaction. The matching of demand 
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and service capacity is a crucial process in all enterprises, and espe-
cially in service industries, since they operate with special logic.
	 •		 In	chapter 9 some important concepts, which affect the quality of 
information (i.e. the level of uncertainty) are discussed: the role of 
information, communication, decision rules. Findings are inter-
preted and discussed in the context of information quality and 
problem-solving ability.
 A conceptual framework of constraints – resilience is derived from the 
findings and literature. The forming of resilience is modelled as a long-
term learning- and adaptionprocess integrated in the resource-generat-
ing production process. Four important principles and prerequisites of 
the learning process are discussed.
 This explains the relationship between information quality, con-
straints, and resilience. It also explains how constraints, and resilience 
are formed — maybe even more important, how resilience can be 
destroyed. This is one of the contributions in this research.
PART 4 Conclusions
This part concludes the study and initiates new.
The main conclusions in chapter 10 is that bottlenecks are primarily 
located in the Information & Communication System, which in accordance 
with the Theory of Constraints, affects the Ability to solve problems, On-
time delivery, and the Transport Buyers’ Overall Satisfaction.
 •  Chapter 10 and 11:
 The main conclusion from the findings is that it is primarily the ability 
to solve problems, probably in combination with unsatisfactory availa-
bility of relevant information and / or communication that lies behind 
many performance problems. This indicates a “blockage” or bottleneck 
in the communication or information flow to the decision-makers, 
and reveals that there is a lack in understanding how the system oper-
ates or functions.
 Reserve capacity is not waste, but a Quality Protecting Zone, which 
aims to constrain the company from eroding the performance quality, 
and it is a prerequisite for the forming of resilience.
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 The importance of this finding, consequences, and implications for 
practitioners and for future research is discussed. Especially the con-
straints – resilience framework, the CORE- learning model, needs to 
be tested empirically. A number of possible research tracks are sug-
gested.
	 •		 A	summary of this thesis is available on request separately in Saxin, 
2013.
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2. Capacity and its use
In this chapter I will describe the main theoretical underpinnings and per-
spectives on the relationship between the utilization of capacity and quality 
in services.
My intention with this research is to contribute to the understanding of the 
relationship and interactions between constraints, performance and qual-
ity in complex service organizations in supply networks. Much operative 
research has focused on increasing productivity and reducing waste and lead-
time in manufacturing supply chains. But does that lead to resilience, com-
petitiveness and long-term survival?
Services are often analysed using the same logic as goods flow chains. There 
is research, though, showing that their dynamics are different (e.g. Akker-
mans and Vos, 2003; Anderson et al., 2005). In both cases, however, there 
are clear effects on the quality of the operations and in fact often also on the 
overall productivity. The Theory of Constraints is addressing especially the 
latter problem: focus on productivity often leads to local optimisation (sub 
optimisation) of performance, but losses in other parts of the chain (Gold-
ratt and Fox, 1986; Goldratt, 1990; Sterman, 2000). But maybe more seri-
ous and subtle is that focus on cost and productivity also can lead to not only 
short-term improvements but also long-term erosion of quality, capabilities, 
and resilience (e.g. Oliva, 2001; Repenning and Sterman, 2002; Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007).
Goldratt, 1990, based much of his theory on the Toyota Production System 
(TPS) form of lean management, developed by among others Taiichi Ohno 
(Goldratt and Fox, 1986; Stratton and Warburton, 2006; Holweg, 2007). 
Ohno in turn was heavily influenced by Deming’s quality thinking (Strat-
ton and Warburton, 2006:669). The bad effects of (unintended) constraints 
on the productivity, or throughput, and indirectly on a company’s ability to 
compete, are the focus of the Theory of Constraints. That the effect of con-
straints in product supply chains could be inventories is easy to see, but in 
services inventories are not present, except as “Work-in-process” and queues 
of customers. Sometimes this is referred to as backlogs and workload (or 
work pressure). The choice of literature is therefore in the area of the inter-
action and operative application of resources, above all capacity utilization, 
and the effect on service quality. Both in services and manufacturing human 
capacity, in the form of work-hours and skills, are inputs. Research show that 
especially in service processes the capacity is sensitive to constraints, and this 
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is connected to the workload. Research covering workload or work pressure, 
and effects on service quality as well as long-term capability are therefore 
included in the theoretical frame.
The data in this study is from the transport service sector, thus from a sector 
that is both capital and labour intensive. Services can, however, differ widely, 
as can manufacturing, depending on the industry. Thus selling insurance 
is obviously quite a different process from doing maintenance in an oil 
refinery, or transporting goods. However, with a systems’ perspective it is 
easier to analyse the connection between the structure and the behaviour of 
the system, thus drawing more general conclusions. Service categories also 
change over time, e.g. from having been customized to become more or less 
standardized and automated (e.g. Schmenner, 2004; Chase and Apte, 2007). 
An example of this is bank service, which has gone from over-the-counter 
service to self-service in automats or internet-payments. Also in goods trans-
port the same development is obvious, e.g. track-and-trace information can 
be retrieved directly by the customer via internet instead of phoning the 
transport company, the customer packs and ships a whole container instead 
of a number of separate pallets at different occasions. There is also the oppo-
site development with just-in-time (JIT) shipments, instead of shipping a 
whole container, the customers want frequent deliveries of small quantities 
and third party logistics (3 PL) arrangements where the Transport Provider 
provides additional services. The point here is that the strategic choice of 
operative structure, how services are to be carried out, also affects how capa-
bilities develop over longer periods of time.
2.1. Competitive advantage
Pressures from customers and stakeholders arise due to competition. Porter, 
1980, emphasised that it is the competitive forces on an industry level and 
the strategies and actions planned by managers that decide market positions 
of companies (Teece, Pisano et al., 1997:511). This is a theory of competing 
or rivalling for resources by outfoxing opponents. The market strategies to 
create competitive advantage are either to make things or service the same 
as others, but as cheaply as possible, i.e. to have a cost advantage, or else do 
things that differ from others, i.e. differentiation.
Another view on how to achieve competitive advantage is the resource-based, 
which is a firm-level strategic theory, that it is the firm’s available resources 
or assets coupled with its capability that is the foundation for growth (Hunt 
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and Morgan, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Penrose, 2003). Thus the essence of 
a resource-based view is that competitive strength comes from within the 
companies, how resources are used and combined, and how knowledge and 
skills are formed and developed. This model is more focused on creating 
advantage by operative competence and strategic cooperation in ways that 
build products and services so they have “unique properties”, i.e. they will 
be difficult to copy.
According to Teece et al., 1997:516:
“End products are the final goods and services produced by the firm based on 
utilizing the competences that it possesses. The performance (price, quality, 
etc.) of a firm’s products relative to its competitors at any point in time will 
depend upon its competences (which over time depend on its capabilities).”
Capabilities are, according to Day, 1994:38:
“…complex bundles of skills and accumulated knowledge, exercised through 
organizational processes, that enable firms to coordinate activities and make 
use of their assets”
So companies need to have and develop certain strengths and be aware of or 
eliminate weaknesses. In Porter’s (1991) competitive forces’ view some assets 
are to be important, but “secondary” to managers’ strategic skills and abili-
ties to position their companies on the market. In that view resources are 
“homogeneous”, i.e. not changing, but are interchangeable11, whereas in the 
resource-based view they are considered “heterogeneous”, they have different 
value depending on how they are e.g. combined.
Gadde, Håkansson et al., 2002, (p. 85):
“Therefore, business relationships promote innovation, as does the interac-
tion of different types of resource elements (Gadde and Håkansson, 2001). 
Accordingly, resources can be regarded as results of economic processes and 
not just as conditions for them. This view is in contrast with classical microe-
conomic models in which resources are perceived as givens. In our view there 
is much to be gained from a perspective on logistics where it is considered 
that resources might be provided with new economic features. Thus, we have 
to start from the assumption that the economic processes in which they are 
involved affect resources.”
11 Like spare parts. 
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So the performance and the capability of a firm are considered to be built 
up interactively over time as skill and knowledge increase the competence. 
These are the active, added resources of a company. As skill and knowledge 
increase, capabilities are sustained or improved. If they are not, then capa-
bilities will erode, for example by neglecting maintenance, training, and / or 
development.
But capability is not just about handling the present situation, but creating 
some kind of sustainability and future of a firm. In the words of Mentzer, 
Min et al., 2004, for logistics operations:
“Schumpeter (1950) theorized that firms are seekers of new ways of compet-
ing and, thus, should focus on market dynamics. Schumpeter further argued 
that competition based upon innovation is more effective than price-based 
competition. In logistics, for example, postponement (the extent to which 
production and distribution are delayed to add options or differentiate the 
product as close as possible to when customer purchases the product) is an 
innovative approach in which firms achieve not only cost reduction but also 
product customization (Waller et al., 2000). From the Schumpeterian view, 
distinctive logistics capabilities based upon organizational learning emerge as 
valuable factors in the development of customer-oriented corporate strate-
gies aimed at obtaining sustainable competitive advantage through creating 
customer value.”
2.2. Categories of service
Central in services is what degree of contact there is between personnel and 
customer in carrying out the service (Chase, 1978; Lovelock, 1983). As 
described above, Chase’s classification system (Jacobs and Chase, 2008:110, 
see Figure 1 above), describe the balance between standardization and cus-
tomization. It obviously depends on the nature of services if automation 
is going to be possible, but often some kind of mixture is present, i.e. the 
customers do a part of the work of the service delivery themselves. The factor 
costs (wage level for the employees and the cost of automation respectively) 
are obvious drivers, as well as the prospects of increasing productivity, and 
increasing capacity e.g. by being more available to customers (Schmenner, 
2004).
The goal for the service company is to simplify operations by higher degree 
of standardization. This strategy has a productivity-focus, whereas more cus-
tomization requires more human involvement and more time consumption 
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and tying up of resources. On the other hand, as Figure 1 shows, more 
personal customer contact also gives better chances for sales and building 
relationships.
For services (as well as in manufacturing) there is, according to Schmenner, 
2004, a clear trend towards increasing standardization with movement from 
the “Professional service” corner towards the “Service factory” corner, with 
lower labour intensity, lower throughput time, and less customer contact. 
Schmenner, 1986, places “trucking” fairly far up in the “service factory” area, 
with little customer contact, and fairly low labour intensity. In the revised 
and developed diagram with more of a process view12 (ibid. p. 342), truck-
ing is split up in “ground service trucking”, placed in the “Mass service” 
category (medium or high lead-time, i.e. slower), and “Express service truck-
ing” (low lead-time) in the “Service factory” category. The Express services 
are generally speaking more capital intensive than Ground services in truck-
ing (p. 341).
Armistead and Clark, 1994, describe operational focus by a model based 
on previous research, Figure 2. Here customer contact and degree of stand-
ardization illustrated in Figure 1, is combined with the dimension of value 
creation. Where in the service process is the value created for the customer 
(seen from the customer’s perspective)?
Figure	2:	Circled	is	the	operational	domain	for	transport	service	
delivery	based	on	the	degree	of	interaction	with	the	customers.13
12 Relative throughput time.
13 After Armistead and Clark, 1994:13.
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Simple transport services that are highly standardized (e.g. transport from 
A to B, time table) are thus largely operations driven. This could maybe 
be described as “mass service”. However, if the operational focus is more 
customized, e.g. by time constraints, or some kind of flexible arrangement, 
it becomes more front to back room driven. This means that the higher 
logistical content of the service, the more complex and “niched” a service is, 
the more crucial is the interaction with the customer, and the more skill is 
required by the staff. The “front office” (staff in direct contact with the cus-
tomer) e.g. are important to manage the customer’s expectation (Armistead 
and Clark, 1994:14), but they also need to be updated with the status of the 
“back room” (which the customer does not see).
2.3. Resources and activities
Mentzer et al., 2001 define a supply chain the following way (p. 4):
“… a set of three or more entities (organizations or individuals) directly 
involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
finances, and/or information from a source to a customer.”
In this thesis I focus the discussion to apply to companies in interdependent 
arrangements, as suppliers and customers, but the context is a supply net-
work. As Lambert, Cooper et al., 1998, point out, not all supply chains are 
strictly separated. There can be links to “non-members” in the supply chain, 
i.e. influence from one supply chain to another, e.g. a supplier can also sell 
to customers that are competitors in different supply chains. They describe 
this as a network structure in supply chains. The activities of transport ser-
vices (the shipments from suppliers to their customers) tie different actors 
and resources together in different supply chains; a supply chain network 
perspective is therefore appropriate to describe such business relationships. 
A point of significance in this context is that the network structure can thus 
affect e.g. exchange of information. Especially since the Transport Provider 
could serve competitors it could result in communication constraints in 
these supply chains.
Actors use resources in interactions, and these activities form the processes 
and performances of production or service. The view on resources and activi-
ties in logistics research has shifted over the years (Jahre, Gadde et al., 2006), 
from resources considered to be the foundations of the activities within a 
firm (ibid p. 34), to almost a total focus on the activity dimensions, involv-
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ing actors in the whole supply chain (ibid. p. 39f ). Activity focus is espe-
cially the case of the process-oriented view of lean production. In that view 
“the main task of resourcing is the more or less predetermined utilization 
of a resource in the context of a particular supply chain.” (ibid. p. 40), i.e. 
resources are “givens” or “homogeneous”.
Jahre et al., 2006, argue that resources can be coordinated in different ways, 
and thus the use of them can yield different results (p. 38f ). They mean that 
a resource-focused view is important because it can provide opportunities of 
joint benefits e.g. by combing resources in innovative or new ways (p. 44), 
be “facilities of value rather than facilitators of operations” (ibid. p. 36).
This has been shown also empirically for companies of various sizes (Jahre et 
al., 2006; Gadde and Håkansson, 2008; Skarp and Gadde, 2008; Jansson, 
2012).
From a resource-based point of view there are really only a few generic com-
ponents that are needed to describe a business. For example Polesie, 1995, 
uses a square-model in financial analysis of a company’s resource side, its 
financing, and its production side, how the money is used. Jansson and 
Polesie, 2011, and Jansson, 2012, also show that even three dimensions 
can give a good understanding of the basic resource groups, their flows and 
relationships in a business. These dimensions are labelled subjects, objects, 
and finance. Objects can be network relationships, business units, facto-
ries, machines, trucks, and computers. Subjects are people. In this thesis 
I will make this distinction of “resources”, i.e. the objects or the technical 
and network facilities represent “shipping capacity”, and the subjects are the 
people-dependent factors. There are also different understandings that can 
be enhanced by applying different perspectives, such as political or informa-
tional dimensions (Allison, 1971).
A lean view on the use of capacity
In lean thinking excess inventory buffers are considered waste and are there-
fore targeted, and that is no difference to the Theory of Constraints view 
(e.g. Stratton and Warburton, 2003; Hines et al., 2004). Inventory buffers 
are, though, sometimes necessary for service level reasons, especially when 
demand fluctuates. According to Stratton and Warburton, 2003:184-185 
there are only three ways to protect a flow in a supply chain from the impacts 
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of demand fluctuation: level scheduling14, protective inventory and protec-
tive capacity. The last option, they mean, has traditionally been avoided in 
volume manufacturing such as lean.
According to Mason, Lalwani et al., 2007:193:
“Where spare capacity in those assets exists on a value stream the ideal from 
a lean perspective would be to stabilise demand and right size the assets 
accordingly (Womack and Jones, 1996)”
In other words capacity is to be trimmed or cut down to fit the flow, with 
level scheduling. In lean, idle capacity is considered waste according to Moore 
and Scheinkopf, 1998:28. They point out the underlying lean philosophy 
of “everything-works-or-nothing-works” (quoted from Womack and Jones, 
1996), which simply means that everything and everyone works, however it 
requires e.g. cross-trained workers, machinery that is 100 % available, and 
accuracy, etc. (Moore and Scheinkopf, 1998:28). According to this cost-
focused view “less is more” (Jahre et al., 2006:36), i.e. the more resources 
(including people) are utilized, the better.
This view has led to that companies in reality slim not only excess capacity 
but also reserve capacity, e.g. due to financial constraints (Oliva and Ster-
man, 2010:350).
2.4. The Theory of Constraints
A constraint should in this thesis be interpreted as a limiting consequence 
of an unintended or intended action15. The limitation can be beneficial 
and developing (such as giving a direction, or enabling focusing on skill 
improvement in a certain speciality or niche), or it can be potentially harm-
ful (bottleneck or obstruction), which also appears to be the meaning of in 
the Theory of Constraints, as shall be shown.
14 Level scheduling or “uniform plant loading” (Japanese heijunka) is to try to stabilise production 
planning and revising plans close to production, so that it will be evenly spread during a certain 
time period, see e.g. Harrison and van Hoek, 2008; Jacobs and Chase, 2008.
15 An unintended action is when an action that is supposed to give certain intended effect also have 
counteracting (unintended, not foreseen) effects. An intended action could also cause a constraint, 
e.g. if someone is intentionally blocking or sabotaging a certain decision with the intention to 
harm the organization. 
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The essence of the Theory of Constraints is that something limits the flow 
(“Throughput”) of the system in relationship to its goal (Goldratt, 1990), 
i.e. some kind of “bottleneck” is restricting or even hurting the flow. So the 
constraint is a limitation of the capacity in a system. However, Goldratt 
starts out his book (Goldratt, 1990) saying: “The message of this book is not 
bottlenecks or cutting batches” (p. 3). The (implicit) reason for this state-
ment is thus most likely that people, including professors in business schools, 
company leaders, managers, and business consultants think the Theory of 
Constraints is about increasing capacity (which often means hiring more 
labour) by increasing financial investment and cost. Goldratt’s main mes-
sage is that it is not always the human and technical capacity, such as the 
number of people (“work-hours”) and the production capacity of machines 
that limit the throughput (i.e. the flow or the product volume per time unit) 
but other things in the organization, such as emotional resistance to change, 
bad managerial models and policies. Therefore, he gives his definition of a 
system’s constraint as (p. 4):
“…anything that limits a system from achieving a higher performance versus 
its goal”
In other words, what Goldratt is saying is that a constraint definitely is a 
bottleneck of a flow. However it is not always caused by a lack of technical 
resources or human capacity (labour-hours). Thus it does not automatically 
mean increased cost to do something about improving operations, so that 
the Throughput and (thereby the productivity) will increase. However, it 
practically always means that people in the organization need more insight 
and knowledge on how the system actually works. Goldratt seems to be 
inspired by some or all of Deming’s 14 points (Deming, 1986; Bergman 
and Klefsjö, 1990; Stratton and Warburton, 2006), and the so-called PDCA 
cycle (problem solving cycle, see e.g. Bergman and Klefsjö, 1990) and the 
TPS lean principles (see e.g. Jacobs and Chase, 2008, ch. 9).
Goldratt uses cost accounting terminology in discussing efficiency and flow 
(Goldratt and Fox, 1986; Goldratt, 1990), however the theory is more about 
logistics and operative management. He defines the term “Throughput” as 
“sales” (i.e. volume of sold products per time unit, expressed in monetary 
units)16, Inventory as “assets” (means both Work-in-process, stocks of raw 
16 This definition means that ”Throughput” in Goldratt’s view is to be understood as ”actual 
demand” (i.e. what has been ordered and delivered and payment has been made), since he also 
assumes ”kanban” (make-to-order). In reality this definition can cause problems, since customers 
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materials or components, finished goods, and equipment, buildings etc. 
needed for the production processes), and Operative Expense (salaries and 
other costs for sold products). Goldratt is highly critical of classical Cost 
Accounting, and also means that the concept “cost” is ambiguous and being 
used to mean different things: purchasing price, operative expense, and 
product cost (Goldratt, 1990:49). As an example of the influence from cost 
accounting on the operative supply and production design decision he uses 
the batch size problem (ibid). Batch size, as order quantity, is in operative 
management often calculated as a trade-off between storage cost and set-up 
cost17. Some kind of internal cost distribution model is used to calculate the 
cost of work time, etc.18. Goldratt means this optimisation is not based on 
how the system actually works operationally, and means furthermore that 
this is a cause for excess Inventory and thereby slowing down Throughput, 
in other words it actually decreases the productivity of the whole system. 
Goldratt, 1990, qualifies this (p. 49f ): If there is a bottleneck situation 
”…in such a situation, the impact of doing an additional setup would not be an 
increase in Operating Expense, but rather a more devastating effect, a decrease 
in Throughput.”
Taking time in that situation would mean stopping up the flow while setting 
up e.g. a machine an extra time. The constraint decides the rate of produc-
tion (“drum”19), and anything that disturbs the flow of course slows the 
flow even more. This means that, as delay (or lead-time) increases20, thus 
throughput decreases. However, if there is a kanban21-system, it is not inven-
tory that piles up but the backlog of orders.
sometimes order but then cancel. Notice that ”throughput” in an operative sense and in this thesis 
is to be understood as output from a system or a process (whether it is a phantom order or not). If 
it is a ”push” system, which produces to plan, readymade products are stored in a finished goods 
inventory, waiting for the demand. 
17 Set-up and break-down time that it takes to switch when a variety of products are going to be pro-
duced in the same machine. In transport this is equivalent to getting loading equipment changed, 
e.g. different types of trailers.
18 For example calculated with ABC (activity-based costing) or similar cost distribution model.
19 Goldratt calls an analogy or metaphor of marching soldiers (of different abilities) to illustrate the 
underlying logic of the TPS, and calls the technique drum-buffer-rope. The constraint represents 
the ”drum” which indicates the pace for which the material or components were to be introduced 
(expedited) into production. A ”rope” ties the ”drum” to the entering station in a manufacturing 
chain. A ”rope” is in other words an information feedback or communication, and the drum + 
rope system is a kanban-system. The buffer is extra capacity that can be placed in front of the 
constraint to eliminate it.
20 By Little’s law, see section 2.5.
21 See footnote 19.
39
And, Goldratt continues, “let’s assume…none of the resources involved in the 
setup is a bottleneck. In such a case, the impact of doing an additional setup on 
Operating Expense is basically zero.”
The logic of this is that the resources are there anyway (unless the setup takes 
a long time so that a bottleneck is formed meanwhile).
The main purposes of the Theory of Constraints are thus to
 1.  Improve the total flow through the system (“Throughput”), not just 
for local processes, by finding and eliminating bottlenecks
 2.  Promote and encourage learning and knowledge formation
 3.  Develop and support a culture of continuous improvement (i.e. a 
profound ability to solve problems and develop the business)
So Throughput is the primary according to the Theory of Constraints. 
Throughput is limited and also decided, actually dictated, by the system’s 
constraints. It is therefore the Throughput that primarily should be bal-
anced, not the capacity (Goldratt and Fox, 1986). What Goldratt means is 
that it is not the capacity in the production chain that should be trimmed 
(i.e. that the reserve capacity would be taken away), but the flow that is to 
be adjusted. If there is a constraint, it is that constraint that should be elimi-
nated instead, i.e. be given extra capacity. The obstacle is to be removed.
Goldratt thus has a holistic approach and advocates a global perspective in 
finding and dealing with constraints in the flow (Goldratt and Cox, 1989).
Since it is the constraint that “dictates” the rate of the flow through the 
entire system, there is no point, according to Goldratt, in optimising non-
constraints, which unfortunately sometimes happens. On the contrary, 
increasing capacity utilization at non-constraints only increases Work-in-
process (inventory), which clutters the whole system even more i.e. it creates 
waste, increases lead-time, and lowers throughput22. On the other hand, to 
cut down “slack” capacity of non-constraints without trying to find, analyse 
and eliminate the real constraints could be a recipe for stagnation or even a 
“death-spiral” (Goldratt, 1990; Oliva and Sterman, 2010) of the company. 
Also that is unfortunately common management philosophy (ibid).
22 I here use the term ”throughput” from an operative, logistical flow perspective, in the systemic 
way, according to Little’s law, see e.g. Sterman, 2000.
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Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints was mainly focused on manufacturing 
when it started off in the 1980’s. Thus many of the processes and applica-
tions are for the shop-floor and within a company. This is in line with lean 
management. Also the “Japanese” form, TPS, was originally mostly applica-
ble to the shop floor (Hines et al., 2004). The application to supply chains 
has since then been somewhat developed.
The constraint is in other words a balancing or goal-seeking process that can 
explain the operative inertia in such a system (Sterman, 2000). Sometimes 
an upper limit of production is a goal, however, what Goldratt means is 
that there can be inefficiencies in an organization other than the production 
resources per se, which affect the Throughput.
2.5. Capacity and delays
What have delays got to do with capacity? According to Sterman, 2000. “A 
delay is a process whose output lags behind its input in some fashion” (p. 
411). A system in its simplest form, including a production system, is char-
acterised by a flow in transit and at least one accumulation, or a stock, which 
is the difference between the inflow and the outflow to a delay (p. 421). The 
reason for this is that things takes time, like production, it takes time to 
get information, measure, assess, make decisions, get production resources, 
and so on (p. 411). There are delays in material flows as well as in informa-
tion flows (pp. 411-412). When something changes we normally do not act 
immediately. “There is a delay between the receipt of new information and 
the updating of your beliefs” (p. 412), which e.g. includes testing and assess-
ment of data, reflections, discussions, etc. (cf. p. 426).
In a production flow, the accumulation is in other words a stock, e.g. an 
inventory, or products going through production processes (work in-pro-
cess). It is the complexity of the process and the capacity of the outflow and 
the inflow, which decides how big the accumulation is going to be. This 
gives system inertia, normally expressed in delay or throughput lead-time. 
All systems strive to be in balance23, i.e. to have input equalling output (Ster-
man, 2000). Inertia is good, because it gives the system memory, thus makes 
it predictable and reliable, since it counteracts change. On the other hand, 
there are situations when inertia is considered bad, when instead responsive-
23 In some disciplines called ”homeostasis”.
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ness, flexibility or fast response is needed. Constrained systems have more 
inertia than unconstrained, as shown by Little’s law.
Little’s law24 explains why the Work-in-process (i.e. a queue) grows when a 
capacity ceiling is reached.
Little’s law states:
 Work-in-process= Delay x Throughput25
  Work-in-process = i.e. the total accumulation (in transit) in the system
  Delay = Time lag or lead-time to pass the system (e.g. cycle time)
  Throughput = Throughput / time-unit, outflow-rate of a system in 
balance
So Work-in-process or a queue is really “inventory” (e.g. of unfinished prod-
ucts in the process of being refined; or a queue of customers) “in the pipe-
line”. When getting near to the capacity ceiling this inventory grows, which 
increases lead times and slows throughput, in other words it increases inertia 
in the system. This is maybe not obvious at first but can be shown by e.g. 
queuing models (Hutchinson and Liao, 2009). Figure 3 shows the effect on 
Work-in-process of increasing capacity utilization. Thus, an inventory that is 
too big is generally “damaging”, according to the Theory of Constraints Gol-
dratt, 1990, since it slows down the throughput (total lead-time increases).
24 Really that the outflow of a stock equals its inflow, when the system is in balance. Outflow is 
the same as the throughput. This phenomenon was first proved by John Little, once professor of 
operations research at MIT (Sterman, 2000:423).
25 Delay times Throughput.
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Figure	3:	Constraining	effect	on	backlog	(work-in	process)	of	
increasing	capacity	utilization.26
2.5.1. Capacity and performance
Oliva, 2001:28, states that
“the major recurring problems observed in service industry – erosion of ser-
vice quality, high turnover, and low profitability – can be explained by the 
organization’s response to changes in work pressure.”
Work pressure is described by Oliva and Sterman, 2001:898, as the “relative 
workload”.
Oliva, 2001:26f. describes work pressure for service personnel as how they 
perceive “the difference between the amount of work that can feasibly be 
done and the amount of work that needs to be performed”.
26 After Hutchinson and Liao, 2009.
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Oliva and Sterman, 2001:898 give the following definition of work pressure 
(Wp):
   
Wp = (RC − NC)
NC
=
RC
NC
−1
NC = Normal (effective) capacity
RC = Required capacity (necessary to deal with the workload in order to 
keep lead time)
Required capacity (p. 896):
RC = B
l
*T*
B = Backlog of orders
λ= Desired delivery delay = management’s goal for delivery delay
T* = The standard time to be allocated to each customer
Akkermans and Vos, 2003 define workload W27 as:
W =
B
NLT
NC
=
RC
NC
where
   
NLT = l
T *  
= Normal Lead time
Under Little’s law we can thus formulate the order backlog (B)
B=W* NC* NLT = RC* l
T *
Throughput (TH) is in other words
TH =W* NC = RC
27 In other words Wp = W–1
λ
λ
λ
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2.5.2. “Carrying capacity”
Carrying capacity is a concept that is used in ecological contexts (e.g. 
Catton, 1984), but is applicable to all systems, including companies and 
other organizations, according to Sterman, 2000. In the natural system (e.g. 
an ecosystem) it is the amount of available and resources necessary to keep 
people and animals, or an eco-system, alive. An example of that can be the 
spreading of a desert when dry lands are over-cultivated or overgrazed (too 
many domestic animals) (e.g. Dörner, 1996)28.
A limited resource can thus form a bottleneck. According to the Theory of 
Constraints all growing systems will sooner or later develop constraints (e.g. 
Goldratt and Fox, 1986). This is also supported by Systems thinking and 
described by the Limits-to-Growth model (Forrester, 1994; Sterman, 2000). 
Growth can only be sustained as long as the supporting capacity (“carrying 
capacity”) is not exceeded. When that happens the system “hits the roof”, 
and the growth stops (e.g. Sterman, 2000). In cases when the carrying capac-
ity is eroded, which can happen e.g. when natural resources dwindle or when 
a company’s financial situation drastically worsens, the system could even 
collapse (ibid p. 123 f.). This happens e.g. when a business goes bankrupt. It 
can also be the case when a project or a business has been underinvested29.
But normally the limits-to-growth model produces an S-shaped growth-
curve (ibid:118). The S-shaped growth means that the growth starts with 
an exponential behaviour, then, at some point, unplanned side-effects set 
in and slow down the growth, or rather “balances” the performance around 
a value, however higher than the original. The unplanned side effect is for 
example what Goldratt describes as a constraint or a bottleneck (e.g. Goldratt 
and Fox, 1986). So the nature of the constraint is that it limits the growth, 
i.e. first slows it down until it balances around a target value30. The con-
straint is in other words a balancing or goal-seeking process that stabilises a 
28 Similar situation could be the case for the sustainability of a city. For example the Indian city Agra, 
just south of Delhi, with clean freshwater becoming scarce due to heavy water pollution upstream 
(Ghosh, 2011).
29 Senge, 1990, p. 128f, based on a study by John Sterman, gives the example of the pioneering low-
price People Express Airline that started in 1980 in eastern USA. The company was a success and 
grew fast. It invested a lot in aircraft capacity, but, under increasing price competition, neglected 
to do so in service capacity. However, according to that analysis, it was not for lack of number of 
service personnel but primarily the training of skills and organizational infrastructure that failed 
and affected the morale and the quality of service. Due to big losses that followed as people aban-
doned the company, it was taken over by another airline in 1986.
30 Not necessarily the target value that was intended, but the balancing level of the system. What this 
is depends on among other things the inertia of the system. 
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system at a certain level, and it is very difficult to achieve any more growth 
after that, unless more resources are added, or obstacles are removed.
As Sterman, 2000 explains, the S-shaped growth-model can also oscillate 
or fluctuate around the carrying capacity. This happens when the balancing 
process (i.e. the negative, controlling, feedback in the process) contains a 
delay (ibid. p. 23). This indicates that there sometimes is “a margin” around 
the balancing level, i.e. the increasing phase in the oscillation has a maxi-
mum, but the decreasing phase also has a minimum below the balancing 
level. However, the maximum of the oscillation is not a higher level of the 
system that can be exploited at an extended period of time.
The concept “excess capacity” in this thesis refers to situations when work-
pressure is <1, i.e. when normal capacity is not fully used, however in litera-
ture it can sometimes also refer to “reserve capacity”.
Example of when excess capacity means “slack” (i.e. less than “normal” pro-
duction capacity is engaged):
	 •		 too	much	capacity	because	of	misjudgement	of	demand	when	start-
ing a business (Sasser, 1976:176)
	 •		 too	much	capacity	because	customers	have	left	(consequence	of	qual-
ity erosion), etc. Oliva, 2001, or slack in the business cycle
Example of when excess capacity means “protective” (i.e. more than “normal” 
production capacity is engaged):
	 •		 protective	 capacity,	 a	 buffer	 to	 absorb	 variability	 and	 disruptions	
(e.g. Banker, Datar et al., 1988; Leitch, 2001).
Note that e.g. Banker et al., 1988; Leitch, 2001 use the concept “excess 
capacity” also to include “reserve capacity”. Their meaning of “excess” is 
“unused”, however in relationship to “available capacity”31. This is clear since 
they explain that too little excess capacity sometimes causes constraints.
Oliva and Sterman, 2010, use the concept “reserve capacity”. “Reserve 
capacity”, or sometimes “protective capacity” (e.g. Stratton and Warburton, 
2003) is to protect a resource when work pressure is higher than normal (at 
31 Leitch, 2001:174: “The difference between the capacity available and the resources used is the 
unused capacity or excess capacity”, calculated as a quota: 1/(1+excess capacity). For example 1/
(1+0.20)= 0.8333 capacity utilization for 20 % excess capacity.
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least over an extended period), e.g. backlogs build up, and overtime is used 
to normalise the situation32.
I use the concept “reserve capacity”, i.e. as protective capacity, unless oth-
erwise stated, in accordance with the third meaning. The focus is on the 
capability constraints of the Transport Provider (as seen from the Buyer’s 
horizon), i.e. the constraints that (usually not intentionally) limit the Trans-
port Provider to perform according to the agreement made with the Buyer.
2.6. Resilience to increase response capacity
Growing interconnectedness and interdependencies, despite their benefits in 
business development, also mean increasing complexity in systems (Craig-
head, Blackhurst et al., 2007)33, and thus increased vulnerability (Pettit, 
Fiksel et al., 2010).
Pettit et al., 2010, discuss a company’s ability to handle supply chain disrup-
tions in view of ever-increasing interconnectedness and globalization. There 
is a growing awareness that such circumstances of business cooperation and 
competition also can increase vulnerabilities.
Often vulnerabilities are disclosed through unexpected events, like the tsu-
nami and earthquakes in Fukushima, Japan, 2011, but sometimes they are 
consequences of designed structures and deliberate strategies, e.g. by increas-
ing dependencies of relationships and time, complexity, chosen strategies, 
or neglected precautions, such as contingency systems (e.g. Svensson, 2002; 
Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Peck, 2005). When it comes to more or less 
“deliberate” choices, such as “no contingency system”, or “no quality moni-
toring”, too much “leaning” (e.g. Christopher and Peck, 2004; Kleindorfer 
and Saad, 2005; Zsidisin et al., 2005), in order to increase productivity, it 
32 All this confusion stem from the view of “waste” and what is compared. If a ”normal capacity” and 
a ”required capacity” is defined then a normalised measure can be constructed. Sometimes also 
maximum, or ”heroic”, utilization of capacity used as comparison (cf. Sterman, 2000:555). 
33 Craighead et al., 2007, define ”complexity” as “the sum of two components—the total number 
of nodes (Nnodes) and the total number of forward (Nforward), backward (Nbackward), and 
within-tier materials flows (Nwithin-tier) within a given supply chain. “ (p. 140). This means if 
there are only two nodes, e.g. between a supplier and a customer there can be (at least) two in-
between flows (one delivery and one return if necessary) plus at least four within flows (if process 
allows correction). That adds up to 8. If the customer adds another supplier then the number will 
be at least 13. In other words there is (at least theoretically) a geometric growth in information.
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could even be a calculated risk, or possibly overconfidence based on mis-
judgement (Sterman, 1989b; Dörner, 1996).
Pettit et al., 2010, postulate that “Forces of change create supply chain vul-
nerabilities” (p. 6). Forces of change are understood as “internal or external 
disturbances”, and they identify seven major factors causing vulnerabilities, 
among them external pressures, (such as price pressure, corporate responsi-
bility) resource limits (capacity limits, utilities availability, lack of workforce) 
(p. 18). Pressures and constraints are thus described as antecedents to vulner-
abilities.
Vulnerabilities often cannot be totally avoided though. Long term it is a 
matter of developing resilience, i.e. a way to handle and balance vulner-
ability and capability, so that performance and quality is not compromised 
or eroded, and that new opportunities are not missed and the business can 
develop. Resilience is a property of “bouncing back” in the face of adversity, 
different types of flexibility as opposed to rigidity, but also has a dimension 
of learning and creative problem solving.
Originally an ecological concept (introduced by C.S. Holling in 1973, Gun-
derson, 2000), but little research has been done in management about resil-
ience (Christopher and Peck, 2004). For example Bhamra, Dani et al., 2011, 
show that there have been several publications since then that have used the 
concept also from organizational and supply chain perspective.
Christopher and Peck, 2004, distinguish between robustness and resilience, 
where robustness is understood as a built in capacity to deal with disruptions 
whereas resilience is defined as (p. 2):
“the ability of a system to return to its original state or move to a new, more 
desirable state after being disturbed.”
Conceptually there is room for clarification. In ecological and engineering 
contexts the concept used is rather “resistance”, i.e. how well a system can 
resist external pressure without being disturbed (Carpenter, Walker et al., 
2001; Fiksel, 2003), in other words resistance creates robustness of a system. 
Resistance is in organizations achieved by standardisation and management 
control (cf Fiksel, 2003; Pettit et al., 2010), whereas complexity requires 
diversity (requisite variety, Ashby, 2011 (1968)). Fiksel, 2003, argues that 
systems (here meaning organizations) should rather be designed so that 
robustness would be achieved by resilience rather than resistance (p. 5338).
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Fiksel (ref. in Pettit et al., 2010:1) defines resilience as:
“the capacity for an enterprise to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of 
turbulent change”
Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009, conceptually model supply chain resilience 
as three progressive phases of readiness, response, and recovery, made pos-
sible if certain dynamic logistic capabilities are present.
Resilience is thus a number of different capabilities that over time builds up 
an organization’s strength and ability to adapt to disruption, to better handle 
risk, therefore to increase chances of continuity, i.e. to survive and develop34. 
Resilience in the organizational world is in other words connected to peo-
ple’s skill and abilities to deal with unexpected disruptions and recovery in 
complex contexts.
2.7. Empirical research on resilience and  
business continuity
The phenomenon of resilience for business organizations was however 
described and discussed before the concept resilience was commonly used. 
An early attempt was work going on in the Royal Dutch / Shell Group (de 
Geus, 1997). Four factors important for long-term resilience were identified 
in 27 companies: sensitive to their environment, cohesion (i.e., tolerance of 
diversity, conservative financing.
Also Polesie published a book on the subject based on longitudinal observa-
tions of 18 companies, of which several in the transport industry (Polesie, 
1991). That book has the focus on the importance of organizational identity 
and its interaction with finance to enable continuity.
A newer publication with a resource-based focus uses several longitudinal 
studies of well-known companies to illustrate and discuss the resilience con-
cept in an organizational perspective (Tengblad, Oudhuis et al., forthcom-
ing).
34 According to Pettit et al., 2010 resilience of a supply chain increases as capabilities increase. They 
identify 14 capability factors and 71 sub-factors to increase capabilities, among them reserve ca-
pacity, redundancy, backup energy sources and communications, visibility, adaptability, efficiency, 
recovery, learning from experience, creative problem solving (p. 12).
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Shifting perspective from production logic to the customer-oriented service 
logic is another aspect of resilience development. Enquist (Enquist, 2003) 
and Enquist, 2003; Enquist and Johnson, forthcoming, discuss the impor-
tance of communication and dialogue to develop value in public transport 
systems in Sweden, based on a model for dialogue in interest-networks, and 
service logic.
Holmén, 2007, uses the case of how a car manufacturer starts financial ser-
vices for customers, and describes the long adaption process to implement a 
service logic from a dominating industry ideology, and how that changes the 
way the industry company later profiles itself. Inertia in learning processes is 
an interesting phenomenon involving the communication and information 
exchange, relationships, as well as the coherence (sense making) process.
Carlsson-Wall, 2011, exemplifies by three industrial case studies how dif-
ficult problem solving can be in product development project contexts due 
to communication problems. He describes how complexities, goal conflicts, 
negotiations, unexpected disruptions, and time pressure affect communica-
tion and information quality in cost-driven development. This illustrates the 
difficulties of cooperation in networks, of how not knowing the customers’ 
“hang-ups” and opinions well enough, generate uncertainties in the infor-
mation. This situation is transferable also to other complex situations, such 
as goods transport services, where the matching of the customer’s needs and 
wishes with the supplier’s capabilities and capacity can lead to problems, 
because what the Buyer means, is not understood the same way by the Pro-
vider.
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3. Method
This research is descriptive and exploratory.
In data collection I have used both qualitative and quantitative methods and 
data. This is in line with grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in the 
sense that data sources and observations of different kinds are used as sup-
port.
The Theory of Constraints (Goldratt, 1990) is used to communicate the 
phenomena of constraints. Goldratt challenges a dominant paradigm in 
management thinking, which gives leverage to the discussion, since it makes 
it possible to refocus the problems.
Allison (1971) used more than one perspective to illustrate the reasons for 
the Cuban missile crisis, showing that different conceptual models can give 
different explanations depending on the perspective and “mental model”35 
of the actor, and at the same time increase the understanding of a certain 
phenomena or problem. The aim is to reduce complexity to understandable 
models or theories.
This is also in line with systems dynamics perspective which has a well devel-
oped coding system based on operative logics for flows, resource accumula-
tions, information feedback, external influences, and boundaries (e.g. For-
rester, 1958; Wolstenholme, 1990; Sterman, 2000). It also uses conceptual 
models that can be used to map complex systems and to simulate the behav-
iour of them.
3.1. Selection of transport companies
Goods transport service is a type of service supply chain that has similari-
ties to hybrid supply chains (Anderson et al., 2005). The transport service 
is though a pure service, and as such has the same logic (“pull” strategy, the 
transport cannot be produced in advance). However, at the same time it is 
involved in flows of goods. From that point of view a transport is a sort of 
“conveyor belt” between two geographical locations, and often in partner-
ship with the Transport Buyer. It is, however, still ”pull” logic in this perfor-
mance, since there is no “product” but a service, which is the actual transport 
(not the goods that are transported), therefore the operations are constrained 
35 See footnote 134
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by the operator’s performance capacity. Both Akkermans and Vos, 2003; 
Anderson et al., 2005, clearly show that it is the capacity that takes over the 
role of protecting the chain from fluctuations in service chains36. Goods 
transport services also have a mixture of technical capacity (load capacity, 
terminals, computer systems, communication equipment, etc.) and human 
capacity, with a high degree of automation and under high competitive pres-
sure, still, or maybe because of that, in need of developing skills and capa-
bilities.
The other reason for choosing goods transport services is that it is a cat-
egory of service where the customers’ demand for quality and flexibility has 
increased, at the same time as complexity of the services also have increased. 
This change has only been possible through the technical and organizational 
development that has occurred in recent years, coupled with deregulation 
and globalization. But what got my attention were the relatively big adjust-
ment problems that could be noticed, which above all can be detected as it 
also showed comparatively low satisfaction with some capability attributes 
of the Transport Providers.
3.2. The research process
The major part of the data was collected several years ago for a similar pur-
pose in a project I was involved in. Since part of that very extensive data also 
was relevant for this thesis, I have used it as my main data set.
The data was primarily collected 2001-2004, and some complements in 
2011.
The purpose of the original study was to study service quality and for that to 
collect flow data and attitudinal data from Transport Buyers of what service 
attributes they desired, and assess how their present Transport Providers per-
formed (according to them).
In the data analysis I had observed the high failure rates and the exceptional 
time pressures in some industries in the data. Even though the “raw findings” 
were brought out and presented to industrial professionals and academics, 
there was never a deep discussion about the causes. The questions not dis-
cussed then were what the nature of these problems was, and if and how it 
36 Even though they do not as such study transport, however the basic logic is the same.
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could have any significance for the development of transport industry, from 
the point of view of the individual Transport Provider.
Since I started this thesis end of 2010 the theory of constraints was brought 
into the picture by Thomas Polesie. Question was raised whether the failures 
had to do with constraints and what kind of constraints. Could constraints 
be observed in the data? A number of discussions were held about con-
straints, which contributed to the development of the research model.
The interviews with Transport Buyers made in 2001-02 gave a lot of support 
for dissatisfaction with how transport services were performed. These data-
sets were appropriate for the phenomena in question to be studied.
The research process has been iterative. It started with a question or hypoth-
esis, the theoretical connection. In my case the stages from a research ques-
tion to operationalization of this was done already a decade ago. This lead to, 
as described above, findings that raised further questions of how the services 
really worked, and why. Since then we have had many dialogues and dis-
cussions, which have lead to the development of concepts and the research 
model.
This process is in accordance with grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967), data from a number of sources can be used.
Interviews of Transport Buyers and Providers were performed late 2001 and 
early 2002. Meanwhile the project research group I was a member of pre-
pared a bigger survey to Transport Buyers, with the purpose to find out their 
desired services. Below I will describe more in detail these processes and 
discuss validity and reliability.
The age of data is not a problem, since it is the phenomenon of constraints 
that is studied. However, it is justified to question whether the findings 
would be valid if the survey was repeated today. According to Ahldén, 2011, 
much would be the same, however there are some differences. For example 
the problems to get personnel are less today (more mobility in EU). Smaller 
Transport Providers have learnt to cooperate better, thus could add more 
competitive pressure. Smaller shipments are more prevalent today than 10 
years ago.
Lean thinking is also even more established and accepted today, and “agil-
ity” is a fashion word in the logistics sector, however its application is more 
questionable. Both these concepts put more strain on available capacity.
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This sounds to me like more time pressure, not less, which means the com-
petitive situation could be even more sharpened, in other words there are no 
signs that planning, coordination, and time management would be less com-
plex today than a decade ago. On the other hand more cooperation could 
of course also work in the opposite direction with better use of industry 
resources. Information & Communication Systems have developed techni-
cally and somewhat improved, however that in itself is no guarantee they 
have improved performance. My point is that there are no signs that the 
phenomena of constraints would be less relevant today than a decade ago.
I will first describe the process of generating the data sets used in this thesis.
3.2.1. Data
Several project group meetings and discussions were therefore held before 
putting the rather detailed and elaborate questionnaire together. Meetings 
were also held with a project reference group to get the industry input. This 
led to that the data need could be specified.
Before the main study I also performed an interview study with Transport 
Buyers to explore and test some of the questions that had occurred in the 
discussions, partly as a validation.
I also performed some interviews with Transport Providers.
The data needed were context data, which described the flow (weight or 
volume of outgoing goods flow) in different dimensions, such as geographi-
cally (from-to), time-constraints (delivery-times, time windows, etc.), and 
failures. The main objective with the survey was to get information about 
the Buyer’s criteria used in choosing a transport solution and specifically 
in choosing a Transport Provider. 33 attitudinal questions covering differ-
ent operative and strategically important capability-aspects of the Transport 
Provider were constructed, such as geographical coverage, handling, on-time 
reliability, trust, quality fluctuation, accessibility, communication, routines, 
contingency, price, physical transport capacity, environmental aspects37. 
Two scales were constructed for the same capabilities, one describing how 
important the item was to the Transport Buyer, and the other how the Buyer 
assessed that the Transport Provider performed for the same item.
Another question describing the pressures in the choice of transport solution 
was also included38.
37 See question 24 in the questionaire, Appendix 3.
38 See question 9 in the questionaire, Appendix 3.
54
3.2.2. Interviews with Transport Buyers
The purpose of this pre-study was exploratory, i.e. to get information of the 
current situation (2001 to early 2002) about industrial Transport Buyers’ 
view on what factors influenced their choice of transport solution. As men-
tioned above, it was also a matter of testing and validating certain assump-
tions and questions that had come to light in the project group discussions.
This qualitative study was carried out as telephone-interviews, which lasted 
15 – 30 minutes each. The interviews were performed at an appointed time, 
i.e. the interviewee was first contacted by phone, and a convenient occasion 
for the interview was then decided. The purpose of that was to avoid that 
the interviewee was under undue time-pressure to answer the questions. Tel-
ephone interviews were chosen because they were the most practical form 
for the interviewees rather than booking a company visit, which would con-
sume more of their time.
The interviewees were mostly logistics or transport chiefs or chief Transport 
Buyers in the twenty medium- or large-sized manufacturing and wholesaling 
companies. Twenty-four persons in all were interviewed.
Thirteen of these companies were manufacturers and seven wholesalers, 
Table 1:
Table	1:	Companies	chosen	in	interview-study
Industries
Nr of companies 
interviewed
Turnover range, 
million SEK per 
year, approx.
Food	&	Beverage,	manufacturer 1 600
Building	&	Construction,	manufacturer 1 1 400
Steel	&	Metal,	manufacturer 3 100	-	700
Industrial	machines	and	tools,	manufacturer 3 300 – 5 000
Electronics	or	electric	appliances,	manufacturer 4 250 – 8 500
Vehicle components industry 1 160
Food & Beverage wholesaler 3 17000-40000
Electronics & Household prod., wholesaler 1 1 600
Building	&	Construction,	DIY*	wholesaler 1 2 000
Industrial supply, wholesaler 2 800
* DIY = Do-It-Yourself
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These cases were chosen in a non-randomised manner from a business data-
base that contains all registered limited companies in Sweden (AffärsData, 
2002). The criteria were that they were to represent a spread of different 
trades of manufacturers and wholesalers. They were also to have a substantial 
turn over and represent medium- and large-sized companies, since they were 
believed to have bigger goods flows. Companies that were believed to have 
widespread distribution I considered interesting to study. This study was car-
ried out October 2001 (3 companies) and in February 2002 (17 companies).
The interview was semi-structured and followed a question guide (Appendix 
2). I introduced it with an explanation of the purpose of the study, i.e. to 
find out what their most important factors and criteria were in choosing a 
transport solution regarding quality, price and environment.
The respondents, answered in their own words (not multiple-choice ques-
tions). The aim for that was to get their spontaneous answers, not pre-fab-
ricated choices.
I was not able to record the phone calls, but I took careful notes during 
the phone calls on the standardized form I had prepared. The notes from 
the telephone interviews were secured with complementary comments and 
supplementary documentation directly or shortly after the phone calls. The 
results were coded and tabulated, then summarised in an internal report to 
the project group (Saxin, 2002a).
3.2.3. Interviews with Transport Providers
I performed also a few exploratory interviews also with forwarders and hauli-
ers in the Schenker-, and Danzas-sphere, and Euroute. These were company 
visits. Interview questions had been prepared in advance. Notes were taken 
and written out afterwards (Saxin, 2002b).
3.2.4. The survey
The purpose of the pre-study was to get some insight in how major Transport 
Buyers were thinking and what they considered important criteria in choos-
ing a transport solution. It confirmed some views and clarified others regard-
ing the Transport Buyers’ views on time, quality, environmental matters, 
and price of transport. With this exploratory qualitatively designed study, 
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the other pre-study on the Transport Providers and another pre-study39, the 
research questions for the main study were specified.
A number of meetings were then held by the project group to design the 
extensive survey including questionnaire40. A number of meetings were also 
with a reference group with representatives from industry.
Since the study objects (the companies) were rather inhomogeneous, it was 
decided that the design of the survey would be a stratified random sample. 
The stratification criteria were type (manufacturer or wholesaler) and size 
(number of employees) of company.
The survey was carried out mainly the second quarter of 2003, but with 
some follow-ups the following months.
3.2.4.1. Response rates
The final average response rate was 49%, Figure 4, but if this figure is adjusted 
by excluding the small manufacturing and wholesale companies, then the 
final response rate was 56% (63% for manufacturing companies and 45% 
for wholesale companies)41. These three groups of companies have the largest 
volumes of goods transported and therefore the major efforts to get the sur-
veys sent back were made in these groups i.e. highest number of contacts by 
telephone and mail. The reward for this work is shown in the high response 
rates for these groups. 64% is undoubtedly a very high response rate for a 
survey like this.
39 See Lammgård, 2007.
40 In Appendix 3 question 9 and 24 of the questionaire are shown.
41 Important is the fact that the largest companies in the two groups got a 63% response rate.
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Figure	4:	Final	response	rate	and	number	of	responses,	the	different	
types	of	companies,	n=	567
3.2.4.2. Non-response analysis
Non-response testing was also performed. Lack of time and / or lack of sta-
tistics was in general the most common reason for not answering the survey. 
This was especially the case for the smaller companies and therefore response 
rate was also lowest, around 32%. A probable explanation is that these com-
panies have low transport volumes and therefore do not use resources to 
collect and analyse flow data.
3.3. Validity and reliability
Lundahl and Skärvad, 1982:67, define validity as “the absence of systematic 
measuring errors”. They make a distinction between internal and external 
validity.
Internal validity exists when the measuring instrument, e.g. the survey ques-
tionnaire or the interview, measures what it is supposed to measure (ibid). 
This means there is high agreement between the theoretical and operational 
definition (ibid), in other words the interface between theory (hypothesis, 
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model) and the operationalization (the interview guide or the survey ques-
tionnaire, etc.). Sometimes coverage can be too much42, too narrow43, or 
skewed44 (ibid. p. 68).
External validity is a concept covering the application of the measuring 
instrument, i.e. so that the results can be generalised from one population 
to another (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002) due to the fact that the right 
people are interviewed, or the right objects are studied. This has to do with 
identifying and selecting the relevant people or the study objects with which 
the phenomenon or behaviour of interest is connected. A survey or an inter-
view can have low external validity e.g. because people do not fully under-
stand the question or the context (but they pretend that they do), they lie or 
deceive, or they remember wrongly (cf. Lundahl and Skärvad, 1982).
Reliability has to do with how the measuring has been performed, i.e. to 
what degree random errors are absent (Lundahl and Skärvad, 1982:69), i.e. 
that random events (that has nothing to do with the phenomenon studied) 
interferes with the measuring, or that the researcher somehow “fakes” the 
results (ibid). An example of the first situation could be that an interview is 
performed in a place where there are loud disturbing noises from the sur-
roundings, or that the interviewee is constantly interrupted by phonecalls 
or by people urgently wanting attention. The second situation could be a 
researcher who has interviewed a number of people and feels he “knows” 
what the rest will answer and fills in the forms himself “for them” (examples 
from Lundahl and Skärvad, 1982).
3.3.1. The interviews
Possible errors in my telephone interviews with Transport Buyers:
I had prepared the interview guide with support from group discussions, as 
described above. Since this was a pre-study the purpose was exploratory to 
see how e.g. transport chiefs of bigger Transport Buyers respond and describe 
their transport situation, this was an occasion to increase validity.
42 That is, the measuring instrument covers the relevant phenomenon, and also other phenomena in 
its context. 
43 That is, the measuring instrument only measures a part of the relevant phenomena. This obviously 
can lead to bias in the interpretation.
44 That is, the measuring instrument does not ”hit the target”, but measures maybe part of the phe-
nomenon and variables that are not really relevant. This obviously can obscure, skew, or shift the 
focus of the phenomenon studied to something else.
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External validity: The fact that a non-randomised manner was used to select 
the companies does of course not make the results generalizable. Yin (1994) 
means, however, that case studies can be generalizable in an analytical 
manner, by forming theory from them. Big companies in themselves are rep-
resentative and influential of (and many times dominate) their industries. By 
choosing well-known companies in various trades and with different types of 
goods the external validity is likely to be less biased than just relying on one’s 
own past experience or contact with a certain company.
A weakness was that I did not send over the questions in advance, which in 
hindsight I should have done. Then the respondents would have had time 
to prepare for the interviews better. However, I did get the impression from 
the conversation that there was no hesitation in their answers, and since the 
answers were open it was obvious that they were well aware of the situation.
Reliability in the context of these telephone interviews depends on con-
sistency and how comparable the situation is when asking questions, how 
the interview material is recorded and transcribed or supplemented, and 
how it is analysed. By using the semi-structured interview-guide, replicabil-
ity increases considerably. However, there is no guarantee that interviews 
made on different occasions will be exact replicas. Also respondents have 
different backgrounds and experiences, and occasionally it took explanation 
or clarifications of questions that I perceived were not fully understood the 
way intended. That, however, by definition would increase both reliability 
and external validity. It could thus be argued that clarifications that have 
the aim to convey the intended meaning of the questions should increase 
the chances to get consistent answers. As can be noticed from the interview-
guide (Appendix 2) the questions were operationally detailed, which Yin, 
1994, means increases reliability.
As a point of improvement it would have been better also to have e.g. fol-
lowed up with one or several group discussions with the same people (see 
e.g. Vennix and Gubbels, 1994), however it was not workable in this case. 
Another point would have been to record the interviews, but as explained 
above, I did not have access to that kind of recording equipment at the time.
Interviews with the Transport Providers were performed on site, and notes 
were written out afterwards.
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3.3.2. The survey
3.3.2.1. Validity
Internal validity can be considered high. Triangulation was used in con-
structing questions for the questionnaire. Questions were generated then 
discussed in the project research group for the senior researchers’45input. 
There was also a reference group of representatives from industry and aca-
demia. Several seminar style meetings were held with progression reports 
and input from members. The exploratory pre-studies mentioned above 
were also performed to get the perspective of industrial Transport Buyers 
and Providers.
Scales were also discussed in the project group. The attitude question con-
sisted of 33 items or sub-questions. These questions were carefully formu-
lated and two scales for importance and performances respectively were con-
structed.
A semantic differential scale was chosen for these attitudinal factors, since 
evaluation was the purpose (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002:382f.). Both 
scales have seven points (1 to 7) where 1 is very small / low and 7 is very 
large. The midpoint 4 thus means neither small / low nor large46. The reason 
for a seven-point scale and not a five-point is that it is slightly more nuanced, 
e.g. it is possible to distinguish if it is near high or low or indifferent. A nine-
point scale obviously would give more nuances, however is harder for the 
respondent to weigh.
These scales were constructed as equal-appearing intervals (Churchill and 
Iacobucci, 2002:375ff) and summated scales (ibid:379) to enable the use of 
an interval scale.
For construction of scale describing pressures were used the constant sum 
method (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002:393).
After several project group discussions, a pilot questionnaire was compiled. 
The pilot was tested by a group of practitioners and academics. We got some 
important feedback regarding the validity of the questions, and we adjusted 
the final version of the questionnaire.
45 With previous experience of such surveys.
46 See question 24 in Appendix 3 about scale constructions.
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With the above conceptual discussions and testing by both professionals in 
industry and researchers, the internal validity has to be considered very high. 
Especially the formulation of the questions to avoid ambiguity and bias, and 
to use concepts understood by practitioners in industry, considerable time 
and discussions were spent. However, there is always a possibility that people 
interpret concepts differently, especially when there is complexity involved 
(Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002:403). The most obvious difference could be 
differences between industries, e.g. careful handling might mean one thing 
if crystal glass is shipped, and another thing if it is tractors. Also it is likely 
that the transport chief in a local work unit has a different perspective than 
the chief procurement officer at head quarters in a bigger international com-
pany, however there is to my knowledge no way to eliminate that kind of 
bias. It is still the decision-makers opinions that are measured, even though 
individuals have different frames of reference. The important part in this is 
to find the actual decision-maker, and I believe that was done in most cases 
due to the telephone initiation of the survey.
The sampling was done on firm level from a frame of SCB’s47 database, 
containing all current firm registrations, which is updated regularly. It was 
SCB that performed the sampling. We used a stratified random sample to 
get better representation of bigger companies, which are few in number, but 
have the biggest flow of goods.
The sampling, dealing with framing and sampling problems, identification 
of respondents, and data collection have been described in detail and pub-
lished in Lammgård, Saxin et al., 2004. The identification of respondents 
was a meticulous (and very time-demanding) way to make sure the “right” 
person was identified. This was done by phoning the companies in the target 
population. This ensured higher quality in the answers than just sending the 
survey addressed to the company.
All phone calls were logged in detail.
Since the data contained quite exact classification of data, e.g. industry 
(SNI02-code), size, etc., it is possible to form categories in the analysis of the 
data, thus draw some conclusions about perceived problems, satisfaction, 
etc. from a statistical point of view. Problems in a certain industry could for 
example be connected to the type of goods being transported.
47 SCB = Statistiska Centralbyrån, Statistics Sweden, the official authority for statistics in Sweden
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The problem is sometimes that the industry classification can change over 
the years, but the company might not make correction immediately of the 
registration to the authorities. Therefore, e.g. a company that has been a 
manufacturer and moves a part of the manufacturing abroad, might be 
more of a wholesaler in function, but could still be registered primarily as a 
manufacturer, until all production is moved. This obviously could affect the 
interpretation of the findings. However, since SCB’s is the official statistical 
authority, the data is the best available.
Also in filling in the form there could be circumstances that affect the qual-
ity of the answers. Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002:404, exemplifies that e.g. 
the frame of mind or the circumstances the respondent is in when answering 
the questions, such as mood, health, can affect the quality of the answers. 
As described above, this could also affect the reliability of the survey results 
(interruptions, etc.).
3.3.2.2. Reliability
The reliability of the survey is high since a questionnaire was used. Also an 
introductory letter was enclosed. The above described telephone-initiation 
method also contributed to finding the person responsible for the procure-
ment of outgoing transport. However, as we could notice on the forms, 
sometimes someone else had filled in the form. Chances are that this delega-
tion is done to someone with “less insight” in the strategic issues and criteria 
of choosing a Transport Provider, on the other hand it might not be. Risk 
is also, since the questionnaire contained quite a number of questions, that 
respondents rushed through the questions and that some answers were not 
well-reflected or based on guesses. Time-pressure and interruptions while 
filling in the questionnaire are, of course, also circumstances that can affect 
results.
3.4. Analysis of data
3.4.1. Factor analysis
Factor analysis is a collection of methods whose main purpose is to reduce 
and summarise data (Hair et al 1992:225). The reduction is if there are many 
overlapping questions, which are reduced to a few factors. In this interde-
pendence technique all the variables are considered simultaneously (ibid).
In this study Principal Component analysis (PCA) is used.
63
The rotation-technique used is varimax rotation (ibid:235f.). See further 
details of tests and statistical strength in section 5.1. and Appendix 4.
Why is factor analysis used?
Asking a number of people many questions about their opinions about 
many different things gives a lot of complex data, i.e. uncertainty. This is 
because people normally have different preferences or opinions. Factor anal-
ysis measures the variance between all the variables, and is a technique that 
can be used in such a situation to reduce the uncertainty.
The purpose of the factor analysis is thus to condense a large number of vari-
ables (the questions or items48) into a smaller number of factors, which are 
easier to understand and analyse.
The reason for that is that questions often overlap each other if they e.g. 
intend to nuance an opinion from different angles. Each factor covers a 
specific common “topic” or phenomenon, e.g. the relationship between the 
Buyer and Seller, the service reliability, or the Information and Communica-
tion System.
In the survey 31 of the questions (describing attributes of the Transport Pro-
vider’s capabilities) were reduced to nine factors with PCA, see the two left 
columns in Figure 5. This is expounded on in sections 5.1. and 5.2.
48 Questions, here attributes of the Buyer’s assessments, are numbered as items. The numbers are 
referring to the order they appear in the survey questionnaire, see Appendix 4.
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Figure	5:	The	sequence	of	data	analysis49.
3.4.2. Partial least squares
The second reduction step of the data is illustrated in the two columns to the 
right in Figure 5. This grouping was done by sorting the dominating nature 
of the questions asked to the respondents into three major groups: technical, 
people-focused, and financial factors. There are five grouped factors defined 
to represent different resources or areas of capabilities. This is expounded on 
in section 5.3. Overall Satisfaction is the Buyer’s overall assessment. This is 
explained in section 5.2.1. As “control variables” were also used actual quan-
titative data on On-time delivery (i.e. the failure rates) and the damage rates 
(in shares of the goods flow); these two are not shown in Figure 5. All these 
variables were used in the analysis of constraints. This is shown in chapter 6.
49 The 31 items (questions asked to the Transport Buyers) were reduced to nine Principal Compo-
nent factors in the factor analysis. These in turn were reduced to three factor groups (people- 
focused, technical, financial), consisting of five capability factors of the Transport Providers. The 
thick arrow shows the direction of the data aggregation. Thin arrows in this illustration show how 
the items and factors were reduced.
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Partial least square regression (PLS), is a comparatively stable regression 
method for multivariate analysis that has some advantages over ordinary 
least square (OLS) and other regression methods (see Wold, Trygg et al., 
2001; SAS, Institute Inc, 2010, ch. 23). It is used to reduce a large number 
of variables to factors. One difference to OLS is that it works when there are 
many variables and correlations are high between the variables (SAS, Insti-
tute Inc, 2010:491).
The advantage is that it balances in explaining both the response variation 
and the predictor variation (ibid.). The multivariate PLS platform is a matrix 
where all the relevant input (X) variables and all the relevant output (Y) 
variables can be loaded into the same model. As X was for instance all the 
importance factors (the grouped capability factors in Figure 5) and the pres-
sures loaded in, and as Y failure rates, damages, Overall Satisfaction and all 
the performance (grouped capability) factors. This gives the effects of the 
X-factors on the output-factors (Y), considering both the variance in X and 
in Y (ibid).
As criteria of effects I distinguished primary and secondary. As a primary 
effect I defined a significant effect50 that show an increase in the measurable 
dimensions (in this study: failure rate, damage %), and a negative satisfac-
tion (i.e. dissatisfaction), and a negative effect on any of the perceived capa-
bilities (Problem Solving ability, Information & Communication Systems, 
Shipping Capacity), or the perceived outputs On-Time delivery and / or 
Pricing.
As a secondary effect: as the primary effect but not giving a clear effect on 
both an output (measurable or perceived) and Overall Satisfaction.
50 According to Wold et al., 2001 and others the VIP (variable importance plot) should be at least 
0.80 and a clear coefficient. I have chosen the PLS-effect of ≥ 0.10 or ≤-0.10. See SAS, Institute 
Inc, 2010, ch. 23 for description of the method.
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4. The context
4.1. The survey
In this chapter I present some contextual data from the survey of Transport 
Buyers’ opinions of conditions, pressures and selection criteria of Transport 
Providers51.
The general business climate 2002 and early 2003 was a medium, but dis-
tinct, upsurge from the recession years 1998-2000 where e.g. only about 40 
% of the road hauliers had “normal” demand (i.e. full capacity deployed), 
in 2002 it was about 55 % (Konjunkturinstitutet, 2011). It also manifested 
itself in increasing difficulty in recruiting personnel, and other constraining 
factors, such as finance (ibid).
4.2. Industries
Two-thirds of the companies in this survey of Transport Buyers were manu-
facturing companies. This classification (a combination of SNI02-code52) 
has somewhat of a “value-chain” arrangement, where products further down 
in the list are in a more “refined” state or ready for consumption.
The following industrial categories are represented in Table 2. Numbers 
within parentheses are the industry codes used in this thesis53:
 1) Food & Beverage: Food, beverages, and tobacco:
  a Manufacturers (15), a large percentage of the manufacturers pro-
duction is delivered to the wholesalers.
  b. Wholesalers (512).
 2) Building and construction (B&C:):
  a. Manufacturers (20) that produce building materials, such as 
wood, chipboard, fibreboard, stone, plaster board, stone wool, 
and glass products. Much of that is delivered directly to the 
51 Some findings have been published in Saxin, Lammgård et al., 2005; Flodén, 2007; Lammgård, 
2007.
52 SNI02 is a classification system of industries valid from 2002. The SNI code has since been changed. 
53 Below the industry code is slightly adjusted from SNI02. See Saxin, 2012, for a more complete list.
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Building & Construction industry (B&C industry), but big 
quantities also to the wholesalers.
  b. Wholesalers (515) sell these products to e.g. building firms and 
consumers (via D.I.Y.-stores, postal order companies, etc.), but 
they also sell other manufactured products, such as ventilation 
systems, Steel & Metal constructions for building, sanitary por-
celain, pipes, electrical materials for installation.
 3) Paper industry (21). This includes pulp, cardboard, packaging, and 
paper for newspapers and finer paper for office or private use.
 4) Industrial manufacturers.
  a. Semi-manufactured products and simpler consumer products. This 
is the large group of companies that manufactures anything from 
chemicals to plastic and rubber details or products (24), Steel & 
Metal parts (27), components and modules for further produc-
tion. Most of this is shipped directly from the manufacturing 
industries to other producers, such as the Vehicle industry (34), 
B&C industry, Electronics & Household appliances industry 
(30), power industry. Some products like this are also supplied 
from wholesalers, as can be seen in the list, Table 2.
  b. Industrial production equipment: Electrical machines, motors and 
electronics, tools, gauging equipment, etc. for primarily pro-
duction purposes and integration in more complex products. 
Products like electrical motors could also be components in e.g. 
vehicles, compressors, pumps, power production equipment, 
and ventilation systems. Therefore these groups (“Machines & 
Tools” for industrial use (29) and “Electronics & Household 
appliances” industry (30)) contain sub-contractors or suppliers 
to the manufacturing industry, such as the Vehicle industry (34).
  c. Household consumption goods: furniture and textiles, etc. (36), 
electronics, refrigerators (30).
  d. Vehicles (34). Includes all types of vehicles: trucks, trains, wheel 
loaders, forest machines, and motorcars.
 5) Industrial wholesalers
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  a. Business (e.g. office) and household products (514). As for other 
wholesalers, a lot of the products can be imports.
  b. Other industrial goods, including machines (518)
  c. Fuels and other chemicals (“Petrochemical” wholesale, 520). 
This refers to the wholesale distribution of primarily fuels to 
industry and consumers, such as petrol, oil products, and house-
hold chemicals.
Table 2 gives a summary of the industries represented in the study.
Table 2: Industries represented in the survey, numbers  
of	companies.54
Company 
category Industry
Adj. 
SNI02-
code*
Estim. 
volumes sample
Million 
tonnes / 
year
n
Manufacturer
Food & Beverage 15 9.8 41
Building & Construction (materials) 20 22.9 31
Paper 21 22.9 42
Plastics & Chemistry 24 7.0 48
Steel & Metal 27 20.2 63
Machines & Tools 29 2.0 64
Electronics & Household appliances 30 0.1 13
Vehicle 34 5.0 31
Furniture & Textile 36 1.5 19
Wholesaler
Food & Beverage WHS 512 12.4 47
Household appliances WHS 514 1.1 30
Building & Construction WHS 515 3.9 16
Industrial supply WHS 518 5.2 76
Petrochemical WHS 520 6.1 9
Total 120.0 530
 * Note that there has been slight adjustments of industry codes in this thesis compared to SNI02, 
    see Saxin, 2012.
54 Volume-equivalent weight is used by the transport industry in charging for the freight. Only for 
low-density freight it differs from real weight. Figures represent the total population (estimated 
statistically). WHS = wholesalers.
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In this thesis the following groups will be analysed:
Industrial group Clarification Company type
Food & Beverage Manufacturers
Food & Beverage Wholesalers
B&C Building	&	Construction Manufacturers
B&C Building	&	Construction Wholesalers
Paper Manufacturers	and	wholesalers
Industrial Manufacturers
Industrial Wholesalers
4.3. Size of companies
What is a small company or a medium-sized?
The survey of this study used the following criteria to decide company size: 
the number of employees, and the main category of business (manufacturer, 
or wholesaler).
Since manufacturing companies have more complex operations, they are, 
generally speaking, also more people-intense55 than wholesalers, which only 
handle flows of goods. That is why manufacturers have been given more 
employees in each category. The following classification for company sizes is 
therefore valid in this study:
A small manufacturer has 10-99 employees, whereas a small wholesaler 
has 5-19.
A medium-sized manufacturer has 100-399 employees, whereas a whole-
saler 20-99.
A large-sized manufacturer has 400 or more employees, whereas a whole-
saler has got 100 or more.
Two thirds of the companies in the survey were of the company size 100-999 
employees, i.e. medium- to large-sized.
For all manufacturers, three quarters of the companies are also in the com-
pany size category 100-999 employees, and only about 16 % are small. Since 
55 At least that was the case when the survey took place.
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medium- and large-sized companies are the ones that have the biggest goods 
flows, they are good representatives of transport-intensive Transport Buyers. 
However, also small companies in some manufacturing industries could 
have considerable transport volumes, e.g. B&C manufacturers.
Almost half of the wholesale companies in the survey are large-sized (at least 
100 employees), then approximately equally many medium- and small-sized 
companies.
Figure 6 illustrates the number of companies in the survey in each category 
(from left to right: large-medium-small) divided into manufacturers (bars to 
the left, n=373) and wholesalers (right, n=192).
Figure	6:	Company	sizes,	number	of	companies	in	the	survey,	large,	
medium,	and	small.	Manufacturers	(left)	and	wholesalers	(right)	
respectively,	n=567
4.4. Flows: Volumes of goods
The flows measured were the outgoing goods from each work unit (“com-
pany”) that had been contacted. The criteria were that at least some part of 
it was transported at least 150 km, and that the goods had to be physically 
distributed with starting point in Sweden. This was to ensure that companies 
studied handled actual transport flows.
Manufacturer’s volume is about three quarters of the total flow. Large and 
medium sized manufacturers constitute almost 63% of the total, but even 
small manufacturers have sizeable freight flows.
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Comp SIZE
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Figure 7 shows the distribution (% of total) flow per industry groups (as 
defined above, section 4.2.). Biggest flow was found for Industrial manu-
facturers and wholesalers, which together answer for about two fifths of all 
outgoing flows. B&C has a little more than a fifth (mostly manufacturers), 
Food & Beverage, a little less than a fifth, and so does Paper industry.
Figure	7:	Goods	flow	per	industry	group,	%	of	total,	tot	pop	 
(n=530,	N=7,075).
4.5. Transport Buyers’ conditions
The Transport Buyer’s conditions on the Transport Provider’s performance 
are strongly influenced by the competitive pressures exerted by the Buyer’s 
customers and the market situation. These “frame” or fundamental condi-
tions can therefore be described as “pressures” or constraints of the transport, 
e.g. how fast the transport should be, within which time specifications deliv-
ery can take place, and to what price.
Sometimes transport lead-time has to be short. In other words transport 
has to be speedy. This could be for products with limited life-time, such as 
fresh fruit, vegetables, fish, newspapers, or fashion products and electron-
ics, where the product life cycle is short, and deliveries have to be frequent 
and in small batches to minimize the risk of obsolescence and unsellable 
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inventory for the retailer or the distributor (Harrison and van Hoek, 2008; 
Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky et al., 2008).
In such cases speed is exerting a higher pressure than price on the transport. 
We can therefore define this as the “speed pressure” of the transport solution, 
i.e. how much of the transport decision depends on speed factors?
In a similar way certain distribution strategies must be based on not only 
speed but often also on time precision. Time precision means delivery within 
a certain time window, e.g. 12 o’clock ± 1 hour. It could also mean pick up 
of the goods from the Buyer within a certain time window.
The corollary of this is that increased time restrictions are constraints in 
choosing transport solutions; it restricts the number of service Providers to 
those who have capacity available and capability to perform the transport on 
time. So “time precision pressure” is the ability to handle resource constraining 
conditions either by increasing the capacity, other capabilities, or the work 
pressure.
Price is normally increasing for a transport service that is performed faster 
than one of “standard delivery time”, and time precision justifies even higher 
prices due to the increased logistical complexity. Price is, of course, always 
an issue, but if speed to market is the underlying business logic of the distri-
bution strategy, then speed takes precedence over price, in other words, the 
Buyers are prepared to pay more to get the products delivered faster. Price 
pressure is thus higher if price (or financial situation) is more of a critical 
factor, i.e. if the Buyer is more price sensitive, and does not want to pay extra 
for the delivery service. So the “price pressure” can be defined as high when 
a low price is more important than extra service, including special timing of 
the transport.
In the survey the respondent was asked to describe how much (weight, per-
centage) of each of the following pressures influenced the choice of transport 
solution: Time precision, Speed, Price and Emission Control56. In reality 
most companies have a “mix” of these four (and maybe others, but in this 
study only these four will be considered) depending on the competitive situ-
ation, the industry, size of company, and the customer. In this study only the 
first three will be used in the analysis and discussion to reduce complexity.
56 See question 9 in the survey, Appendix 3. 
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These variables will give the “strategic service focus” of the transport, i.e. 
what kind of service content the transport has, e.g. if the time factors domi-
nate or the price (=less “frills”, or just an “a to b” transport). This is what the 
Buyers pay for. If they want fast transport then the strategic service focus is 
“Speed”, if they want delivery within a certain time window, then the strate-
gic service focus is “Time Precision” (which can be both fast and with special 
coordination to pick up and deliver within a certain time margin, or it can 
be a normally paced transport + time window, however with the logistic 
complexity increased compared to the standard transport).
The levels (% per industry group) of these pressures are shown in Figure 8. 
As can be seen Price (the highest bars) is always, on average, an important 
factor for most industries, but especially for B&C, both manufacturer and 
wholesalers, paper, and industrial wholesalers. For individual companies this 
can vary though. High time-sensitivity is especially apparent for Food & 
Beverage, and Industrial Products, especially wholesalers, but also manufac-
turers. Price sensitivity normally increases for smaller companies.
Figure	8:	Price	and	time	pressure	shares	(%),	per	industry	group.57
57 Price pressures are, on average, all over 50 %. NB! Individual companies may have big deviations 
from this. Time pressure here = speed + time precision pressure. (Weighed to represent the total 
population, n = 567, N = 7,832).
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4.6. Transport Providers’ time to prepare
Buyers affect the time pressure in the order fulfilment process also by how 
long in advance they notify the Transport Provider, i.e. how long they order 
before the actual delivery. This indicates how long the operative “planning 
horizon” is for the Transport Provider to allocate transport resources58. Table 
3 shows the range of average number of hours the notification is done in 
each industrial group. As can be seen, notification is often given just a day 
before delivery takes place59.
Table	3:	Notification	time	of	Buyer	when	booking	an	order,	hours	 
(tot	pop),	approximate	range,	average	hours	per	industry	group,	n=354.
CAT2 Comp type Min 
hours
Max 
hours
Food&B Manufacturer 10 25
Food&B Wholesaler 15 22
B&C Manufacturer 24 67
B&C Wholesaler  7 19
Ind Manufacturer 16 34
Ind Wholesaler  7 30
Paper Manufacturer  6 21
Figure 9 below shows the Transport Providers’ average response time, i.e. 
the quota between the transport Lead-Time (LT) and the minimum Order 
Cycle Time (OCT min time)60. A higher quota means there is little time gap 
between order and delivery.
Whether delivery can be performed quickly could depend on the Transport 
Buyer’s stock levels. The figure shown after the industry category is the mean 
percentage of goods delivered from stock. Paper industry and Food & Bever-
age manufacturers appear to have the speediest deliveries in relationship to 
the OCT. Wholesalers are in the middle, and Industrial and B&C manufac-
turers have a lower quota, in other words somewhat more allocation time.
58 In contractual situations though the transport volumes could be known or scheduled over a longer 
period of time, however all fluctuations might not be foreseeable.
59 Interpretation should be cautious though since not everyone answered this question.
60 Order Cycle Time (OCT)= the time from the order until delivery arrives at the customer. 
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Figure	9:	Order	cycle	minimum	time,	and	transport	lead-time	share	
of	minimum	Order	Cycle	Time	(OCT).61
Figure 10, below, shows how much (percentage) of the goods are delivered 
from stock. It is noticeable that stock levels are higher for manufacturers of 
Food & Beverage and B&C. For Industrial products it is the opposite, and 
the difference is statistically significant. The low stock levels for Paper industry 
and relatively low lead times, indicate a high time pressure at delivery point.
Figure	10:	Percentage	of	goods	delivered	from	stock.62
61 The figure gives the average percentage of goods delivered from stock. Average lead time, weighed 
against the goods flow (volume equivalent weight). OCT min time is the average of the entire 
minimum Order Cycle Times.
62 95 % confidence interval indicated around the mean (the dot). n=522. Tot pop (N=7,305).
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5. What is important for the Transport 
Buyer?
As a supplier of goods, the Transport Buyer has to be able to give its cus-
tomer a certain level of service (e.g. delivery of specified quantities at specific 
times) at a certain price, therefore it has specific requirements of the Trans-
port Provider’s capabilities. The Buyer obviously tailors a delivery strategy 
that stays competitive. Therefore certain factors are more important to the 
individual company than others. If the Provider can fulfil the requirements 
they have agreed upon, the Buyer will be satisfied, if not — dissatisfied. In 
order to e.g. renew contracts, Buyers periodically assess their Transport Pro-
viders’ performance, and the assessment is at least hypothetically compared 
to their own importance weights.
5.1. Some factors
To find out which factors are important to different industrial Transport 
Buyers we asked the respondents to assess how important certain attributes 
of a Transport Provider’s performance are to their business in choosing a 
Transport Provider.
In all, 33 questions were asked, see question 24 in the questionnaire, Appendix 3.
These attributes covered more technical and operational aspects of the trans-
port service, as well as the human aspects, such as communication, informa-
tion retrieval, trust, quality, problem solving, and skill. The same questions 
were also asked regarding their main Transport Provider’s perceived perfor-
mance, see Appendix 3.
Two of these attributes, trust and quality stability, were chosen to repre-
sent the “Overall Satisfaction” with the Transport Provider’s performance. 
The equivalent importance attributes formed “Overall importance”, which 
in other words is the “input” variable63 representing, attributes that make 
prediction and planning easier. Of the remaining 31 attributes nine factors 
were chosen,64 see Table 4.
63 I.e. the independent variable (X).
64 Principal Component analysis (PCA) of correlations was performed of the Transport Buyers’ 
importance weights. The model explains 62% of the total variation (i.e. it reduces uncertainty in 
the statistical information with 62 %). 
How to read Table 4
Factors (in the columns) are the resources or phenomena that describe 
the major capabilities of the Transport Provider.
The items (or attributes = the rows) are the different questions asked to 
assess about levels of different aspects of the Transport Provider’s capa-
bility.
Each factor is formed when usually several items with high factor load-
ings “flock” on it. The factor loading (here shown by “pluses”, see “codes” 
above) shows the strength of the association between each item and the 
factor, i.e. if the item and the factor vary in the same or the opposite 
direction. With positive associations, the “movements” are all in the 
same direction for each factor’s items, however some items contribute 
more than others.
When the factor loading = 1.0 item and factor move in the same direc-
tion, which means total agreement, no uncertainty whatsoever.
-1.0 means they move in the opposite direction.
Values near zero (0) are therefore interpreted as if there most likely is no 
association, i.e. people asked are uncertain, or they don’t really know. 
Random answers like that therefore cancel each other. Generally, the 
loading is tested at a certain significance level, for example 95 %, which 
means there is 5 % risk that what seems to be a connection could just be 
a coincidence, i.e. just a random event that “happened” to occur.
!
!"#$%&'(&)*+,$&-&
!"#$% &'()"*%
+"'#,-.%
/$+'),"-01,2%3("**$+'),"-4%5$)6$$-%,)$7%'-#%
8'()"*%
999% "#$"!%!"#&&! '()*!+,)-./!0-+1,12(!3++-413,1-.!
99% "#5"!%!"#67! 8,)-./!0-+1,12(!
9% "#9"!:!"#97! ;-)(!1<0-),3.,!0-+1,12(!
394% "#==!%!"#=7! 81/.1>143.,!0-+1,12(!
$72):% ?!"#==! @.4(),31.A!.-,!+B-C.!1.!,B(!,3DE(!
!
!
!
!
Compare Hair et.al., 1992, p. 239.
81
Table	4:	The	31	attributes65	reduced	to	nine	factors	(in	the	columns),	
Principal Component analysis.
65 See Appendix 4 for exact factor loadings and other measurements.
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32 Environmental mgmt system  +++ 
        
33 
Environmentally efficient 
transport 
+++ 
        
30 Low emission standards +++ 
        
 6 Quality certif. (e.g. ISO 9000) +++ 
        
29 Using other fuels than diesel ++ 
        
10 Accessible for bookings 
 
+++ 
       
15 Transport on time 
 
++ 
       
11 Accessible for follow-up 
 
++ 
       
17 Routines. disruption report 
 
++ 
       
 3 IT system, track & trace 
  
+++ 
      
 2 IT system for ordering 
  
+++ 
      
 4 
Complementary logistics 
services   
+ 
      
31 Offers intermodal R/R  
   
+++ 
     
27 Offers Rail transport 
   
+++ 
     
23 
Access to detachable load-
carriers    
++ 
     
24 Different transport modes 
   
+ 
     
21 Has good reputation 
    
+++ 
    
20 Has worked for us before 
    
+++ 
    
18 Good manners 
    
++ 
    
26 
Coordinated deliveries with 
other companies      
+++ 
   
28 High loading factor 
     
++ 
   
25 
Can coordinate our in- and 
outbound transport      
+ 
   
12 Many scheduled dispatches 
      
++ 
  
13 
Can adjust to large variations 
in volume       
++ 
  
14 Deliveries at short notice 
      
++ 
  
 1 Geographic coverage 
      
(+) 
  
 5 Can handle our goods 
       
++ 
 
 9 Customized transport 
       
++ 
 
 7 Routines document handling 
       
(+) 
 
 8 Has safety routines 
       
(+) 
 
22 One of the lowest prices 
        
+++ 
 Uncertainty reduced (%) 11.4 10.4 7.6 7.2 5.8 5.7 5.3 5.3 3.6 
 Total uncertainty reduced  (%) 62.3 
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Factor values were then constructed as summated scales both for the Trans-
port Buyers’ assessed importance weights and the performance values. Reli-
ability tests of these summated scales were performed which gave high or 
very high Cronbach’s (standardized) alpha.66
5.2. Description of the factors
The mean importance weights (bottom row of Table 4) show that the 
respondents classify the factors “F2 Reliability of Service”, “F9 Price”, “F8 
Skill”, and “F7 Network Capability” as the most important.
Factor “F2 Reliability of Service consists of four attributes to do with on-
time delivery, and different aspects of communication with the Transport 
Provider. This will be described more in detail below. F7 Network Capabil-
ity, a technical system factor, covers the distributional aspects of geographi-
cal coverage of the transport network, and the delivery operations: that the 
service Provider has enough capacity to cope with volume fluctuations, high 
frequency, and short notice transport. The factor “F8 Skill” is a “People”-
factor. It is a crucial factor tying people, technology, standards, and opera-
tions together, so that at the same time efficiency and good service can be 
achieved, that damages, loss and failures to deliver the goods on time can be 
minimised.
Regarding the factor F9 Price, see section 5.2.10.
Relationship (F5) consists of three items: “…has good reputation”, “…
has worked for us before”, and “…has pleasant manner…” (these will be 
described more below), i.e. how well-known, reputable, and approachable 
(thus communicative), are the Transport Provider and their personnel?
The last four factors are Technical, “F1 Standards”, “F6 Load factor”, “F3 
ICT”, and “F4 Modal”. “F1 Standards” represents quality and environmen-
tal management systems, i.e. both quality certification, and technical systems 
that fulfil the requirements for Emission Control, to ensure environmentally 
acceptable transport67.
66 Cronbach’s alpha gives the internal reliability, i.e. is a test that the variables are measuring the same 
thing. Should be at least 0.70, but in some cases could be lower. See Appendix 4.
67 Some critics of ISO 9000 certification mean it has little to do with quality development since 
the system is product oriented, not process oriented, encouraging an old fashioned control view 
instead of continual improvements (Bergman and Klefsjö, 1990:269f ).
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“F6 Load factor” covers efficiency and utility of space in the vehicles and 
load-carriers, which in other words has an economical aspect to the trans-
port.
The two lowest ranked factors are ”F3 ICT”, and “F4 Modal. “F3 ICT” con-
tains attributes to do with the IT-based communication standard, and any 
extra third party logistics services offered by the Transport Provider.
”F4 Modal” includes availability of different transport modes, including 
regular train, and intermodal road/rail transport, and access to detachable 
intermodal load-carrier units (e.g. containers). However, there can be big 
variations in importance weights especially between different industries and 
company sizes.
So what we see here, from this explicit ranking of importance, is that factors 
which concern the core operative service of the relationship, reliability and 
skill that the service will be performed as promised, that all customers can be 
reached, and that capacity is available for flexible performance, are weighed 
the most. These are often considered, on average, at least as important as 
price. That the remaining technical factors are described as “less important” 
does not mean they are considered unimportant; they might just be antici-
pated or expected as “basic requirements”. Such factors will not necessar-
ily increase satisfaction as performance improves, however they will invoke 
dissatisfaction if performance worsens (e.g. Matzler and Sauerwein, 2002; 
Vargo, Nagao et al., 2007).
In the following description of each factor, for the “items” referred to, 
see Table 4, and the full question in the questionnaire, see question 24 in 
Appendix 3. The factors are presented in the same order as they occur in the 
PCA (the factor order in Table 4), which is based on the explained variance.
5.2.1. Overall Satisfaction
The most fundamental entities in a relationship are trust and reliability68. 
The inter-organizational relationship in question, between a Transport 
Buyer and a Transport Provider, is also the interface between the Buyer and 
68 What I mean by reliability is that the agreement of service delivery is fulfilled, i.e. that service is 
performed within e.g. the time limits or in a manner that was agreed upon. Trust is a relationship 
concept that assumes (from the Buyer’s horizon) that the service Provider is not only reliable but 
also honest, and capable of, if necessary, taking initiative without a contract in order to benefit a 
good relationship. Notice that reliability in this context is a perception concept, and not necessari-
ly the same as the statistical reliability. 
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its customers, thus extra sensitive. To anchor “trust” with an overall opera-
tive indicator, I chose to use “quality stability”, since the Buyer wants as little 
quality fluctuations as possible.
So Overall Satisfaction can be described as an overall indicator of trust and 
reliability in that the Transport Provider will perform in a predictable way, 
i.e. in a way that they have agreed upon, and that gives as little uncertainty 
as possible.
So the two items used for this overall or “summarising” indicator are:
	 •		 Item	16:	Measures	how	 the	Transport	Provider	 fulfils	 its	 commit-
ment, i.e. the agreement with the customer. It also assumes (from 
the Buyer’s horizon) that the service Provider is reliable, honest and 
capable of e.g. taking initiative (also without a contract) to benefit a 
good relationship.
	 •		 Item	19:	“The	Transport	Provider	maintains	an	even	quality	level”,	
which is the assessment of quality fluctuations caused by distur-
bances or deficiencies of the performance and capabilities.
5.2.2. Standards
I call this factor F1 Standards, see Table 4, because it contains industrial 
standards or guidelines for both quality and environment in the form of 
ISO-certifications or comparable. It is not difficult to see e.g. the connec-
tion of quality-certification such as the standard ISO-9000 compared to the 
performance of the production process. For the item especially important 
for the process quality the question was asked:
“The Transport Provider is quality certified e.g. ISO 9000”69. Why was this 
question chosen for the survey?
The attribute describes quality standards according to the international ISO 
9000 or similar certification. The whole idea with quality-certification is 
to create awareness of quality levels, and to increase predictability by stand-
ardization. Quality that fluctuates is a big problem, not the least if flows 
are big. One purpose of a quality system such as ISO-9000 is to make it 
easier to compare suppliers when it comes to factors that are essential for a 
production (or service) to be reliable, i.e. to make sure that the supplier has 
69 Item 6 of question 24 in the survey, see Appendix 3.
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an organization that clearly defines production processes and responsibili-
ties, how these are to be maintained. It also specifies how routines should be 
applied, contents of contracts, etc. (IVF, 1989, p 222-223).70
5.2.3. Reliability of Service
The factor named “Reliability of Service” consists of four core service items,71 
see Table 4. Three of them cover communication to and from the customer, 
one the performance on time.
Communication:
	 •		 Item	#	10	is	measuring	how	accessible	the	personnel	is	in	giving	infor-
mation and in assisting with bookings
	 •		 Item	 #	 11	 is	measuring	 how	 accessible	 the	 personnel	 is	 in	 giving	
information when orders need to be followed up
	 •		 Item	#	17	is	a	contingency	or	warning-variable	that	has	to	do	with	
giving feedback when something goes wrong or disrupts the deliv-
ery. This obviously could include communicating with the Transport 
Buyer or its customer if necessary.
Core performance:
	 •		 Item	#	15	measures	how	important	it	is	to	stick	to	agreed	delivery	
times. From a business perspective time precision is often crucial to 
keep service levels up. The importance weight is in other words indi-
cating the Buyer’s time sensitivity, and its performance assessment to 
what degree the Provider is able to deliver On Time.
It can be noticed that these items are connected to people, either accessibility 
to a person (to retrieve information, items 10, 11, 17), requesting skills or 
routines for special tasks (15, 17). Of course, there could also be technical 
or resource aspects to these, such as enough capacity to perform deliveries 
on time (15).
The first three items are communication with the intent for the Buyer to 
retrieve essential information. I call it communication because it could also 
give the Service Provider direction e.g. how to solve a problem.
70 See also comment in footnote 67.
71 Reliability, see footnote 68.
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The last item has to do with trust, and the performance evaluation measure 
with reliability more than any of the other factors72, and could therefore in 
that sense be considered a ”skill-factor” as well as a factor representing the 
perceived performance or output of the service.
Ability to communicate
To be able to plan, there has to be relevant information available. For ship-
ments that might mean to get information about an express delivery, or 
about customs regulations and service levels to customers in remote geo-
graphical areas. Much information is available through technological means, 
such as Internet or EDI, timetables, price lists, etc., but sometimes com-
munication has to be direct through a person, to avoid misunderstandings if 
nothing else. The attribute items 10, 11, and 17 described above are covering 
some of this, including the booking situation, the possible follow-up during 
or after the transport.
Many “lean” companies are so slimmed that barely anything must go wrong; 
otherwise there will be disrupted processes (e.g. Christopher and Peck, 2004; 
Zsidisin et al., 2005). Therefore predictions have to be reliable. To be reliable 
especially means to be dependable, so that predictions can be trusted. But 
predictions are unfortunately not flawless, since the future is not known. In 
processes it is therefore sometimes necessary to have a working contingency 
system instead, or a “plan B”, if and when something goes wrong that needs 
quick attention. A contingency system could be a feedback or communica-
tion system, which gives early warning when something unforeseen hap-
pens, so the problem can be tackled and managed, or at least mitigated.
Access to personal service
Transport Buyers are many times pressed for time, since processes are 
increasingly time-compressed. One could assume that the Transport Provid-
ers try to routinize and standardize as much as possible of their operations, 
much the same way that banks are trying to automate services so that the 
customers themselves do the actual work (e.g.Schmenner, 2004). Examples 
for Transport Providers are e.g. self-booking by EDI and internet or in pro-
viding ”track and trace” of the shipments. However, it seems from findings 
in this survey quite clearly that customers are very dependent on personal 
72 Apart from ”Overall Satisfaction”, which is intended to measure the overall trust and quality of the 
Transport Provider’s performance, see section 5.2.1.
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assistance in situations like getting information, doing the booking, and fol-
lowing up orders73.
Why then is the personal contact so important to Transport Buyers? If people 
are easily accessible to answering questions, it saves time for the Buyer. Direct 
communication also reduces uncertainties regarding the transport situation 
very quickly. The same goes for item 11 (“…follow-up of transport”). This 
could concern questions when there are problems with the shipment, such 
as delays or damages. The bottom line is that personal contact is preferred 
when there are uncertainties in complex situations, and one can assume 
time-saving is a reason; another could be personal preferences if it is easier to 
communicate by personal contact, it reduces misunderstandings.
Routines and contingency systems
Routines are standardized behaviour to deal with repeated tasks in an effi-
cient and hopefully also effective manner. Item 17 above concerns routines 
that directly affect the quality of the delivery. “The Transport Provider has 
well functioning routines for reporting deviations” involves giving feedback, 
i.e. communicating, with the Transport Buyer when things go wrong. This 
way precautions can be taken to compensate for, or “fix”, disruptions or 
emergency situations in the delivery, in other words this is a part of a respon-
sive contingency system. The idea of this is to deal with the unplanned so 
that failure can be avoided or at least mitigated, just like a “shock-absorber” 
of a car, which “deals with” potholes in a road.
This factor is therefore named ”Reliability of Service” since it captures both 
the trust-aspects of the service relationship: that the service Providers are 
reliable and can live up to their commitments, and that they have the capac-
ity to ”fix things” when things go wrong. This is to keep quality fluctua-
tions within the ”tolerance zone” (Berry and Parasuraman, 1991; Strandvik, 
1994). And, maybe above all, that communication and feedback is there 
when such disruptions occur.
5.2.4. Information and Communication Technology
ICT stands for “Information and Communication Technology”, but the 
factor also contains an element of external problem solving (3PL). It consists 
of three items (item numbers from Table 4):
73 The importance weight average for item 10 is 6.26 (tot pop), which is among the four highest of 
all the 33 variables, however the performance is far below this expectation.
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	 •		 Item	#	2:	Order	booking	system	available
	 •		 Item	#	3:	Track	and	trace	system	available
	 •		 Item	#	4:	Complementary	logistics	services	can	be	offered	(3PL)
It was shown above that one of the biggest concerns of the Transport Buyer 
is to get personal service, e.g. to get information for booking transport, or 
follow up information. However, once a transport solution is well function-
ing it might be more practical to get access to the Transport Provider’s system 
in a way that can be routinized. IT-based information and booking systems 
could, if the process is well known, be controlled by the customer himself 
and therefore important for various reasons, e.g. to save time, to have better 
control, or to get standardized information. This works today e.g. by EDI or 
by Internet-based databases. When the survey was made there was also access 
to these, but it can be assumed that considerable technical development has 
been in the meantime.
The importance weight for this variable (item 2) is 4.27, which shows this is 
considered to be of ”medium” importance. To have control of the transport 
process through ”track and trace” seems to be of more interest by the Buyers. 
This could have to do with e.g. the urgency to retrieve information when 
there are deviations from plan, i.e. when there is some delivery problem, 
however possibly this is also a sign that the personal communication is not 
so good.
This indicates three things:
 1)  The interest is high to be able to trace the goods through an IT-
system.
 2)  There is a considerable variance, which means to some companies 
this is high priority, to others this is low priority.
 3)  Transport Providers are, on average, good at offering technical sup-
port for information search and on-line booking.
Comment on item 4: The outsourcing trend for logistics, so called third 
party logistics (3PL), is strong, at least if one looks at the logistics services 
(Weele, 2010:161). However in asking the Transport Buyers the question 
” …has a wide variety of complementary logistics services”, it was somewhat 
surprising to find that this was one of the lowest weighted items of all of 
them. There is a considerable variance for different trades, especially con-
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sidering the volume effect, i.e. the size of the flow. Bigger companies seem to 
consider 3PL somewhat more important than smaller ones.
5.2.5. Modal factor
This factor consists of four items, of which three concern the choice of vehi-
cles. A fourth item deals with access to detachable load-carriers, such as ISO-
containers.
The modal choice depends to a large degree on if the chosen forwarder has 
access to different modes of transport. For bigger forwarders with a network 
organization it is normal that they can offer different modes: truck, train, 
ship, and airplane, or any combination of these. Buyers normally do not 
bother about the modal choice as such, so importance weight average is low.
However, the access to detachable load-carriers is sometimes of more con-
cern, as can be seen in the findings for some industries (e.g. Paper industry, 
and Machines & Tools manufacturers).
5.2.6. Relationships
Three items constitute this factor, see Table 4:
	 •		 Item	#	18:	 If	 the	personnel	have	good	manners	when	they	collect	
and deliver the goods, this can be important to the Transport Buyer.
	 •		 Item	#	20	weighs	to	what	degree	the	Transport	Buyer	feel	they	know	
a Transport Provider by own experience, before contracting them 
again (or for the first time). This obviously has to do with uncer-
tainty and risk assessment, and being able to plan (”we know what 
we have, but not what we will get”). A new Transport Provider could 
be cheaper, but might not fulfil the service requirements that the 
Buyer expects.
	 •		 Item	#	21:	The	same	reason	as	a	pleasant	or	friendly	manner	can	be	
crucial, the reputation of the Transport Provider is very important. 
One reason for that is that a bad reputation could easily ”rub off” 
or stain the Buyer’s own reputation. Most of all, though, it could 
be considered to be a ”trust-indicator” since reputation usually also 
includes the image that the company has in the market.
These items really have to do with communication.
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At the collection it could e.g. be that special instructions about the goods 
have to be given. Or it could be to get feedback about a previous transport 
or any other problems that needs to be dealt with. This makes it important 
that the personnel are reliable, approachable and communicative. It could 
also be a way for the Buyer to assess the Transport Provider when it comes to 
skill and problem solving. Transport companies with well-trained and expe-
rienced staff are likely to handle both goods and disruptive situations better 
than inexperienced personnel.
Also in delivering the goods to the receiver it is obviously an advantage to 
have a pleasant and approachable manner for the same reasons as above. 
Sometimes this is also the only person-to-person contact the Transport 
Buyer has with its own customers, which means the driver actually is the 
“representative” of that company.
Networks of transport chains are often complex with many actors, and it is 
important to know that the relationship works. To work with known part-
ners that have good performance records should be more important as com-
panies’ vulnerability to disturbances increase. Findings in the survey indicate 
that relationships overall are lasting. However, especially bigger companies 
usually have many contracts and can therefore switch over more easily if 
there are relational problems.
5.2.7. Load factor
The naming of this factor refers to what degree the physical loading space 
and capacity of the shipment equipment (vehicles, containers, etc) is used.
This factor consists of three items (see Table 4):
	 •		 Item	 #	 25:	To	 coordinate	 in-	 and	 outbound	 flows	 of	 a	 company	
increases dependencies on the Transport Provider and has con-
sequences for coordination of both receiving and shipping goods. 
Looking at it this way, then this variable is also connected to skill, 
to be able to plan and coordinate. This item deals, in other words, 
with the productivity aspects of the transport, but is at the same time 
connected to the dispatch situation and frequency (planning and 
coordination), which obviously also has economic considerations.
	 •		 Item	#	26:	Sharing	deliveries	with	other	companies	puts	even	higher	
demands on skills to plan and coordinate. Despite this, there might 
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be other reasons why companies do not want to freight goods mixed 
with other companies’ goods.
	 •		 Item	#	28:	High	loading	factor	is	considered	very	important	in	some	
industries, e.g. food and paper industry. This is an efficiency aspect 
of the transport, a sign of high competitive price pressure.
All three of these items can be interpreted as productivity variables. As such 
they have a direct economic impact on performance (e.g. cost per delivery).
To co-deliver goods with different Transport Buyers in order to increase the 
loading factor obviously also increases the productivity, at least if the Buyers 
are located reasonably near each other. This is the economical and corporate 
reason to co-ordinate shipments. However, as I found in the interviews, there 
are reasons why Buyers do not want to mix their goods with other compa-
nies’ goods (Saxin, 2002a). One might be for marketing reasons. Sometimes 
companies will not co-transport, simply out of competitive reasons (e.g. ICA 
does not co-transport with COOP or Axfood). Sometimes it is due to secu-
rity reasons, goods might get damaged or stolen more easily, or even because 
it could be against the competitive legislation (cartel-like situations). One 
company I interviewed e.g. had to turn down an offer of co-transport of 
tyres with their food product due to the risk of not being able to substitute 
damaged goods and also due to increased theft risk since their own personnel 
would not be present at the loading.
5.2.8. Network Capability
This factor consists of technical resources (capacity, geographical coverage), 
and people-focused resources (relationships). However, in the survey, the 
four questions that were asked were more focused on the technical system 
aspects, why it is not possible to single out the relationship factor here.
The factor thus consists of the following items (see Table 4):
	 •		 Item	#	1:	Geographical	coverage,	 to	have	access	 to	a	network	that	
can reach all required destinations. This normally means cooperation 
with global or international actors. This item is considered of very 
high importance.
	 •		 Item	 #	 12:	 Frequency,	 “…has	 many	 scheduled	 dispatches”.	 This	
means regular distribution after time-table or special arrangements.
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	 •		 Item	#	13:	The	ability	to	adjust	to	large	volume	variations	means	the	
company must have access to reserve capacity.
	 •		 Item	#	14:	The	ability	to	deliver	at	short	notice	requires	availability	
to reserve capacity. This type of flexibility is, in other words, also 
including ability to deliver apart from the scheduled shipments.
Network Capability has to do with the physical shipment capability of the 
Transport Providers, how they have enough spatial resources such as their 
own transport chains or a network that enable them to reach all required 
destinations. Another dimension is the shipping capacity, which includes 
access to reserve capacity.
The frequency (item 12) of scheduled delivery occasions is a fundamental, 
not to say crucial, and observable part of the service level. If the pick-up 
occasions are enough, the purchaser won’t have to be worried about disrup-
tions or long delays in the dispatch of the goods. What is ”often enough” 
obviously varies depending on the type of industry, the volume of the flow, 
and other factors such as Price. Frequency, however, is important but less of 
a problem according to the respondents, since performance is almost ade-
quate. The ability to absorb fluctuations is of a far bigger concern, according 
to the Buyers’ responses.
5.2.9. Skill
This factor consists of four items:
	 •		 Item	#	5	measures	the	skill	of	the	Transport	Provider	to	avoid	dam-
ages. This can refer to both technical applications and handling skill.
	 •		 Item	#	9	is	a	measure	of	the	planning	and	management	skills	of	the	
service Provider, in order to customize transport-solutions, in other 
words problem-solving.
	 •		 Item	#	7:	This	item74 is directly connected to ISO (9000)-certifica-
tion. Good documentation routines could be seen as important in 
the control of the shipments to save time otherwise spent in these 
tasks.
	 •		 Item	#	8:	Systems	and	routines	to	avoid	theft	and	loss.
74 ”The Transport Provider has good routines for handling documents”.
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People’s skills and capabilities to perform their tasks determine much of 
the performance outcome. The level of skill depends on how well a person 
understands the system and can manage the processes of the business. This 
is largely resulting from accumulated experience, training, i.e. some form 
of learning, but also motivation. To e.g. handle unplanned situations obvi-
ously could be dependent on skill, and ability to solve problems. Skill and 
problem-solving ability could thus also influence what promises the Trans-
port Provider gives to the Transport Buyer. These promises or commitments 
form the basis of the Buyer’s expectations of the performance. Indirectly, the 
Transport Providers’ ability to deliver on time is directly connected to this 
ability to plan and design the transport (e.g. allocate resources) and often to 
have a functioning contingency system (reserve resources) on hand if any-
thing goes wrong.
Item 9 (see above) could also be limited by e.g. the available information 
or the available shipping capacity of the Transport Provider. An example of 
that, apart from the ability to plan and coordinate, is to have the network 
resources or contacts available when needed in order to perform the actual 
physical transport75.
The handling skills, item 5, usually by the driver or the terminal staff, who 
load and secure the loads on the trucks, trains or ships, are affected by e.g. 
time limits. However, they could be crucial in order to avoid unnecessary 
damages of the goods, thus also causing delay.
The third aspect of skill mentioned is designing and following operative rou-
tines that give the system efficiency. Item 7 and 8 both cover some aspects 
that can and should be routinized, to avoid unnecessary mistakes and delay. 
Item 8 also contains a safety aspect that many times is neglected e.g. due to 
lack of time.
5.2.10. Price
Price is the trade-off for the service levels. A Transport Buyer normally has a 
ceiling when transport becomes too pricey. However, often the Buyer76 has 
service priorities due to requirements and needs of its customers, therefore 
it is not necessarily the lowest price that is the most interesting. Thus we 
asked for the price dimension of what weight, when deciding for a Transport 
75 Network resources are though in this thesis assumed to be included in factor 7, Network Capability.
76 Which is the supplier of goods.
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Provider, had ”one of the lowest prices” (question 24:22 of the survey, see 
Appendix 3)? In other words we did not ask how important it was that the 
price was the lowest, but one of the lowest, that is that the price was competi-
tive. The reason for this was to be able to see if both service factors and price 
were important at the same time, or if one or the other dominated77. The 
average weight 5.83 signals that price, after all it is considered a very impor-
tant factor, however still not the most important. The variation between the 
trades is considerable78.
This means that there is some substance in suggesting that this importance 
item indicates price sensitivity, that is the higher importance weight, the 
higher the Buyer’s sensitivity is to price79.
The equivalent performance variable for this item, in other words, then rep-
resents Pricing, i.e. how the Transport Provider responds to the Buyer’s price 
sensitivity. The more the Pricing factor increases the more the Transport Pro-
vider tries to adjust to the Buyer’s desired price level (i.e. price decreases).
5.3. Grouping the factors
Service is a concept that we usually associate with human involvement, e.g. 
someone performs a service. It is, however, possible to standardize certain 
routinized tasks, and still maintain (sometimes even improve) the service 
level. So service could be bound to technical systems, such as computers,80 
or to persons. An attempt was therefore made above to operationalize the 
activities in the description of the PCA-factors and Overall Satisfaction. 
Normally persons handle the more complex tasks that are difficult to stand-
ardize. Therefore, when complexity grows, information also grows, and time 
is a scarce resource to the customer (in this case the Buyer), communication 
is even more important. If the automated information system is difficult to 
use, to understand or if it lacks transparency, it might be necessary to speak 
to someone instead.
77 Another question (Question 9, see Appendix 3) in the survey is complementing this factor and 
makes it possible to see whether the respondent is primarily time- or price-focused, or both. That 
question was not included in this PCA though but will be analysed separately (see chapter 6). 
78 Range 4.81-6.00 for different industries on a scale 1 to 7 (max)
79 There is high correlation and fit between the two price questions question 9 (which measure the 
price pressure of the total transport solution) and question 24, item 22 (see survey form, Appendix 
3). A few trades do not show this correlation. If those trades are excluded the fit for the remaining 
will be even better (correlation r≈ 0,41 and F≈ 83).
80 An example of an automated service is a bank automat to withdraw money from a savings ac-
count.
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To simplify further, in the following analysis I therefore reduce the nine 
Principal Component factors above into capability groups, thus “technical 
factors” i.e. shipping capacity, “People-focused factors”, and financial factors 
(i.e. money, here represented by price). The reduction is done by reasoning 
(discussions based on experience and analysis of the items).
This is illustrated in Figure 11. “People-focused factors” can further be 
divided into Information & Communication, Ability to solve problems, and 
On-time delivery.
Overall Satisfaction is the Buyer’s overall assessment, all things considered, 
of how the service is over an extended period of time.
5.3.1. Technical factors
Shipping Capacity factors is the “Technical system” which refers partly to 
those resources that make up the asset side of the balance sheet: produc-
tion equipment like vehicles, machines, containers, computer and commu-
nication hardware and software, warehouses and other buildings. Since the 
structure in the transport industry has changed in recent years, the Transport 
Provider does not necessarily own these assets, however it is understood that 
they are available in the transport chain. In transport networks actors buy 
services from each other, not just equipment capacity.
5.3.2. People-focused factors
People-focused factors refer to the availability of people, especially their abil-
ity to carry out their tasks with skill, to solve problems, and to communicate. 
Note that “F2 Reliability of Service” is split up in On-time performance and 
Information & Communication Systems.
The Information & Communication Systems (ICSys) is the “support-sys-
tem” to accomplish On-time performance, communication, and problem 
solving. This implies that people are necessary for the more complex problem 
solving in contrast to simpler, “automated” problem solving, i.e. standard-
ized information available for the Buyer to solve problems without especially 
having to contact the personnel of the Transport Provider (such as price lists, 
track & trace, time-tables).
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These factors have to do with planning, coordinating, allocating resources, 
and ability to solve the customer’s specific problem. That also includes good 
goods-handling skills.
5.3.3. Financial factors
Financial resources are in this study not included as such, but only repre-
sented by the transport price. The price level of the Transport Provider is a 
strong indicator and trade-off of the quality-level, but also of the competitive 
situation of the Transport Provider.
Competition, and the company size of the Transport Provider (thereby the 
power balance) in the dyad with the Buyer, decides to some degree what 
price-level can be kept. With enough customers and orders, prices do not 
need to be lowered, but can be used as an instrument to “regulate” the 
demand, thus also to avoid order backlogs.
Figure	11:	Reduction	of	the	nine	Principal	Component	factors	to	
three	factor	groups:	Technical,	People-focused,	and	Financial	factors.	
These	three	categories	consist	of	five	capability	factors.
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6. Findings about the performance of 
the Transport Provider
In this chapter findings will be presented.
Another important aspect of the delivery is how much of the goods arrive 
in good condition, or to revert the question, how much is damaged or is 
missing? These two measures, how much goods arrived on time, and how 
much arrived damaged, are important indicators of the quality of the service 
performance. This will be developed in this chapter.
6.1. To deliver on time
To most Transport Buyers, delivery on time is of high importance, because 
lead-times both for the order-cycle time and the actual delivery are usually 
very tightly planned. To deliver on time is important for the Transport Buyer 
in order to have a credible service offer and to show reliability. Also to the 
customer of the Transport Buyer it might be vitally important with predicta-
ble, in other words, reliable deliveries. For customers who are manufacturers 
with just-in-time planned production the dependency on the timely deliver-
ies could be crucial in keeping their production going, or, if it is retailers, 
not to be out of stock with products. Of course the whole order fulfilment 
process does not totally depend on the transport lead-time and the Transport 
Provider, but timing is of utmost importance in supply chains, especially if 
they have small or minimal time- and inventory-buffers. Planning transport 
lead-time is based on the Transport Provider’s experience, but disruptions 
cannot always be foreseen. Another factor in this is that it is normally the 
forwarder (the Transport Provider) who negotiates the design of the trans-
port solution with the Transport Buyer, whereas contracted hauliers per-
form the actual physical transport. This means that as long as these business 
relationships and routines are the same, then predictability is higher than if 
new relationships are formed. New business relationships in the transport 
network might mean new routines, and it could take time until they are 
functioning.
The other factor mentioned above that affects the quality of the transport 
service is how much of the goods arrive damaged or missing. Also, the goal 
here is of course 0 %, but circumstances, inexperience, ineptitude, careless-
ness and rush can cause damages. Damages can happen when the goods are 
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loaded or unloaded. It can also happen because they are not fastened prop-
erly during the transport, or from vibrations, accelerations or decelerations, 
e.g. when the vehicle breaks suddenly. Damages at lift-offs by aircraft (due 
to too high g-force, Gooley, 2004) or sorting parcels in express goods’ ship-
ments (ibid.) is another reason. In train transport, damages are common due 
to shunting, and vibrations during the transport.
Findings: error rates
On an average, approximately 91 - 94 %81 of the shipments arrive on time 
depending on the region of the customers, the highest for Finland, the lowest 
for Europe outside Scandinavia. For Swedish receivers the delivery precision 
is 92.7 %, in other words over 7 out of 100 deliveries failed to be on time!
I am using the concept “Failure rate” for the failure to deliver the ship-
ments On Time82. Biggest differences then are between small companies 
(both manufacturers and wholesalers) and medium-sized and large compa-
nies, Figure 12 below. For the total population of all industries covered in 
this study the failure rate is 7.7%83.
Average damage was 1.68% (±0.24)84 of the outgoing goods quantity 
(n=310).
The model developed above proposed that damage and failure rates (“not 
on time”) are outcomes of performance. These are measurable entities that 
also give a comparable measurement for the quality of the service. A test of 
this gives a strong positive correlation between Damage % and Failure rate. 
Correlation is the strongest for Failure rates of deliveries in Sweden (t= 4.16, 
p<0.0001), Finland (t=2.73, p=0.0066) and Overall (t=3.08, p = 0.0022). For 
deliveries in Denmark there was instead a negative correlation (t=-2.25, p = 
0.0251). This means that there is indication that most damages occur with the 
deliveries within Sweden and they affect the Failure rates negatively (i.e. dam-
ages can cause the shipments to be delayed or to be perceived as not on time).
81 All error rates are from the Transport Buyers’ data, i.e. their own information systems. As will be 
illustrated in a couple of the cases below, Transport Buyers and Transport Providers sometimes 
have different opinions whether the delivery is on time or not. The reason for that could be that 
they measure differently. From a service management view, it is primarily the customer’s interpre-
tation that is important. 
82 Assuming there is agreement between the Buyer and the Transport Provider that ”on time” means 
”on time”.
83 Missing values were imputed with the average of each industry and company size.
84 For total population, flow in volume equivalent tonnes.
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The difference between industries is big. The seven groups of industries used 
in this study are also shown in Figure 13.
Figure	12:	Failure	rates	(top),	damage	%	(bottom),	medium	&	large	
sized	companies	versus	small.	Manufacturers	(left),	wholesalers	
(right),	means	and	95	%	confidence	intervals	shown,	n	=	567,	tot	pop.
Figure	13:	Failure	rates	(top	row)	and	damages	(%,	bottom)	for	different	
industry	groups,	means	and	95	%	confidence	intervals	are	shown.85
85 Failure rates, n=537, N=7,572, damages, n = 567, N=7,832.
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Figure 13 shows that there is quite a spread of the variance within and 
between the groups. B&C wholesalers stand out. Damage (in %) is signifi-
cantly different from B&C manufacturers. Failure rate is just about signifi-
cantly different.
For Food & Beverage wholesalers also show bigger measures, however it is 
only damages that are significantly different.
For Industrial companies there is no certain difference for failure rates, how-
ever wholesalers show lower damages86. It should be noted, though, that 
the manufacturers in this group consist of six different industry categories, 
wholesalers of three different categories. Comparing each industry and even 
sizes might give different results.
The paper industry is only classified here as “manufacturers”, but in reality 
these companies also are wholesalers, at least bigger actors. However, com-
pared to other industries it can be seen that damage (%) is significantly lower 
than other industrial manufacturers, and B&C wholesalers, however, higher 
than for food manufacturers.
Regarding failure rates there is only a significant difference between B&C 
wholesalers and Food & Beverage manufacturers. However, as implied 
above, comparing individual industries and sizes might give different results.
When both these variables are considered, failure rate, and damages (%), 
four distinct groups can be seen, Figure 14. Food & Beverage manufactur-
ers (1) have the least damages, and the lowest failure rates. Next group (2), 
medium failure rate and medium damage (%) consist of Food & Beverage 
wholesalers, Paper industry, and B&C manufacturers. Group (3), high fail-
ure rate and medium damage (%) are industrial companies. Group (4), very 
high failure rate and very high damage percentage, B&C wholesalers.
86 Statistical significant difference.
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Figure	14:	Failure	rate	(%	of	deliveries),	and	damages	(in	%	of	goods	
volume),	means	per	industrial	group,	total	population.
6.2. Effects of Buyer’s pressures on  
performance
A company’s ability to respond to a change in demand is indirectly a measure 
of its capability (Day, 1994). If response is slow this is a sign of inertia and 
/ or potential vulnerability, i.e. how resilient the company is if resources, or 
capabilities, are pressured. By measuring demands against the responses and 
including the customer’s satisfaction, it should therefore be possible to detect 
constrained capabilities, i.e. attributes of the service Provider that worsens or 
throttles the performance. Why is this important to know? In assessing the 
capabilities of a system one needs to know not only the risks of performance 
failure, but also the strengths and weaknesses of the company in dealing with 
unplanned or disturbing situations.
In this and the next section constraining conditions will be examined. First, 
in what way do the pressures defined above (Time Precision, Speed, and 
Price), affect the failure rates and damages (this section)? These are findings 
from multivariate (PLS) analysis. Second, in the next section, effects from 
all surveyed conditions, summarised in the Buyer’s desired performance, are 
analysed for the seven industrial groups.
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Findings: time pressure effects
Looking at all companies together, Speed has a noticeably deteriorating effect 
on damage %, i.e. it increases that variable, however does not seem to affect 
failure rate. On the other hand Time Precision has a slight (increasing) effect 
on failure rates, but also a lowering effect on damage rate.
Looking at different strata (large, medium and small manufacturers and 
wholesalers respectively) instead, the picture above is partly confirmed.
For manufacturing companies of all sizes, Speed seems to have an undesirable 
(i.e. increasing) effect on damage %. For large and small companies it also 
has a negative effect on the failure rate, especially for the larger companies. 
For smaller manufacturers Time Precision also has an undesirable (=increas-
ing) effect on damage and slightly undesirable on failure rate.
For wholesalers there is a slightly different finding. Large companies show 
increased failure rates for Time Precision. Medium-sized and small wholesal-
ers are more price-sensitive, and there are some increasing effects on failure 
rates and damages. Small companies also show some increasing effect.
To summarize:
	 •		 For	manufacturers,	as	well	as	for	small	wholesalers:	Speed	seems	to	
inflict more undesirable (increasing) effects on damages, sometimes 
also on failure rate.
	 •		 For	 large	 wholesalers:	Time	 precision	 has	 undesirable	 (increasing)	
effect on failure rate.
	 •		 For	medium-	and	small	wholesalers:	Time	precision	that	has	unde-
sirable (increasing) effect on both failure rates and damages.
Summary of time pressure effects:
There are higher failure rates when the delivery is focused on time con-
straining factors, especially Time precision. This suggests that Buyer’s time 
restrictions appear to increase the constraints on the available capacity of the 
Transport Provider, which was also hypothesized.
A Speed-focused transport solution is associated with higher rates of damages 
than other strategies, however not when transport volume is considered. This 
indicates that fast shipments with smaller volumes are more prone to damages.
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Findings also show that there is a positive correlation between damages and 
failure rates, in other words, indication is that damages could possibly cause 
delays.
6.3. Effects of Buyer’s desired performance
The following analysis is done in two parts; first comparing the levels between 
importance values and performance values, second of effects. Results are 
summarised in Table 5.
The second part is an analysis of effects as the inputs, including the pressures 
of time and price defined above, change one unit. Results are summarised in 
Table 6, and a brief presentation follows illustrated by six cases. This analysis 
is described more in detail in Saxin, 2012.
6.3.1. Findings from some industry groups
Figure 15 illustrates the state of capabilities for all industry groups examined 
in this study. This is a comparison (“matched pairs”) of the Buyer’s desired 
levels87 (left bar) and assessment of the main Transport Provider’s perfor-
mance for the same capability (right bar, next to it).
It is apparent that Overall Satisfaction (row 1), Ability to solve problems 
(row 2), On-Time Delivery (row 5), and Pricing (row 6) show that perfor-
mances are lower than desired. However, Shipping Capacity (the technical 
aspects of the delivery, row 4) are normally considered to be better than what 
the Buyer assesses important. So it is with Communication & Info-system 
(row 3), except for Food & Beverage wholesalers.
All the t-values from this matching for the different industry groups are 
summarised in Table 5, which shows the size of the gaps. The bigger the neg-
ative t-value, the higher is the statistical significance of the “gaps” between 
what the Buyer’s desire and what is assessed as performed by the Transport 
Provider. As can be seen for Overall Satisfaction, all industrial groups have 
substantial negative gaps88.
87 That is, the Buyer’s importance value or “benchmark”.
88 For example for Industrial manufacturers a t-value of -13.51 means the probability (p) is less than 
0.0001 that this is a random result, i.e. not depending on an effect.
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The On-Time delivery is also significantly lower performance for all indus-
trial groups. Problem Solving shows significant negative t-values for B&C 
manufacturers, Food & Beverage wholesalers, Industrial wholesalers, and 
almost significant for Industrial manufacturers, and Food & Beverage man-
ufacturers.
Figure	15:	Matched	pairs	of	capabilities.89
89 Pairs: importance weight (left) – performance assessment (right), scale 1 to 7 (see section 3.3.2). 
Different industry groups, n=567, tot pop.
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Table	5:	Matched	pairs,	capabilities,	t-values90
Industrial
group
Comp.
type
1.
Overall 
Satisfaction
2. Ability 
to solve 
problems
3. 
ICSys
4.
Shipping
capacity
5.
On-
Time
6 Pricing
Food&B Mf -4.20 -1.89 1.87 3.25 -5.03 -1.42
Food&B Whs -7.63 -6.62 -2.47 -0.01 -7.46 -5.71
B&C Mf -5.52 -5.27 2.25 4.87 -11.06 -3.10
B&C Whs -3.77 -0.48 0.38 5.77 -2.30 0.08
Paper Mf -4.27 -1.67 5.10 4.85 -4.19 -3.51
Ind Mf -13.51 -1.91 2.89 12.89 -14.35 -8.00
Ind Whs -8.55 -2.94 3.03 11.00 -7.85 -5.71
6.3.2. Constraining effects
A partial least square (PLS) analysis was performed (see section 3.4.2.) to 
find effects and thus get indications of bottlenecks. Table 6 summarises the 
findings of the effect analysis for the seven industrial groups91.
Table	6:	Summarising	the	findings	for	different	industry	categories92.
Constraining effects described by Buyer
Industrial group Comp
type
Overall 
Satisfaction
Ability to 
solve probl.
ICSys ShCap On-Time Price
Food & Beverage Mf (x) X (x) X X
Food & Beverage Whs X X (x) X X
B&C Mf
B&C Whs X X X X X X
Paper X X X (x) X X
Industrial Mf
		Spec	Ind	30,	M&L Mf X X X X X (x)
Industrial Whs
		Spec	Ind	518,	M&L Whs X X X
90 How to understand table 5:
 The table contains ”t-values”. A t-value ≤ -1.96 means that Transport Providers’ performance is 
significantly worse than the Buyer’s importance weight, and a t-value ≥ 1.96 that it is significantly 
better (i.e. the Provider performs better than the Buyer desire). These differences are significant 
with 95 % confidence intervals, i.e. with 95 % probability these differences are not random. 
n=567, represents the total population (N=7,832). 
 Mf = manufacturers, Whs = Wholesalers, ICSys = Information & Communication Systems, 
ShCap = Shipping capacity, On-time = On-time delivery.
91 More details in Saxin, 2012.
92 X = primary effects from higher time or price sensitivity, (x) = secondary effects.
 A primary negative effect I define as a significant effect that show an increase in the measurable 
dimensions (here: failure or damage rate), and a negative satisfaction (i.e. dissatisfaction), and a 
negative effect on any of the perceived capabilities.
 A secondary effect is as the primary effect but not giving any clear effect on both an output (mea-
surable or perceived) and Overall Satisfaction. More about this in Saxin, 2012.
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Food & Beverage, manufacturers
Food & Beverage manufacturers have the lowest failure rates and damage 
incidents of all the industries in the data studied; see Figure 13 and Figure 
14.
There are not many signs of serious constraints for this industry, Table 6. 
However, there is an indication that the Communication & Information-
system and the coordination of Problem-Solving, and Shipping Capacity 
may be affected as time and price pressure increases. Especially time preci-
sion pressure, in itself a constraining circumstance, could e.g. make shipping 
capacity less available or leave less time, thus making e.g. Problem-Solving 
more difficult.
The following case is to illustrate what distribution decisions for a company 
in this group can look like.
Case: BISQ, manufacturer of dry foods93
BISQ is a large manufacturer (and wholesaler) of well-assorted food 
products with long shelf life. Their biggest customers are wholesale food 
distributors in Scandinavia, such as ICA, Axfood and COOP. Some cus-
tomers have a delivery time window of ± half an hour, and a pickup time 
window of ± 1 hour. Half the goods volume is exported, mostly within 
Scandinavia. Shipments go directly to the food distributor’s terminal.
BISQ’s shipments have a high load factor, which indicates high price 
pressure94.
Most important criteria for their choice of transport solution are: Time 
precision and reliability, Price, Handling (i.e. undamaged goods).
However, BISQ does not really measure the delivery precision (“we are 
more interested in measuring costs”) according to the inventory man-
ager. Customer contact is kept through the forwarder. The forwarder 
solves any possible time-problems. BISQ is satisfied overall with the 
transport service performance, no delivery failures last year (2001) as he 
could recall.
93 Interview 15 Feb 2002, inventory / dispatch manager.
94 This is validated in our survey a year later where this company answered that the competitive price 
pressure on the transport solution is 90 %, Time precision 5 %, and Emission Control 5 %.
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Is BISQ a typical Food & Beverage manufacturer? Overall they are showing 
price-sensitivity, however they have no complains about the problem solving. 
On-time delivery though for 2002 (survey result) shows clear problems95. It 
is possible that circumstances for the Transport Provider has changed in that 
year.
Food & Beverage, wholesalers
Wholesalers of Food & Beverage show a different pattern than the manufac-
turers. They express even more pronounced problems with the Information 
& Communication Systems (ICSys), involving also the Shipping Capac-
ity (ShCap). Damages are more prevalent than for manufacturers, and also 
somewhat higher failure rate, see Figure 13 and Figure 14.
High price pressure especially affects the On-Time delivery (even more for 
medium- and large-sized companies than small). It also necessitates a high 
load-factor i.e. efficient use of the shipping capacity. Therefore both the 
communication and the information are of special importance to coordinate 
resources, especially under high time pressure.
The case ICOOPDAG illustrates the importance of getting feedback and 
other relevant information to be able to deliver goods on time.
Case: ICOOPDAG96
These three major Food & Beverage wholesalers and distributors have 
very complex operations and distribution covering the whole of Sweden.
According to the transport wholesaler (A) time precision is the most 
crucial factor. The reason is that otherwise there will be queues with the 
loading and unloading of goods. This was also the case for the other two 
wholesalers. “Everything is time controlled…Fresh foods require (time 
windows of ) ± 15 minutes” (B).
Wholesaler (C) states that they use time windows on all categories, espe-
cially the dry foods to avoid queues.
95 Answer by the purchasing chief.
96 In October 2001 I interviewed one transport coordinator and two transport chiefs for the three 
largest food wholesalers and distributors of food and household consumer products, ICA, KF 
(COOP) and DAGAB (Axfood) respectively. The “case” is therefore an amalgamation of these 
three actors, and consists of eight business units, however I will describe them as three corporate 
profiles, A, B, and C.
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Use of time windows (time precision) apparently is top priority with 
these major actors in the Food & Beverage Wholesale industry, even 
though they have slightly different priorities.
Lead-time (speed) is according to wholesaler (A) important in their 
operations for fresh foods. For the dry foods it is less important though. 
For them the load factor is more prioritised — …”trucks can be filled 
to 100%”.
Speed is in other words less important here, but to utilize all available 
load capacity is top priority.
Building & Construction material manufacturers
There are no clear constraints to be seen for this group, from the aggregated 
data since Overall Satisfaction does not give us clear guidance. However, 
from Table 5 and Figure 14 can be seen that dissatisfaction and lack of On-
Time delivery can still be problematic. So the following case, BUILD, will 
illustrate that studying an individual company can reveal problems.
Case: BUILD97
BUILD is a large-sized manufacturer of standardized building materi-
als98, with about 400 employees and a turnover of well over 1000 m 
SEK. Customers are Building & Construction companies and the 
DIY99-sector (retailers). Goods’ flow is large; most of it is for export. 
However, the degree of customization of the shipments is high since the 
customers do not want to keep much inventory in stock. This explains 
the high frequency of delivery vehicles. Time precision is important with 
time windows of ± 2 – 3 hours, e.g. to builders100. However, bigger 
retailers are visited en route certain days (time table).
97 I interviewed the transport chief, Feb 2002, who said that he together with the logistics and the 
environmental managers were deciding the quality criteria of deliveries. Survey just over a year 
later was answered by the distribution manager.
98 SNI02 industry 20.
99 DIY = Do-It-Yourself, i.e. retailers selling building materials, tools, etc.
100 The time pressure is hight, 40 % is described in the survey as time precision and 10 % speed, the 
rest price pressure.
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Delivery failure (delivery not arriving on time) at the time was 4-5%, 
but was not allowed to get worse. A year later it was described as between 
5 and 8 % depending on the geography. Delays occur mostly at the 
delivery point, not at the pickup. In other words disruptions seem to 
occur during the transport.
Important decision criteria for the choice of a Transport Provider he 
explained was: 1. Delivery precision (delivery time and “right day”). 2. 
The quality of the vehicle, that they are in good shape and clean. 3. The 
behaviour of the driver, “since he is our representative to the (customer) 
companies”.
Criteria 2 and 3 were interesting and maybe not the ones normally consid-
ered.
BUILD appears to be fairly representative to the average B&C manufacturer, 
however according to the survey they have a clear Overall dissatisfaction and 
the Communication & Info-System is much below the average (and nega-
tive). Data also show there are communication problems, and e.g. quality 
problems, including on-time delivery and trust. They also find the access to 
the system and to the staff for information and booking dissatisfactory. So is 
also the case for the behaviour of drivers, the aspect they considered impor-
tant when meeting their customers.
Building & Construction material wholesalers
As Figure 14 shows, wholesalers of Building & Construction (B&C) mate-
rials have the highest failure rates and damage percentage of all the groups 
studied. However there are only a few cases in the study (n=16) why the con-
fidence interval is big and thus this finding is not statistically significant101.
B&C Wholesalers is the industry group compared that most clearly shows 
signs of constraints, see Table 6. Especially Time precision and Speed seem 
to affect Problem-Solving, Shipping Capacity, and Communication & Info-
System, with serious problems for On-Time Delivery and damage (%). 
Findings reveal though that the Transport Providers focus well on respond-
ing to Shipping Capacity and On-Time demands by the Buyers, however 
other capabilities do not respond as well.
101 At 95 % confidence interval.
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The following case, HARDWARE, illustrate some of the complexity.
Case: HARDWARE102
HARDWARE is a large wholesaler (about 250 employees) of hardware, 
distributing to ironmongers, DIY103 outlets and the building industry104, 
mainly in Scandinavia. At the time of the interview on average 35 trucks 
were transporting just over 200 tonnes of hardware per week. Most 
goods are delivered from stock.
Distribution to the customers require sophisticated logistics including 
night deliveries with cross-dockings. Delivery On-Time is the most 
important criteria. HARDWARE also delivers “fast orders” (over night, 
delivery usually early morning).
The industrial customers demand 99% On-Time delivery but only 97 % 
is achieved.
However, despite the high ambition, only 94 % arrive on time (in 
Norway 92%).
Distribution has a very pronounced time focus105.
Drilling deeper in the data specifically for the case HARDWARE, it is the 
Shipping Capacity (especially geographical coverage, ability to adjust to 
volume fluctuations), and Communication (not sufficient feedback), On-
time and Problem-Solving that HARDWARE sees unsatisfactory. This illus-
trates and underlines the occurence and importance of feedback in time-
pressed situations.
Paper industry
Failure rates are considerably higher for small paper companies than for 
bigger, as is the case with damages. Price sensitivity dominates the indus-
try, however also the time sensitivity appears to be high. Larger companies 
export most of their production.
102 11 Feb 2002.
103 DIY = Do-It-Yourself, i.e. retailers selling building materials, tools, etc.
104 SNI02 industry
105 HARDWARE describes the competitive pressures in its choice of transport solution as time precision 
30 %, speed 40 %, price 20 %, and emission control 10 %, in other words time is clearly dominant.
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Paper industry has a medium high failure rate and damage %, see Figure 14.
Data also show that performance of Problem-Solving Ability, Communi-
cation & Information-system, Shipping Capacity have clear signs of con-
straints, and that affects On-Time delivery and Overall Satisfaction.
A conceivable explanation is that since time sensitivity is high, time pressure 
affects Communication & Information-System and thereby temporarily 
makes Shipping Capacity less available and reduces available time. Strikingly 
is that the communication does not seem to work well. This is visible (by 
looking at data closer) through the lack of feedback in situations of disrup-
tions, and it can make it more difficult to deal with the problems.
However, even if the Communication and Information-system performs 
well, under those circumstances, it either might produce too much infor-
mation (cf Senge, 1990:128), or else the “wrong kind” of information, to 
handle if time margins are too narrow. This affects the Buyer’s assessment of 
Problem-Solving and On-Time delivery negatively.
Manufacturers of industrial goods
This quite heterogeneous industrial group106 consists of a wide range of 
industrial production: plastics, rubber, chemicals, steel, electronics, vehicles, 
furniture, etc., where really individual industries can differ considerably. 
Average failure rate is high, so is damage occurrence, however individual 
industries vary a lot. No constraints could be identified in this mixed group. 
Therefore one industry, is chosen instead, Electronics & Household appli-
ances (SNI02, ind code 30).
This industry (note this sample consists of only medium and large sized 
companies) has a price focus. The effect analysis shows that time and price 
pressures affect and link the performance capabilities and output. A deeper 
analysis shows that it is especially the modal factor, particularly the access to 
containers (i.e. lack of them) that could explain some of these effects, also 
making Problem-Solving difficult (e.g. coordination).
There are clear indications of constraints for Communication & Informa-
tion-System and Shipping Capacity, and they affect Problem-Solving. Ship-
ping Capacity and Time Pressure negatively affect overall Satisfaction and 
On-Time delivery.
106 n=256.
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Damages seem to be linked to, amongst others, Speed, Problem-Solving, 
and Communication. This makes sense, since increased time pressure also 
will speed up handling of the goods, thus increases the risk for e.g. mistakes 
and accidents.
The following case is a good illustration of some challenges for Just-In-Time 
deliveries under price pressure.
Case: BRIGHT, equipment for building industry107
BRIGHT is a large manufacturer of products mostly for the B&C 
industry and the public sector. 75 % are standardized products shipped 
directly from stock, the remainder customized to order. The transport 
chief I talked to sounded frustrated and stressed as he explained the 
problems with their distribution.
This is an example of a volume product where the load factor is impor-
tant because of their packaging, etc. On average, almost 100 shipments 
were performed per day by truck. But half of them were small ship-
ments of less than half a cubic metre, or 10 kg. The trend is more ship-
ments (higher frequency) of smaller and smaller batches per customer. 
Therefore BRIGHT needed to improve the delivery precision, according 
to the transport chief. Sometimes the customer orders “from room to 
room” (i.e. gradually as the building process progresses)108.
But why was BRIGHT’s transport chief so frustrated about the distribu-
tion? The company had 18 contracts, the three biggest covering 37% of 
the transport volume and valid for 1-2 years. The biggest forwarder (X), 
which distributes most of BRIGHT’s Swedish volumes, was, according 
to the transport chief, also the biggest problem.
He exemplified the major problem areas of forwarder X: Time precision, 
how X handles fragile goods, their unreliable telephone notification, and 
pricing. For example the delivery time precision stated by X is totally 
wrong, freight bills are incorrect, and these were some of the things that 
seemed to be part of his frustration.
107 SNI02 ind code 30. Telephone interview Feb 2002.
108 Price pressure is described as very high: 90% and the remaining 10% for Emission Control.
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The transport chief explained: (Forwarder) X measures the time preci-
sion to 98%, but our own system says 88%! “We have done spot checks 
and followed up with customers…”. (Forwarder) X measures wrongly. 
X starts measuring when the truck leaves the terminal… Sometimes 
it arrives on the wrong day. For example telephone notification of the 
arrival of the shipment is important (especially for BRIGHT’s custom-
ers), but for X this takes an extra day to perform.
—The smaller transport companies we use are better. They have better 
flexibility.
Possibly, he said, BRIGHT would “throw out X and choose (forwarder) 
Y instead. They have better coverage up north.”
Obviously the frustration of BRIGHT’s transport chief was mainly about 
the delivery failures, but no doubt also about the mistrust because Forwarder 
X (according to him) were measuring wrongly and giving wrong informa-
tion. The communication and relationship problem in this example is obvi-
ous and outstanding.
Wholesaling of industrial supplies
Industrial wholesalers as a group has somewhat lower average failure rate and 
damage percent than the industrial manufacturers, see Figure 14.
No constraints can be identified, see Table 6. Therefore one industry group 
is chosen, “Industrial wholesalers”109.
The large and medium-sized companies have lower failure rates than small 
companies.
Price pressure affects Communication & Information-System, On-Time 
delivery and Overall Satisfaction negatively. Increasing Shipping Capacity 
does not seem to improve performance, on the contrary. Neither is increas-
ing Problem-Solving. However, Communication & Information-System 
seems to form a bottleneck.
Purpose of the following case, MACH, is to illustrate the communication 
and performance problem in this industry.
109 Basically SNI02 indystry code 518.
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Case: MACH, wholesaler of industrial machines and 
supplies110
This company is a large international manufacturer of industrial prod-
ucts, with both machines and materials for industrial use. However, 
manufacturing is mostly done abroad, and this is why this business unit 
is registered primarily as a wholesaler.111 The turnover in Sweden is 1,800 
MSEK and it has 1,000 employees.
Customers are industries and resellers or wholesalers, which in turn sell 
to smaller or bigger industries. Most of the products are standardized 
and dispatched from stock. Nordic customers require delivery within 
24-48 hours. The transport manager complained that forwarder X only 
had about 90 % time precision and forwarder Y 94-95 %. “Forwarder 
X does not even want to discuss delivery reliability over 95 %” was one 
comment. MACH wants at least 98% and unchanged price.
Delivery reliability is not measured directly, his perception came from 
the customer complaint statistics.
—Transport Providers today do not give feedback, he said.
However, he meant that MACH was in the process of renewing trans-
port contracts, possibly change forwarders, and they now require certain 
delivery precision, follow up, statistics, etc. of the deliveries. He com-
mented that one of the possible reasons behind the present transport 
solutions and problems were that they today had several carriers (with 
the intention to press prices), but that they now considered cutting 
down the number of them to increase quantity on each contract. Main 
reason for this was to be able to raise quality of performance (“rather 
higher delivery reliability than lower price”). Customers do not accept 
any lower service quality, or delivery reliability, he commented.
The most important criteria in choosing a Transport Provider for MACH 
were thus: Frequency, Speed (“lead time”), and delivery On time (deliv-
ery reliability), Price, Geographical coverage, and Track & trace. This 
110 I interviewed the European transport manager February 2002. He informed me that the company 
at that time also was building up a European central distribution centre on the continent for 
distribution to Central Europe. The goods to the Scandinavian distribution centre arrive via South 
Sweden by truck.
111 In this thesis it is classified as SNI02 industry code 518, wholesaler of industrial goods, but also 
have some manufacturing that could be classified as industry 29.
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was not necessarily a ranking of factors, but important criteria in order 
to fulfil their service commitments.
6.4. Observations from the transport  
industry
According to Ahldén, 2011,112 (with a Schenker perspective) the biggest 
constraint in the transport industry, that overshadows everything is “bal-
ance”, i.e. that capacity is used in both directions. To get goods in both direc-
tions is a problem especially when the price, as in Sweden, is not adjusted, 
like in yield management113 (which makes prices more attractive for custom-
ers). However, the transport industry prefers direct shipments, not middle 
storage. Furthermore, in 2002, he confirms, the employment situation was 
also more problematic than it is today, however there was still more time to 
pack the goods into the trailers etc. Smaller companies cooperate better than 
10 years ago, haulier cooperations (“Lastbilscentraler”114) have grown.
According to Lundberg, 2001,115 (Euroute / Norfolkline) “time is the nee-
dle’s eye” in the transport operations of a bigger forwarder like Euroute116. 
For example operative transport planning has to be done between 8 and 
11, since the drivers need to get their instructions. He also gave an example 
that communication in the transport chain was not always working, e.g. in 
contact with the intermodal rail transport operator.
Isacsson, 2001117, described terminals and drivers as two operative bottle-
necks. Regarding customer communication with them (Schenker consult-
ing), booking normally occurs the same morning, apart from some cus-
tomers who have got scheduled pickups. The short notification time often 
depends on that the Transport Buyers do not know themselves what the 
order situation is, or that their overview is not good.
112 1999-2004 Vice President, Schenker AG.
113 As an example he referred to how J.B. Hunt improved their use of return capacity this way.
114 Lastbilscentral is a local or regional cooperation between a number of hauliers, generally with its 
own forwarding and cooperating with other forwarders.
115 Corporate manager, Euroute AB.
116 Euroute / Norfolkline (today owned by DFDS) then specialized in contracted, time restrained di-
rect trailer transport for bigger companies, much of it sea bound (intermodal) in Western Europe.
117 Logistics consultant, Schenker Consulting AB, Göteborg, interviews. Schenker Consulting AB 
was at the time a daughter company to Schenker-BTL AB, but detached from their mother com-
pany.
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7. How capability factors get constrained
The findings presented in chapter 6 give an indication of bottlenecks in the 
people-focused factor category, especially the grouped factors Information 
& Communication Systems (ICSys), Ability to Solve Problems (ASP), and 
the On-time delivery outcome. But how are these factors interlinked with 
the service delivery process, and how can they get constrained?
Assuming that companies’ long-term resilience depends on their capability 
to handle vulnerabilities and disruptions in complex systems (e.g. Christo-
pher and Peck, 2004; Pettit et al., 2010), my intent in this chapter is to start 
to derive a research model that will attempt not only to explain how man-
agement control can lead to unwanted, bad, constraints, but also how aware-
ness of constraints and service quality instead can be used to build resilience. 
In chapter 9 I will get back to the latter part of that attempt.
On-time delivery can be assumed to be a major goal for most Transport 
Buyers. As was described in chapter 4 the Buyer operates under certain pres-
sures due to competition, customers’ requirements, etc., that they also specify 
requirements or conditions regarding timing and pricing for the deliveries. 
The Transport Provider then transforms the agreement into a work-pressure 
for the employees, since a certain volume of work is to be performed in an 
allotted time period. Eventually the Buyer perceives the Transport Provider’s 
capability to deliver on time. In other words, if the Transport Provider has 
a high failure rate the Buyer perceives this (e.g. through complaints from its 
customers) as if the level of performance is lower than the level of impor-
tance for the same attribute.
In this study the main focus is on the Buyer and the Provider of the trans-
port, however also the customer of the Buyer (the receiver of the goods) is 
involved in the interactions and affects the conditions and pressures. This is 
shown in Figure 16. The transport process (simplified) is to transport goods 
from the Transport Buyer to a customer, the receiver of the goods. If there 
is an external Transport Provider involved he will coordinate the transport 
from “door-to-door”. After the ordering, the physical transport process itself 
takes place. The transport can be straight from a to b, or very elaborate with 
storage in between. The broken arrow going from the receiver of the goods 
to the Transport Buyer represents the customer conditions for the transport.
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Figure	16:	The	interactions	between	the	Transport	Buyer	and	the	
Provider.	The	receiver	of	the	goods	usually	has	conditions	of	the	
delivery.	Notification	can	be	both	at	the	pick	up	and	delivery	of	 
the goods. 118
From a business point of view, there are more processes involved for all this 
to happen: The Buyer’s customer has to order the goods, the order is han-
dled by the Transport Buyer (here the Supplier of the goods), who also has 
to arrange transport with a forwarder, the forwarder has to plan and coor-
dinate the entire transport, before the actual shipment is fulfilled. This is 
depicted in a simplified form in the next illustration, Figure 17. Shipments 
can be defined as the product of resource capacity and capacity utilization 
(Sterman, 2000, pp. 554ff.). The performance outcome (“On time” or “Not 
on time”) is to a large degree decided by the capabilities of the Transport 
Provider. Outcomes also influence the Transport Buyer’s (and even more 
importantly: the Buyer’s customer’s) satisfaction with the service. This is the 
quality aspect of the provided service. If the “On time” share is high, Buyer 
satisfaction is likely affected positively (indicated by “s”, change in the same 
direction). However, if the “Not on time” share is increasing, satisfaction is 
likely decreasing (indicated by “o“, change in the opposite direction). Cus-
tomers who are satisfied tend to order again (cf. Keaveney, 1995).
118 Unbroken line means physical transport, broken lines information flows through communication.
Receiver of the goodsTransport Buyer
Transport Provider
Conditions & 
feedback !
Actors !
Notification !
Conditions !
121
However, before it comes to operational activities there has to be some think-
ing, planning, and designing of what resources are needed, and what capac-
ity. Desired production” is the management’s planning of the operations, 
which means its matching of the incoming and hopefully future orders (the 
demand) and the production capacity (the supply). If there is not enough 
capacity, there will be a backlog of orders, i.e. orders (and customers) waiting 
to be served.
Work pressure for the Transport Provider arises due to the amount of work 
that needs to be performed in a certain time period119, and it becomes a 
driver for the capacity utilization (Sterman, 2000, pp. 554ff). If for example 
50 hours’ work is scheduled in a week and the normal workweek is 40 hours, 
either more than one person has to do the work, or else that person has to do 
overtime 10 hours. In such case the work pressure is 1.25 (Desired produc-
tion / Capacity = 50/40 = 1.25) on a normalized scale, i.e. 25% higher than 
normal.
Work pressure is in an extended way decided by the managers’ ability to 
solve problems and to plan. Since the resource capacity is also under the 
manager’s domain there is a way to balance work pressure (more capacity 
decreases work pressure, indicated by “o“ in the Figure).
Capacity and capacity utilization is important in this context because they 
are the origins of bottlenecks or constraints. If one looks at a production- 
or service-process, with an inflow and an outflow, it is easy to understand 
that a capacity ceiling sets the maximum pace, or rate, of the flow through 
that process. In other words, when approaching the capacity ceiling and 
the maximum utilization rate, the growth slows down and levels off, then 
finally stops. In normal work processes utilization rates should be considered 
normal, not “heroic” (ibid, p 555) at least in the long run. In other words, 
it is not a sustainable system to schedule work with limited resources and 
count on that increased productivity which would compensate for the lack 
of capacity.
The performance results in deliveries that are on time, and those, which for 
various reasons are not120. The quality of the performance affects the Buyer’s 
satisfaction, and that likely determines the long-term business relationship 
with the Transport Provider, i.e. if future orders are to be placed.
119 In other words time pressure in doing the work.
120  In this study referred to as “failures” and / or ”damages”.
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Figure	17:	Transport	Provider’s	capabilities,	performance,	and	the	
Buyer’s response.121 
The ability to solve problems requires relevant 
information
In section 5.3, “Ability to solve problems”, and “Information & Communi-
cation Systems” were described as factors grouped in the “people-focused” 
category of capabilities. “Ability to solve problems” represents not only 
the system’s (i.e. people’s) capability to plan that deliveries arrive on time, 
but also to handle disruptions, or to come up with a solution of a current 
problem. It furthermore includes the ability to “solve” the company’s future 
problems, i.e. create sustainability, to develop capabilities that support the 
long-term survival and development of the business, e.g. by using the oppor-
tunities that occur, or innovativeness. This factor is highly dependent on skill 
and competence and also on the availability of relevant information, and 
ability to communicate.
The “Information & Communication System” is the “support-system” or the 
infrastructure but also the “interface” between the customer (the demand 
and the requirements), the staff, the available shipping capacity, the problem-
121 The service process is depicted in the middle (the “pipes” with flow regulators symbolize the flows, 
i.e. the activities, in the direction of the arrows, rectangular symbols are the accumulations in the 
process). Thinner arrows are information flows, representing influences, and allocation of resources 
(cf. Sterman, 2000:554ff.)
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solver and decision-maker. Information & Communication System is not 
only referring to computers and communication equipment, but primarily 
to the processing and communicating capacity of the problem-solver. To be 
useful, large volumes of data must be carefully sorted, condensed and under-
standable, data has to be transformed into information i.e. the quality of the 
information has to be increased. This requires information processing capac-
ity. To be useful in the operations and for others, the relevant information 
has to be turned into knowledge and shared with others. Especially when 
complexity and activity increases, the data and the information volume also 
increase (e.g. Comfort, Sungu et al., 2001), and so do mistakes and failure 
rates. Under high work pressure, resources may be reallocated to deal with 
the most acute. However, as shown in chapter 6, there can be constraining 
effects of these capabilities. This means that resources have to be reallocated 
to dissolve the constraint. This is depicted schematically in Figure 18.
Figure 18 shows the same situation and transport service process as in Figure 
17, however the factor groups described above (section 5.3.) have replaced 
“capacity” and “capacity utilization”. This model illustrates that resource 
allocation has to support both short-term activities (the actual shipments 
or work) but also long-term (supporting, maintaining, and improving the 
delivery system) in order to build up capabilities.
Figure	18:	Same	delivery	process	as	in	Figure	17,	but	the	inputs	of	the	transport	
process	instead	with	the	grouped	capabilities	described	in	section	5.3.122
122 Notice the resource allocation to the various categories of capabilities, and the work pressure.
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The following illustration, Figure 19, is a simplification of Figure 18. The 
transport process is here compressed into the box “Performance On Time 
delivery” and the Buyer’s response into “Satisfaction”. In chapter 6 the find-
ings were presented showing constraining effects especially affecting the 
Information & Communication Systems, the ability to solve problems, and 
On-time delivery.
Figure	19:	A	simplified	model	of	Figure	18.	Arrows	here	mean	
influence,	i.e.	what	a	resource	input	or	action	affects	(with	or	
without	delay).
In this chapter I have shown the link between operations, quality in perfor-
mance (i.e. how much is “On time”), and the resource allocation to different 
capabilities, which in turn are inputs in the production (certain capacity and 
capacity utilization). Here is also where bottlenecks are generated.
In section 9.6. I will develop this and show the connection to resilience.
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8. Response to demand
In this chapter, focus is on the interaction between the Buyer and the Seller. 
First, I describe and discuss the Buyers’ and the Providers’ perspectives, and 
then the particular situation facing services in matching demand and supply. 
This is a part of being able to answer the research question:
In what way does high capacity utilization affect the development of long-
term resilience and competitive advantage of a service company?
Let me first re-phrase the question:
Is high capacity utilization advantageous for the development of long-term 
resilience and competitive advantage of a service company?
The rational actor answer would be a resounding ‘yes’, at least what concerns 
competitive advantage. Working harder obviously means you produce more! 
Is that so?
It depends on what is meant by working harder! If it means working at 
maximum capacity to keep up with the demand, the answer, I argue, would 
be ‘no’. Short-term, I agree, yield would be higher by mobilizing everything 
to keep up production, but not long-term. The result would be the opposite.
Does this sound counter-intuitive?
Let me explain.
Up to a certain level of capacity use the performance will be improved, but 
over that level performance will decline, which will show itself in persistent 
quality problems. This statement will be developed in this chapter.
Research and implementation in operations and business management has 
in recent years focused on increasing value by eliminating waste in processes, 
applying lean practices. These lean principles have been based on manu-
facturing using “push”-strategies (Anderson et al., 2005). However, even 
though they are developed in a conventional manufacturing context, they 
have practically without questioning also been deployed in services and cus-
tomized production (made-to-order and “pull”-strategy; ibid).
In order to answer the research question I also posed two sub-questions:
	 •		 How	do	Transport	Buyers’	pressures	affect	the	quality	of	service	Pro-
viders’ performance?
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	 •		 How	can	constraints	of	the	service	Providers’	capabilities	explain	per-
formance quality problems?
The first of these sub-questions was answered in sections 6.2. and to some 
degree also in 6.3.
Findings showed that the alignment of Transport Buyers’ requirements and 
the Transport Providers’ performance is to some degree problematic. It could 
be noted that especially failure and damage rates were surprisingly high in 
some industries. In these sections it was shown that adverse, as well as good 
effects, can actually be seen from these pressures.
The second sub-question was answered in section 6.3. where it was shown 
that a decrease in the Transport Providers’ performance of an attribute some-
times can be connected to an increase in failure or damage rate and decrease 
in the satisfaction of the customer. These findings give clear evidence that the 
ability to solve problems and to deliver On time is often inadequate, despite 
(mostly) better than desired Shipping Capacity and Information & Com-
munication Systems. The synchronization of these major factors is appar-
ently not totally satisfactory, and the reason for this will be discussed in the 
rest of this thesis.
8.1. The Buyer’s perspective
In chapter 6, time and price pressures were briefly described and discussed. 
In this section these pressures will be described in their distributional con-
text of distributional channels, customer and goods categories.
8.1.1. The need for transport services
The development of global trade and production networks have in recent 
years increased the demand for transport services drastically (e.g. Hesse and 
Rodrigue, 2004:172). This is due to, amongst other things, deregulation of 
transport markets, the ICT123 revolution, but also the changed customer 
requirement in logistics, such as mobility and timing (ibid.).
So more competition, more complex supply chains, increasing demand for 
high service quality means
123 ICT = Information and communication technology.
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 a)  more time-dependent service, time constraints (time windows, fast 
transport, frequent shipments, flexibility in dispatch, JIT),
 b)  globalization, i.e. more geographical coverage and mobility,
 c)  more volume fluctuation (i.e. demand volatility).
The importance of all three of these was apparent from the findings of this 
thesis. Volume fluctuation is a concern for many businesses, especially when 
seasonal or temporal demand variability is common (e.g. Stratton and War-
burton, 2003:184).
8.1.2. Distribution aspects
The main purpose of distribution is to create time and place utility, i.e. to 
make the goods or products available in either production or sales when 
customers need them (e.g. Grant, Lambert et al., 2006).
The competitive situation of companies, their products, customers, markets, 
competitors, service levels, prices, production etc. determines the transport 
solution of the products. Manufacturers of finished products for consump-
tion (either in industry or by consumers) tend to, if they are bigger, dis-
tribute their products via wholesalers or distributors so that an economy of 
scope and / or scale can be achieved both what concerns the transport itself 
and in reaching the markets (cf. Coughlan, Anderson et al., 2001).
Economy of scale in transport means consolidation, i.e. that bigger ship-
ments can be made in one go, which is conducive in increasing the load 
factor (i.e. the degree to which the available load capacity is used). Of course 
using a distributor does not in itself guarantee that the load factor will be 
high or that the load capacity is fully used, much of that is decided by the 
service levels of the customer.
In the manufacturing part of a supply network shipments are often arranged 
by the companies themselves or via forwarders. The scale of the shipment 
sizes is usually decided by the customer’s process needs.
Economy of scale in reaching the markets is achieved by wholesalers and 
distributors in marketing channel arrangements (e.g. Coughlan et al., 2001). 
Normally therefore distributors are wholesalers or distribution agents of a 
variety of products, e.g. household equipment, household and office elec-
tronics, building and construction materials (e.g. wood, building stone, 
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water and sanitation equipment, electrical equipment). Distribution is then 
channelled via a wholesaler or nowadays more and more directly to the end 
customer, in many cases a retailer or directly to the consumer. When this 
survey was performed (2003) B2B and B2C124 sales via internet did not 
generate bigger volumes, but this type of channel arrangement has since 
increased considerably.
Distribution channels
The marketing channel reflects the power situation in the supply chain and 
is many times a decisive factor in the transport arrangement (Coughlan et 
al., 2001). A marketing channel normally also contains the physical distri-
bution network, or distribution channel (Coughlan et al., 2001; Jonsson, 
2008). Here are some examples of different categories of distribution (see 
further e.g. Coughlan et al., 2001):
Shipments to manufacturers
Semi-finished goods
Components and semi-finished goods are either shipped directly from 
another manufacturer or from a wholesaler of industrial goods. Type of 
goods and distance decide the shipment size.
A reason for requiring time-window deliveries could be Just-In-Time pro-
duction (JIT). The causes for that is to keep inventories low, to increase 
visibility (e.g.Christopher and Peck, 2004), to keep better quality control of 
incoming goods, and to have more control of the flow through the produc-
tion units.
Subcontractors selling to other manufacturers: Bigger subcontractors could 
have their own transport planning and distribution, but would normally be 
using forwarders. However some bigger manufacturers (i.e. who are custom-
ers to subcontractors) perform the transport planning and arrange pick-up 
of the goods, e.g. Ex Works (EXW). This is common e.g. in the vehicle 
industry. Often shipments like this are Just-In-Time with very tight delivery 
margins.
Industrial goods
There are different arrangements depending on the type of goods, e.g. 
machines, tools, vehicles, computers. Often a distributor is operating as the 
sales agent, however the shipment might be direct from the assembling fac-
124 B2B = “Business to business”, B2C = “business to consumers”
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tory or distribution centre to the customer. This type of goods can be “make-
to-order” (or “assemble-to-order”), thus there is a delivery delay built into 
the order. Since these shipments to a customer are irregular and not so fre-
quent, they are not necessarily time-critical, however in some cases, such as 
when competition is high, they could be. However, in some cases, e.g. when 
a machine breaks down or a tool is needed quickly, fast deliveries at short 
notice might be needed (“express” delivery).
Shipments to wholesalers and retailers
Non-durable consumer goods
This category includes foods and beverages, and other non-durable con-
sumer goods.
Bigger retailing chains with their own channel structure (e.g. Wal-Mart, 
Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Carrefour, in Sweden ICA, COOP, Axfood), buy whole-
sale from manufacturers and bigger wholesalers and usually have their own 
distribution from their own distribution centres, warehouses or depots. Dis-
tribution for this category of businesses can be characterized by a high degree 
of control, i.e. the classical transport solution is distribution with own vehi-
cles and own transport planning. One reason for this is the importance of 
high service levels in the shop shelves, since competition is fierce, and stock 
outs (i.e. empty shelves in the shops) mean not only lost sales but also more 
seriously sometimes lost customers. Another reason is limited areas for goods 
reception and inventory and this generally restricts the delivery of goods to 
narrow time-slots. The deliveries to shops like this is thus normally done in 
smaller quantities, such as a pallet or a few roller-containers, or in some cases 
just a few boxes (Just-In-Time delivery). Since a grocery shop could stock 
thousands of different items it could mean a large number of deliveries from 
different suppliers, thus also a large number of trucks will deliver the goods. 
So it could be both limited unloading space and lack of storage space that 
restricts the delivery access to the retailer. Even wholesalers could have limited 
area (e.g. limited number of loading bridges) to unload and load the trucks, 
and this is why it could be a reason also for them to use time-windows.
In recent years, outsourcing of transport services (Third Party Logistics) 
to forwarders is more common, however, distribution is then usually per-
formed in dedicated vehicles125. From this, one can assume that when it is a 
question of functional products126 or normal consumer goods that are under 
125 With the logo of the supplying company on the vehicle.
126 Generally mass-produced, standardized products.
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high competitive pressure both price of the transport and time precision is 
of primary importance. The price pressure is explained by the competitive 
supply available in the consumer markets, the variety of products that, to the 
consumer, is equivalent in function or quality or similar and therefore can be 
exchanged if it is not available when the customer visits the shop.
Durable goods
Durables are e.g. TV, electronics, computers, clothes, and shoes.
Speed to market is often required because retailers do not keep big safety 
stocks or it is customer order products.
Sometimes price is important, especially with highly competitive products.
Examples of actors:
	 •		 Retailing	chains,	especially	with	more	vertically	integrated	channel	
structure, sometimes including manufacturing (e.g. IKEA).
	 •		 “Independent”	wholesalers	that	distribute	to	many	different	retailers,	
chain stores and smaller wholesalers
	 •		 Distributors	 of	 special	 products,	 e.g.	 high	 quality	 technical	 prod-
ucts with short product life cycle, fashion, pharmaceutical products, 
etc. If these products are high margin and have little competition, 
then it is speed to market that is the underlying distribution strategy. 
Normally shops and distributors do not want to have big stocks of 
products like this (because of inventory value and the risk of obsoles-
cence), which means shipments have to be small and frequent, but 
be able to reach the markets with very short lead time. For long dis-
tance distribution therefore this category of products are distributed 
by airfreight or in some cases by truck. Shorter distances tend to be 
mostly by truck due to the flexibility.
	 •		 Internet,	 B2B,	B2C,	 via	 Fedex,	DHL,	 Schenker,	UPS,	TNT,	 etc.	
which have developed service networks all over the earth for small 
consignment distribution, express delivery. They specialize in fast 
distribution with high precision and function also as consolidators of 
shipments, like forwarders but with specialization to manage small 
shipments. The consolidating role is to achieve economy of scale in 
the long distance shipments; thereby the load factor can be high even 
though service level also is high. In normal forwarder distribution 
there is a trade-off between economy of scale and service level, i.e. if 
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fast deliveries are needed there is generally not enough time to con-
solidate a lot of smaller shipments.
In chapter 7 the transport process and Transport Provider’s capabilities were 
modelled. In the following sections of this chapter further aspects of the pro-
cesses and applied strategies will be developed.
8.2. The Transport Provider’s perspective
The transport can be performed by the Transport Buyer’s own transport 
resources or by an external service Provider. But the Buyer’s “own” perfor-
mance does not have to mean that the physical transport is carried out by that 
company’s own vehicles. In this thesis I mean by “own performance” that the 
shipment is controlled by the Buyer’s resources, and includes the planning of 
the transport. Often a nearby haulier performs the physical transport, or else 
vehicles could be leased and performed by e.g. the Buyer’s personnel.
When transport service is outsourced it is usually a forwarder or bigger haul-
ier, which performs the whole transport, from door-to-door. This includes 
the transport planning, but that could obviously also be performed in coop-
eration with the Buyer.
Transport can also be arranged by the Transport Buyer’s customer (the 
receiver of the goods), so-called Ex Works transport (EXW), however these 
are often also organized by forwarders.
As stated above, the main objective of the Provider is to deliver the goods at 
an agreed time to the Buyer’s customers. If service is performed on time and 
reaches the receiver without damages, etc., the quality of the performance 
is good. Quality of a service Provider is usually perceived over an extended 
period (e.g. Sterman, 2000), i.e. how many shipments are deviating from 
plan in a certain period of time. Thus service quality could also be measured 
or assessed in other dimensions than time, e.g. how the Transport Provider 
performs if there are seasonal variations in transport volumes, or how acces-
sible the staff is for information, anything that affects the customer’s percep-
tion of the service negatively (Parasuraman, 1998). The performance of a 
Transport Provider is thus totally dependent on what capacity is available, 
and of course also how, and to what degree, the capacity is utilized.
But how the resources are used depends to a large degree on the skill and 
competence of the people, i.e. their training, experience, knowledge level, 
and motivation, but also on their ability to communicate and sometimes 
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being flexible or being able to solve problems, including planning and 
resource allocation.
Operative planning of shipments was at the time of the survey often done 
manually, with or without the help of computer-programmes. Communi-
cating, retrieving and giving information was still done by e.g. phone and 
fax but to an increasing degree by more technical system resources such as 
EDI, and Internet.
The shipment takes place by using technical resources, such as loading 
resources, trailers, containers, pallets, traction resources, i.e. vehicles, loading 
areas and equipment, such as terminals, loading ramps, fork-lifters, cranes. 
However, people are still operationally crucial, e.g. to plan shipments, main-
tain and service vehicles, to handle special requests from customers, to solve 
problems, and of course to drive the vehicles.
The experience and work-skills to a large degree decide the performance out-
come, such as avoiding goods damages, but also by not creating expectations 
that cannot be fulfilled by overpromising performance (cf Dion, Javalgi et 
al., 1998; Parasuraman, 1998). The outcome of the service performed can 
be assessed by how well it is performed in agreement to promise (Parasura-
man, 1998). So deviations from expected (= promised) performance can be 
considered to be quality deficient if the performance is worse than agreed 
upon. This leads to customer dissatisfaction.
Occasionally also a performance better than required can cause dissatisfac-
tion, e.g. delivering something before the time window when time preci-
sion is expected. Quality is sometimes dependent on the ability to plan, but 
also on experience, and on knowing what actually is possible to deliver also 
by others in the organization. So not to promise the customer more than 
actually can be realistically performed, considering all difficulties involved, 
can be a matter of experience (cf. Zeithaml, Berry et al., 1993; Dion et al., 
1998). Long term it is the overall performance and the ability of the Trans-
port Provider to handle disruptions, solve problems etc. that affects the sat-
isfaction of the Buyer.
8.2.1. The transport system
As described above, logistics can be affected at several levels due to the ser-
vice needs of the Buyer. The planning for the Transport Provider contains 
both strategic and tactical components. In the transport industry business is 
also often carried out in vertical arrangements between forwarders and hauli-
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ers and other operators (Mentzer, Myers et al., 2004; Mason et al., 2007), 
which involves several parties in the operations. For bigger forwarders and 
shipping brokers, who do not normally own their vehicles or load-carrying 
equipment, that means to subcontract hauliers and other carriers. The plan-
ning and service offer is very much determined, at least in the short term, by 
the transport capacity and the category of vehicles and loading equipment 
available. For the haulier, investment in vehicles (normally lorries) is a stra-
tegic decision for maybe 10 years or more; the same goes for load-carrying 
equipment such as trailers and swap-bodies. ISO-containers on the other 
hand are standardized and can easily be exchanged. However, loading capac-
ity, thereby economy, differs considerably between different types of equip-
ment, why investment in a certain type of equipment usually is a strategic 
decision for the haulier.
8.2.2. The competitive situation
However, the power situation between bigger forwarders and smaller hauli-
ers is in the favour of the forwarder (e.g.Coughlan et al., 2001). Since com-
petition is fierce on the freight-moving market a forwarder can exert certain 
pressure on a haulier to adapt its fleet and equipment, but on the other hand 
a forwarder is not only dependent on the transport capacity but also on the 
reliability of the haulier to perform according to agreement. That means that 
relationships are fairly stable, since there is risk involved in changing busi-
ness partners.
The fact that competition is high in the land-freight market also means that 
load capacity has to be used efficiently, i.e. the load factor has to be high, 
otherwise the haulier will suffer economically. This means freight has to be 
consolidated and load-carrying equipment and vehicles have to be available 
when Buyers want their transport. In other words, both long- and short-
term planning have to be fairly complex, capacity planning has to be based 
on prognosis (i.e. guesses about the future), and “locks in” to a large degree, 
the options for the Buyer (Sterman, 2000, ch 10).
8.3. The interaction between the Transport 
Buyer and the Transport Provider
In a service process context, the goods transported is not transformed, it is 
only “value added” through the increased place and time utility (Grant et al., 
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2006). This value added is assessed or expressed by the Buyer’s perception 
of how the service is performed, i.e. if it is what was agreed upon with the 
Seller, the Transport Provider. The value added is also related to the Buyer’s 
importance weights, i.e. how important is for example speed or delivery 
within a certain time window.
Since a time-window restricts when a delivery should take place, there is nor-
mally more planning involved in coordinating actors and activity. If there 
is a time-window for the pickup, the Transport Provider has to have the 
transport and loading equipment available for that time. There is also some 
coordination between the Buyer and the Transport Provider, e.g. that certain 
personnel, space or equipment is available during that period of time. The 
same goes for the receiver of the goods if there is a delivery time-window. 
Any disturbances during the transport or at the reception area could cause 
a disruption so that trucks otherwise would have to queue up to unload or 
load. The transport itself would also have to be extremely well planned and 
timed.
Sometimes deliveries involving time-windows require fast transport, but not 
always. Occasionally it could mean that the goods even have to be stored at 
a depot in between so the delivery can take place at an appointed time. Then 
it is not only the pickup and / or the delivery time that is time restricted, but 
possibly also intermediary storage space.
However the delivery could also include a high-speed delivery. My point 
here is that there could be varying degrees of logistics complexity involved 
in a transport situation, especially when precision is involved as well. For 
example in long-distance deliveries often more than one forwarder and other 
operators are involved, so each link in the transport chain will have to be 
coordinated. Would one link not have the capacity available at the requested 
time, there would obviously be a delay at that point, and that could very 
likely delay the whole transport, i.e. a bottleneck is formed.
The ultimate purpose of the interaction is to build trust, thereby reduce 
uncertainties. This usually requires openness, honesty, and communication.
An important purpose of communication for the Seller is to retrieve relevant 
information so that the delivery can be performed according to the agree-
ments with the Buyer. One purpose of this could be to nurture the relation-
ship so that business can be developed long-term. Another is to increase 
the predictability of the delivery. Predictability is highly important because 
it affects the Buyer’s service level to its customer. When the service of the 
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Transport Provider fails, it could e.g. mean that the customer’s production 
processes are affected.
But what affects predictability?
The globalization of business is described as a driver for increased transport 
need (e.g. Neiberger, 2008). More pressure and constraining conditions on 
performance due to e.g. more intense competition, from society and other 
stakeholders also lead to increased complexity, higher demand on capabili-
ties, i.e. more resources have to be engaged by the Transport Provider. That 
makes predictability (e.g. stability in performance) more of a challenge.
Another problem when complexity increases is the rising risk for service 
variability, in other words that the service quality is not stable (Manuj and 
Mentzer, 2008). Fluctuating quality creates uncertainties for the customers 
regarding the performance (Diao, 2007), thus making predictions and plan-
ning more difficult (Weick, 1995; Craighead et al., 2007). This makes the 
equation even more problematic for the Transport Providers, especially if 
they also try to operate with leaner strategies than before, e.g. to use equip-
ment and people more and slim the organization. Reliability of performances 
could be at stake if leaning goes too far (e.g. Zsidisin et al., 2005).
However, as shown by the data of this study, quality of transport services can 
fluctuate or be questionable. There are many circumstances that can contrib-
ute to why quality problems occur in the first place. Parasuraman, Zeithaml 
et al., 1985; Zeithaml, Berry et al., 1988, point out that sometimes there 
could be communication problems involved, i.e. that there are “gaps” in how 
the Seller (the service Provider) and the Buyer understand the conditions 
and specifications. That gaps are common in interpretation of conditions 
and specifications also in transport services has been shown (e.g. Abshire and 
Premeaux, 1991; Hopkins, Strasser et al., 1993).
To counteract the categories of problems mentioned above the Transport 
Provider can create “predictability” by pro-active work, such as to perform 
maintenance, to take quality-stabilizing measures, to build reliability and 
trust, to develop an ability to solve problems, and to communicate:
Perform maintenance
Maintenance of equipment used in the service production must function 
properly to avoid disruptions (e.g. Repenning and Sterman, 2002). But how 
can companies that spend a lot of money on maintenance still have a lot of 
disruptions? This will be discussed further in chapter 9.
136
Take quality-stabilizing measures.
One way to handle increasing complexity is to routinize processes. It is 
therefore often in the Buyer’s interest to choose Transport Providers who are 
certified by some standard (e.g. ISO-9000127 for quality, or ISO-14000 for 
environment). This is, at least theoretically, a “guarantor” that the company 
is working with (ideally developing and adapting) their routines and techni-
cal systems.
However, it is not only technical systems and standardized routines that 
affect the quality of the performance. The most important deviation in 
transport service quality is of course that the delivery does not occur in the 
time agreed upon, e.g. due to an unplanned disruption. Another quality 
deviation could be damages or loss of goods during the transport process. 
A third example of quality deviation could be that the Transport Provider 
does not have the capacity available when the volume demand for transport 
increases. All these examples involve people one way or the other, either in 
the planning- or in the operative stage. It could be a matter of planning a 
route, or solving a customer’s problem.
Eroding standards will be discussed more below.
Build reliability and trust.
Overpromising – a consequence of not knowing the system enough, what it 
actually is capable to deliver. This could be an internal communication prob-
lem (Parasuraman, 1998) and that people in the organization do not know 
what the processes (e.g. production and distribution) really are. It takes a 
deep understanding of how production etc. is done, what the difficulties are, 
what the potential disruptions, risks, and vulnerabilities are, to be able to 
make assessments, to plan, negotiate and promise service.
High failure rate is a sign that there are predictability or reliability problems 
in the system, i.e. that the service Provider cannot deliver what has been 
promised (cf. Grönroos, 1998). The service delivery failure rate should of 
course be very close to zero (i.e. delivery precision 100 % of agreed condi-
tions), since the delivery time agreed on already should have the delivery 
failure margin “discounted for”, i.e. the Transport Provider should already 
have planned for and included a safety margin in the agreement to deliver 
“on time”. Transport Providers might see this as the “time buffer” (which it 
should not be, as the agreement is “on time”). By time buffer is understood 
127 See also comment in footnote 67.
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”safety time”, i.e. extra time (reserve capacity) to allow for emergencies or 
unforeseen disruptions (Goldratt and Fox, 1986; Stratton and Warburton, 
2006). A possible explanation for this could be that time buffers have been 
reduced or taken away in the transport system, i.e. that capacity utilization 
is very high, and there is little or no reserve capacity128.
However, of course 100% on-time delivery is not likely or even realistic, but 
there will be failures. There is a “zone of tolerance” since it is not always pos-
sible to assess the quality on single service assignments. For example Dion et 
al., 1998:84, discuss the danger of overpromising service quality, it can affect 
customer loyalty if performance promises are not fulfilled.
For the Transport Providers this means certain demand on flexibility, and 
ability to adapt the capacity.
The ability to solve problems, and to communicate
To solve problems and to communicate are sometimes intertwined. The 
communication may be necessary to obtain information not retrievable in 
the information system. Solving problems might also mean information has 
to be communicated to others.
Both require knowledge and skills, which have to be learned and trained. 
This will be central in the discussion in chapter 9.
8.4. Capacity
One size fits all seems to be the approach in the application of lean manage-
ment. The problem is: all systems are not designed the same way, and they 
need different logic. Manufacturing chains are different from service chains. 
It is primarily a matter of matching the demand with the supply, in other 
words how production resources are allocated and used. And because of the 
nature of the service production, service industries are particularly sensitive 
to imbalances between demand and supply (Armistead and Clark, 1994; 
Oliva, 2001). This is what I will discuss in this section.
128 It is easy to confuse the delivery on time-rate with the service level that retailers and suppliers 
calculate in order not to be stocked-out of products when a customer wants to buy. For companies 
stocking and selling products it is justified to have e.g. a 97 % service level, meaning that at least 
97 out of 100 customers get the service they have been promised. That is a calculated risk that 3 
customers in a 100 might have to wait for delivery, based on stock-keeping costs. But the service 
delivery of e.g. for a Transport Provider cannot have a service level of e.g. 97 % if the promise is 
say 99%.
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8.4.1. The distinction between “push” and “pull”
In a supply chain there are two basic, diametrically opposed, ways of fulfill-
ing demands on the market:
 1. to manufacture the products first then try to sell them, or
 2. to first get the orders from the customer, then manufacture (or 
assemble) them
The first is the supply or “push” strategy, which means the demand has to be 
estimated or predicted first, i.e. the production has to be planned and prod-
ucts manufactured and stocked before they are requested (so-called “make-
to-stock”, see e.g. Harrison and van Hoek, 2008; Simchi-Levi et al., 2008, 
for more detailed description on this topic). The product is in other words 
“pushed” through the system by the producers. 129
The second is to produce only after the customer has placed an order (“make-
to-order”). That is the demand response or “pull” strategy, the product is 
“pulled” or attracted from the system by the customer. In reality there is 
normally a mixture of these two “extremes” in production, i.e. components 
are manufactured in large quantities with a push strategy, then not assem-
bled until there is an order (pull). Together this is referred to as a postpone-
ment strategy (Lampel and Mintzberg, 1996; Harrison and van Hoek, 2008; 
Simchi-Levi et al., 2008), which makes a certain degree of customization 
possible even for mass-produced products.
Applying these strategies to not only production, but also to services, Ander-
son et al., 2005, distinguish three types of supply chains (p. 218):
 1. Inventory supply chains, i.e. interconnected firms that exchange 
only inventory with one another.
 2. Service supply chains, companies that only manage backlogs.
 3. Hybrid supply chains, companies that manage both backlogs and 
inventories, typically a custom-to-order product supply chain.
Number 1 and 3 apply to product chains. The first type, the inventory (or 
products) supply chain, is the make-to-stock product supply chain, which 
uses production planning or “push” strategies. The second and third, the 
129 This is sometimes referred to as “speculation”, and obviously involves some risk that the products 
will not be sold, see e.g. Simchi-Levi et al., 2008.
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service and the hybrid supply chain, both have demand logic, i.e. service or 
production does not start until the customer places the order. The hybrid 
category, is the modularised production of either “pull” or a combination of 
both “push” and “pull” strategies. However the point is that the customer has 
to join a queue (which means the backlog of orders or a literal queue) and 
stays there until the service or product is delivered.
They argue that supply chains show quite different response behaviour 
depending on if they contain inventories (i.e. stocks of products), or if they 
contain only backlogs (i.e. “stocks” of orders or customers waiting in queue 
to be served). Their point is that in operations management literature it is 
generally only inventory supply chains that are considered, and it is assumed 
that their logic also applies to service supply chains and hybrid chains.
They show that this is a mistake. Demand-driven and supply-driven chains 
have different behaviour.
For example to shorten lead-time is a way in inventory supply chains to 
make the process more “value-added”, i.e. to cut out “waste time” (e.g. Har-
rison and van Hoek, 2008). It also decreases the bullwhip effect130 up the 
chain. However, in a service supply chain (or custom manufacturing setting) 
the bullwhip effect can rather be increasing instead — if it is not accompa-
nied with careful capacity adjustment (Anderson et al., 2005:229).
The structural differences, according to Anderson et al., 2005, can be seen 
in Figure 20. So if the service delay in stage 1 (i.e. the backlog) is decreased 
that is normally considered good. However, the further up the chain the 
workload increases (compared to if lead-time had not been shortened!). Also 
Akkermans and Vos, 2003, illustrate this by a study of service operations 
in the telecom industry. The point is that capacity regulation to manage 
backlogs of orders (i.e. to be able to shorten lead times) is very sensitive: too 
much variability through hiring, firing, training, etc. can produce bullwhip 
effects through the service chain.
Figure 20 shows that the service chain, which normally uses “pull” strategy, 
can only manage the backlogs of orders by having sufficient capacity avail-
able. In the service chain, information and work-in-process normally flow 
in the same direction, in the manufacturing chain usually in the opposite 
direction.
130 Rippling effect where amplitudes of the fluctuations grow. Can be described as an information 
distortion effect (e.g. Lee, Padmanabhan et al., 1997).
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Translating this to a transport chain, it means that if for example the for-
warder (the Transport Provider), who sells the entire door-to-door trans-
port to the Buyer, shortens the lead-time for a transport, there will be an 
increased workload on the companies up the chain, the hauliers, etc., that do 
the actual transporting, for the same task as before. This supports my find-
ings in section 6.2. and 6.3. that increased time pressure correlates to higher 
failure and damage rates.
Figure	20:	Supply	chain	of	service	operation	versus	products.	After	
Anderson et al 2005.
Acknowledging this difference in inventory and service chains, how can the 
customers’ demand be matched to the supply in service networks?
8.4.2. The matching of supply and demand
Armistead and Clark, 1994, say that there are three major challenges that 
face the operations manager in matching supply and demand in services (p. 
5f ):
“1.The limited ability of the organization to alter capacity in terms of both 
the extent of the change and response time to make the change while having 
to deal with rapid fluctuations in demand.
2. The need to deliver consistent levels of customer service.
3. The varying degrees of uncertainty in demand.”
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Point 1 implies that the demand in services is from time to time volatile or 
unpredictable, and that there can be problems in trying to adjust capacity 
“chasing” that fluctuation. This also implies that there is certain amount of 
inertia or delay with adjusting to changes. The reason for that is of course 
that it takes time to hire and train people, and waiting is something service 
customers generally don’t like.
Point 2 means that the service delivery has to be consistent, i.e. fluctuating 
service quality is devastating. Customers have to know that they get the same 
service the second or third or the fifty-fourth time as the first time. This can 
be summarised with the concepts of reliability and trust131.
Point 3 implies that demand is sometimes illusive, uncertain or ambiguous. 
Too long waiting time makes customers switch suppliers. Or it could be e.g. 
when customers order but circumstances change, so they cancel the orders.
All three of these points are also relevant in goods transport services.
Armistead and Clark, 1994, continue to point out the structural differences 
in operational strategies for inventory-based product chains and service 
chains constrain service:
“Capacity management in service operations is a testing activity for opera-
tions managers because the nature of the service delivery process and the 
involvement of the customers in the process restricts the options open for 
controlling the process of matching supply with demand across the whole 
service delivery system.” (p. 6)
Oliva and Sterman, 2001, who discuss the human response to high work 
pressure, mean that the normal response to increased work load in service 
operations is
 1) to work overtime (increase Work Intensity)
 2) to cut the time spent on each order (decrease Time Per Order )
 3) to adjust service capacity (invest in Service Capacity).
Oliva, 2001, also brings out the fact that service operations are quite differ-
ent from manufacturing and have different degrees of freedom or response 
flexibility when it comes to matching supply and demand by modulating 
131 See footnote 68 about the distinction between reliability and trust.
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these three factors. The response flexibility depends on the structural charac-
teristics of the service operation, in other words what constrains the choice. 
Goods transport could for example for long distance transport be considered 
to have fairly low Time Per Order flexibility, lower the more time controlled 
it is (pp. 39-41). So for different categories of transport there can be different 
flexibility to tackle increasing work pressure operatively short-term (based 
on Oliva, 2001).
Inventory-carrying (i.e. product) chains have, according to Armistead and 
Clark, 1994, four main control options: alter capacity, inventory holding, 
let customer wait (longer delivery times), and influence demand. However, 
depending on how one sees it, lowering performance standards and chang-
ing work intensity, as pointed out by Oliva (2001), is as a form of capacity 
altering, a change in the degree of utilization, see Table 7. Service delivery 
chains do not hold inventories since they cannot be produced in advance. 
Furthermore the ability to adjust capacity can differ, but is normally not an 
option if demand is volatile and if it is difficult to hire and train staff. The 
alternative to let the customer wait longer is definitely not a good strategy. 
Longer lead times than normal are seldom good for any business, product 
or service, but particularly not for service operations. Neither it is to com-
promise with service quality. Eventually the customer will perceive a change, 
and reduced quality is usually not order-winners.
But in reality Time Per Order and Work Intensity is what first can be used to 
handle demand fluctuations. The problem is if these methods are used more 
than short-term.
Matching demand and supply can be even more problematic for services 
than products, and especially services where customization to some degree 
is involved (Chase, 1978; Chase and Apte, 2007; Jacobs and Chase, 2008). 
One of the reasons for the difficulty is inertia, due to delays in the informa-
tion systems and the lack of transparency, i.e. that all (relevant) information 
is not known in the supply chain (Christopher and Lee, 2004) or deliber-
ately not shown (e.g. for competitive reasons, Bienstock, 2002). Informa-
tion could also be available, however difficult to evaluate (ibid.). There is, of 
course, normally a cost trade-off to asymmetric information; it simply would 
cost too much to always retrieve or analyse all information available.
143
Table	7:	Differences	in	control	options	supply	chains	for	products	 
or services132.
Control option Action if demand increases Product 
supply 
chain
Service supply chain
Capacity altering
Invest, increase
Service	Capacity
+ +
takes	time
Increase work intensity
(e.g.	overtime)
(+)
(+)
quick
Cut	time	per	order
(i.e.	compromise	quality)
(+)
(+)
quick & very risky
Keep inventory Products	waiting	for	customers + Not	applicable
Let	customer	wait
(+)
(+)	a	way
to lose customers
Influence	demand	 Adjust price, availability + +
When demand is fluctuating, on what level does the Transport Provider 
decide its service level? To have a capacity that covers all variation is con-
sidered uneconomical, since it will not be fully used except at the top of a 
business cycle, and the slack carries capital cost (Sasser, 1976). In periods of 
high demand that would mean the order-stock increases, in other words, 
the backlog of work will build up and Buyers will have to wait longer for 
service (i.e. there will be queues to obtain service). However for a transport 
company with high service content (logistically more complex, such as time 
constrained transport or flexible deliveries) that is not a good strategy. Get-
ting near the top of the business cycle they might lose those customers who 
do not accept longer lead-times. For service companies in this situation not 
having enough capacity, this will be a self-regulating process: When their 
work-backlog will be big enough, the demand for their services will decline 
because they cannot deliver what the customer wants (i.e. customers are not 
prepared to accept long lead-times). And it is most likely service with high 
degree of time constraints that will be affected the most, in other words 
logistics service that produces the most revenue.
132 After Armistead and Clark, 1994, and Oliva, 2001. The “+” means long term solution, (+) short 
term (or risky) solution.
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Summary of findings from the literature
 - Supply chain strategy is different for services and products
 - To shorten lead-time locally can create more workload and quality 
problems up the service chain (Anderson et al., 2005) — if capacity 
is not carefully adjusted
 - Capacity adjustments in order to manage backlogs of orders are very 
sensitive to variability: Too much variability through hiring, firing, 
training, etc can produce bullwhip effects through the service chain 
(Akkermans and Vos, 2003).
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9. Response to complexity
In this chapter I intend to connect the discussion more directly to some 
aspects of the Theory of Constraints and other relevant theoretical sources, 
and discuss why reserve capacity is even more important, not less, as com-
plexity and work pressure grow, and especially so in services. However, to 
illustrate that the analysis can be quite different with different assumptions 
and models, I am using Allison’s decision perspective theory (Allison, 1971; 
Allison and Zelikow, 1999) as some different scenarios.
9.1. Essence of decision
Allison analysed the Cuban missile crisis from three different perspectives or 
through three “conceptual lenses”:
 1. The Rational Actor
 2. Organizational Behaviour
 3. Governmental Politics
The “rational actor” is the way we logically think about problems (as we 
assume we have all the necessary information and knowledge), how to pre-
vent them or how to solve them. On an organizational level, this is what a 
company or organization often says or plans how to deal with a situation or 
a problem. It is what seems to be logical, based on the best possible knowl-
edge. One could say it represents the theoretical models, or rather assump-
tions and postulates, we use, in our decisions. Allison proposes that this is 
based on the belief that the decision-maker has access to all possible, relevant 
information and weighs the utility of the different alternatives against each 
other and choses the alternative with the highest utility. He observed though 
that this was not what really happened, rational actors usually leave out a 
lot of relevant information, and models are therefore quite simplified. In 
economical theory this is e.g. described as trade-offs, or optimal solutions 
and maximized utility.
However, reality does not always obey theoretical models. The reason for 
that is that theories and models are based on assumptions, limitations, that a 
change will not affect other variables. Another reason is that we seldom have 
the total information.
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Organizational behaviour is thus often different from the outcome we expect. 
Why? Allison proposes amongst others: Decision-makers tend not to look 
at the whole picture, but break down the problem after the organizational 
limits, departments, functions, etc. Also lack of time and resources cause 
decision-makers to settle for the first plausible proposal. This is what Simon, 
1979, called “bounded rationality” or to have satisfactory solutions133. Alli-
son also meant that the tendency is for leaders to prioritise to eliminate the 
short-term uncertainty over the long-term solution. It is easier (and short-
term cheaper) to follow set routines. One obvious reason for this is that all 
necessary information is not available in the first place, it simply would be 
too costly to retrieve it, if even at all possible, since organizations (especially 
between companies in a supply network) are not always willing to reveal it 
all. Increased complexity does not make that any easier.
Allison’s political model is based on the propositions that actions are the 
result of politicking and negotiations. He means that it depends on the lead-
er’s ability to get consensus from alliances or groups. Actors, stakeholders 
inside and outside of the organization, sometimes have their own agendas 
and other goals than what the Rational Actor solution would suggest.
But, deep down, more or less, all of us feel we are “rational actors” in our 
decision-making, however we base our “rational decisions” on what informa-
tion is available, and it is constrained by our mental frames134, our own set of 
values, our emotions, and our personal goals. Not looking for more informa-
tion could also be a rational way of limiting accountability!
How could the research question be answered in the different perspectives?
I rephrase it with two questions that one might start off asking about the 
data presented in this thesis:
1) Why are the failure rates so high?
2) Why are Buyers not satisfied with Providers’ capabilities?
133 That’s why this also can be referred to as the “bounded rational actor’s” model.
134 Morecroft, 1994, describes a mental model as “…a dynamic pattern of connections comprising 
a core network of “familiar” facts and concepts, and a vast matrix of potential connections that 
are simulated by thinking and by the flow of conversation.” (p.7), i.e. the view a person has of the 
world, how one thinks the world works. 
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9.1.1. The rational actor
A conceivable explanation of how a rational actor would answer the ques-
tions:
1: The failure rates are high because… Transport Buyers are not working hard 
enough. This is mostly a staff recruitment problem for the Transport Provid-
ers. The reason for that is that the labour market is not flexible enough. It is 
difficult to get competent and motivated personnel today when it is needed.
The competitive pressure is high on the transport market. Therefore the 
Transport Providers have to apply lean principles (just like the Transport 
Buyers) in their service production. A low cost per unit is required. There-
fore they always adjust their capacity to demand in order to have a high load 
factor. Excess capacity is very expensive. Bigger forwarders, which dominate 
the long-distance transport, normally don’t perform the physical transport 
themselves, but hire hauliers to do that. So, when there is a downturn in 
the business cycle forwarders have to disengage the hauliers, and they in 
turn have to downsize. But when the demand picks up again, it takes a long 
time to recruit new personnel, because there is such bad flexibility in the 
work-market. It is difficult to get the right competence, so training takes 
additional resources, which, however, sometimes have to be compromised 
with due to the high workload. Apart from that, the ordinary personnel 
also have to work overtime to try to keep the service level up. Inexperienced 
personnel make a lot of mistakes while getting into their jobs, and that takes 
time and resources to correct. This causes work pressure to increase even 
more, which sometimes gets the ordinary personnel even to apply for other 
jobs. So the cause is primarily external, it is the inflexible work-market that 
is the problem.
2. The Buyers are not satisfied with the Providers’ capabilities because… it 
leads to many time failures, which however occur mostly in international 
transport. This is because international transport is still unreliable, despite 
very meticulous and detailed specifications. It could e.g. be that border cross-
ings and customs delay shipments in some countries, things that should not 
have happened, but because of bureaucracy and corruption it does. How-
ever, Transport Providers assume that Buyers have understanding for this 
since this is out of their control, hence that they will still stay anyway due to 
long relationships. Despite everything, this is the best predictability of the 
shipments that can be achieved.
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Regarding damages, they occur mostly in shorter transport, because Buyers 
feel the Transport Providers have too many new and inexperienced person-
nel or they are in too much of a rush, therefore they don’t bother to fasten 
the goods well enough. This is because they are forced to, out of competitive 
reasons, to use their machines to the maximum. After all, the Buyers are 
pressing the prices.
9.1.2. Organizational behaviour
The organizational behaviour model, resulting from the bounded rational 
actions, offers a different explanation. A possible scenario of how a bounded 
rational actor (Simon, 1979) would answer the questions:
1. The failure rates are high because… there is too much conflicting and 
ambiguous information coming in, which sometimes is misunderstood or 
takes time to follow up for the Transport Provider. Occasionally also unfore-
seen things happen, and since Transport Providers are going lean, there are 
not always extra resources set aside to deal with them, but situations have to 
be improvised. This occasionally backfires, especially when there is a short-
age of personnel and Buyers are getting anxious to get things delivered on 
time. When pressures are high more mistakes also tend to slip in.
The growth in network complexity has increased the information flow for 
the Transport Providers considerably, especially with new ERP-systems135, 
which also require more attention. This can give problems in retrieving rel-
evant and correct information. There is no way a decision-maker would be 
able to take in all that information even if it had been available before the 
decision. Just to get all the information together and synchronized is often 
not feasible, because resources are not available, since they have to be used 
in production instead. However, based on long experience in the industry, 
management feel that they know how their business works, so often deci-
sions or choices are predetermined by existing policies and routines.
2. The Buyers are not satisfied with Providers’ capabilities because… they 
feel the Providers are not adapting to their demands quickly enough. Part 
reason for that is the increasing pressure from Buyers to perform faster and 
with higher precision, and this has made it necessary for bigger Provid-
ers to organize in large networks, not the least to cover more destinations 
135 ERP= Enterprise Resource Planning, i.e. computerised administrative systems, generally databases 
that also can provide system information.
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geographically. Transport Providers thought this would be possible due to 
the ICT136 development, especially in the 1990’s, since ICT had attributed 
unprecedented abilities to collect information, plan, coordinate, monitor, 
trace shipments and control the operations even down to parcel level. Soft-
ware developers ensured that the new ERP-systems could be adapted to 
access just about any operational information in real time and that incom-
patibility between systems would soon be history. Decision-makers thus had 
almost all relevant information reachable with just a few finger pressings on 
the key-boards, at least so they thought. Transport Provider vendors trusted 
that the new ICT-systems would make the increased complexity manageable 
and really thought they would be able to align to the Buyers’ conditions with 
increased pressures of timing, price and emission control for trucks. This 
especially since the Internet and broadband became more available.
However, they did not think of that all actors in the transport chain had to 
have compatible information systems to exchange data, or were even able 
to provide updated, reliable information. Neither did time pressure permit 
them to check up everything with foreign partners and the smaller subcon-
tracted hauliers. They assumed they would handle the situation based on 
industry experience and new technology. They also assumed that the Buyers 
would renew their contracts since they had a long relationship, historically 
with a high loyalty factor.
Buyers, who after having been promised a certain service level, perceived 
eroding service quality, thought the Providers simply had overpromised just 
to get the contracts, and that they really had margins but were holding back. 
Thus they increased the pressures even more to send signals to the Providers.
9.2. The Theory of Constraints
So, how are the capability factors, which were defined above137, connected 
to constraints? Using the Theory of Constraints (Goldratt, 1990) to explain 
why problems (i.e. on-time failures, damages) occur in the flow may add 
more to the picture. So let’s consider the potential constraints of these fac-
tors, i.e. the consequences of their limitations.
The Theory of Constraints is a normative theory in that there is a method-
ology offered not only to explain why constraints exist and persist, but also 
136 ICT= Information and Communication Technology.
137 Shipping Capacity, Ability to solve problems, and Information & Communication Systems.
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how to “get rid” of them. The approach should be systemic, i.e. global or 
holistic, not just local. It is not always intuitive what to do. Goldratt means 
that the tendency just to fix problems as they occur, so called “fire fighting” 
or quick fixes, is not a good method, in fact might be a part of the problem. 
The problem-solver needs very good insight and understanding to see how 
the system really works and what limits it. He means that it is essential to 
analyse constraints and recurring problems more deeply, to see what the 
underlying root cause is, and deal with that instead. “Solutions of compro-
mise” (p. 36) which only addresses the effect could even lead to resistance 
to change (i.e. more constraints) in the organization. Especially if there has 
been an attempt to fix a problem, and it hasn’t worked, and the problem 
persists138.
But what is to be dealt with? Goldratt and Fox, 1986, point out that it 
is primarily the major bottlenecks that need to be dealt with; fixing “non-
bottlenecks” will not have any improving effects on overall performance, but 
might, on the contrary, even drain resources from the organization. Some-
times even peak performances at non-bottlenecks could be mistaken for 
bottle necks, and lead to investment in more capacity there, whereas the real 
problem could be e.g. a badly synchronized production. A better production 
planning could thus spread the capacity utilization better over time, so that 
non-bottlenecks never form such temporal constraints.
And how could the constraints be dealt with? To downsize capacity and take 
away time buffers in the service Provider’s transport chain must be done with 
caution, if adaptability to fast changes in demand is going to be kept. Gold-
ratt and Fox, 1986; Goldratt, 1990, argue that time buffers are necessary in 
front of sensitive or vulnerable processes. Transport Providers do not keep 
inventories of products, but their “inventories” are rather their stock of orders 
not yet fulfilled, and sometimes they might have unused loading capacity. 
Since adaption time is long, cutting down load-carrying capacity only works 
if the demand is stable over a long time period. When demand is volatile a 
time buffer must be available to cope with increases, what Goldratt and Fox, 
1986, in a manufacturing context call ”synchronized manufacturing”139. 
In the service context, in analogy with this, I therefore suggest it could be 
called “synchronized service processes”, however, the meaning is the same: 
138 It has also given quality improvement programmes (such as TQM and BPR) a bad reputation (cf 
Repenning and Sterman, 2001), so that efforts to achieve continual improvements have even been 
stopped. 
139 Synchronization of the flows in various processes, not the capacities. The starting point is to iden-
tify the bottleneck resource, and let that decide the rate of production.
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information and actions in management have to be synchronized otherwise 
they can have counteracting effects. Note though that the same principles of 
control or management are not usually applicable to services (according to 
Akkermans and Vos, 2003; Anderson et al., 2005).
So, looking at transport services, there could be “technical” constraints of 
the shipping capacity, there could also be limitations in people capacity, 
such as availability of staff and / or their skill, and ability to solve problems. 
There could furthermore be constraints in the communication and informa-
tion flow, which could affect the policies and the decisions that are made 
in manag ing the business processes. Such circumstances could also affect 
e.g. how people actually solve problems. So let’s continue with the Theory 
of Constraints glasses on and discuss constraints of the shipping capacity, 
people, and policy formation.
9.2.1. Shipping capacity constraints
Goldratt and Fox, 1986, maintain there are few capacity constraints of pro-
duction resources. They refer to manufacturing companies, but as far as I 
know there is no research on the prevalence of constraints across industries. 
However, the technical capacity (machines, vehicles, etc) is the easiest to 
measure and estimate, so let us assume they primarily refer to the productiv-
ity constraints limited by machine capacity and access to materials140. For 
the transport industry this could of course be referring to transport equip-
ment or infrastructure constraints in a transport network. Especially if sev-
eral actors perform the transport internationally and serially, somewhere in 
that chain less transport resources or possibly bad infrastructure could form 
a constraint (cf Mentzer, Myers, et al., 2004).
Originally the Theory of Constraints addressed shop floor problems, with 
the underlying logic that production should be demand driven141 (i.e. have 
“pull” strategy). The Theory of Constraints points out that excess inventories 
(i.e. “push” strategy) cause many of the bottleneck problems with the flow. 
140 Their ”soldier analogy appears to cover the concept ”capacity” in an amalgamated or system-
ic sense that does not clearly distinguish the various kinds of resources: production materials, 
machines and equipment, people and their skill. However, assuming a business places their staff 
so that they can use machine capacity etc. as much as possible, then the machine capacity would 
form the constraint.
141 So called ”kanban” (Japanese for “sign” or “instruction card”, Jacobs and Chase, 2008:230) or 
make-to-order-logic, in other words production is not to start until there is a customer need for 
the product. A kanban, however, is not directly transferable to a supply network, however, the 
underlying logic is the same.
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That does not mean that inventories all together are bad. As mentioned 
above some inventory (or ”time buffer”) is needed in front of sensitive pro-
cesses, to avoid that the flow slows down somewhere else142.
These service operations can work very well without capacity change if the 
transport need can be predicted in advance, and there is no drastic change 
in demand. But when the complexity of the transport solution increases, 
the movable equipment could become a constraining factor compared to 
a normal transport. This could be because the time requirements are more 
restrictive (e.g. “time windows”), and the equipment is simply not returned 
as quickly and made available for other transport. An example of that could 
be empty containers not returned fast enough for new shipments. Zanuy, 
2009, describes e.g. the imbalances in the freight flows143 and the grow-
ing problem of repositioning containers geographically. Another example of 
this is the automotive industry, with big relocation problems of containers 
(Williams, 2011). This problem was also visible in the findings of this study 
for Paper industry and Machines & Tools manufacturers144, indicating dis-
satisfaction with quality fluctuation, volume inflexibility, and relationship 
tension. Also infrastructure, e.g. terminal space, could of course also be a 
limiting factor in flows.
9.2.2. People constraints
Human involvement in services is crucial. The main unit normally used to 
measure input of people’s work is time, such as hours of work. Depending 
on experience, skill, and motivation, the individual performs with certain 
productivity, i.e. works at certain speed and with a certain skill. Goldratt 
and Fox, 1986, classify productivity as a potential constraint, in other words 
the experience and skill can limit the performance. One person can solve a 
problem, or plan, maybe not faster, but with a better result than someone 
else. For example, one transport company may also have fewer damages than 
another comparable because their staff have a better knowledge and skill of 
how to load, fasten and unload the goods, drive, etc, than another company.
This, as well as shortage of staff or not training and developing skills, can 
over time obviously affect performance. However, there can be various rea-
sons for lower or fluctuating quality, not necessarily that there is a lack of 
142 That is, forms constraints or “bottlenecks” elsewhere in the organization.
143 More goods in one direction than in the other.
144 SNI02 ind. code 21 and 29.
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skill. For example increasing complexity of task or time pressure, or uncer-
tain information, can be other reasons. Maybe not all parts in an organiza-
tion develop in a synchronized way to e.g. support that.
In people-intense services that require more customization and interaction 
with customers (which could be the case in working out transport solu-
tions), quality of performance can become a problem (Chase, 1978; Chase 
and Apte, 2007; Jacobs and Chase, 2008), especially when the financial pres-
sure is rising and productivity growth is slow (Oliva and Sterman, 2001). 
According to Oliva and Sterman, 2001, if extended, this can lead to that 
capacity utilization increases overly much. If that means a lot of overtime 
over an extended period it can lead to fatigue or even burnout, and this in 
turn can cause performance problems (cf Armistead and Clark, 1994).
Labour shortage worsens or cements the capacity utilization problem if 
the service Provider cannot use necessary shipping capacity in situations of 
increasing demand. Market data show e.g. that there is, on average, almost a 
chronic shortage of labour for Swedish haulier companies, even when there 
is a business recession145. When this is the case that can also lead to more 
financial problems, due to lost opportunities and less revenue (assuming the 
fixed cost for unused shipping capacity is there).
Obviously it also takes some time before the upsurge in a business cycle is 
noticed or can be established, and it is not likely that carriers start employing 
more personnel until that is noticeable. As Oliva and Sterman, 2010:343, 
describe it for service industries in general:
“The desired workforce is determined by desired service capacity and man-
agement’s belief about average productivity. However, because labor is costly 
and slow to change, management does not act instantaneously on labor 
requirements. Instead, the desired workforce adjusts with a lag to the level 
indicated by desired service capacity and perceived employee productivity.”
However, if personnel capacity is increased, there is also the aspect of train-
ing due to lack of experience. If work-pressure is high, training might have 
a lower priority though, especially when there are many new employees 
(Sasser, 1976). Training and building skills often takes time, and this is why 
there is some inertia in expanding capacity (e.g. Akkermans and Vos, 2003). 
So, also according to Repenning and Sterman, 2002, skill and capability 
145 Well over 20 % of haulier companies in 2002 stated they have this problem according to Kon-
junkturinstitutet (Konjunkturbarometern, 2004).
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could become constraints, especially for personnel with key positions (e.g. 
involving planning and problem-solving).
So both for the short-term problem-fixing of disruptions and the long-
term problem-solving of companies it is necessary to reduce uncertainties. 
Sometimes unwanted constraints, like skill problems or too high turnover 
of the personnel, or other capacity problems can make both these processes 
in effective. Such constraints can undermine the competitive edge and seri-
ously jeopardise the long-term development of the business.
But underlying action are usually policies or other rules, which guide peo-
ple’s day-to-day choices. This is what the following section will illustrate.
9.2.3. Policy constraints
As mentioned, Goldratt argues that it is usually not those capacity resources 
that are constrained, but rather the policies regulating the production that 
limit the processes (Goldratt, 1990; Stratton and Warburton, 2006:670). 
Policies are decision rules146, which are dependent on information and peo-
ple’s judgment, and, implied by Goldratt, their whims, opportunistic behav-
iour, and politicking (cf Allison and Zelikow, 1999). The point is that bad 
or inconsistent and counter-active policies can cause fluctuations or qual-
ity problems or otherwise obstruct processes, which injure the overall effi-
ciency. However, the positive thing with that insight is that if policies are 
questioned, analysed and changed there is room for operative improvement 
without really adding to the assets147.
An example, mentioned above, of an inconsistent policy used, based on (at 
least in some situations) wrong logistics thinking, is the trade-off between 
batch size and set-up cost, especially since it can lead to a build-up of inven-
tory (Goldratt and Fox, 1986).
Another example of the more opportunistic kind, is the “emotional resist-
ance” to block continued improvements in an organization. Sometimes, 
Goldratt means, there are even cultures of punishing those who improve 
performance e.g. by laying them off (Goldratt, 1990:91f )148. Production 
146 Will be expounded below.
147 Stratton and Warburton, 2006, describe this as moving the operating frontier towards the asset frontier. 
148 The logic of this is, according to Goldratt, that if a department has managed to remove a constraint 
and it becomes a non-constraint, but new constraints have appeared somewhere else in the organiza-
tion (where no improvement has been made), it is likely that those who have improved so that they 
have slack capacity are in more risk to be laid off if the company wants to cut cost (p 92).
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capacity might have increased by e.g. quality improvement, but a constraint 
to further growth in Throughput is identified. However for some reason 
someone blocks it or disagrees. He gives an example (ibid:93f ): If e.g. the 
production department has spare capacity due to improvements, but mar-
keting department has reached its budgeted goals, blocking an increase in 
sales can be caused by e.g. intra-organizational rivalry for a position. If each 
function has accountability for results (which is common), an increase in 
sales will, short-term, give the production department a better result (higher 
Throughput and no increase in Operative Expense since there is no capacity 
constraint there), however the marketing department will get a worse result 
(e.g. Operative Expense will increase if new employees have to be hired and 
trained). However, as implied this is just temporary, and long-term their 
result would also have benefited.
If e.g. there is, as in this example, little or no communication between these 
two departments, it could simply be because there is no deep insight or 
understanding or tradition in sharing information. This culture or atmos-
phere could simply be because there is not enough knowledge about the 
other processes or due to someone’s “political” ambitions.
This example also illustrates what Allison (Allison and Zelikow, 1999), would 
describe as the Political model. Opportunistic behaviour could be rational 
e.g. to guard one’s position or job (definitely if accountability for short-term 
results is important). But it could also illustrate how someone in the organi-
zation acts irrationally as a gatekeeper and for other reasons guards positions 
or has other personal agendas. Actions then are short sighted, information 
is asymmetrical or totally disregarded, usually because there is not enough 
time and resources to get a better picture. But if it is not opportunistic poli-
ticking behind the behaviour it could simply be because there is limited (or 
sometimes too much) information available. Due to time limits decisions 
are made on limited, or bounded, information, what Simon, 1979, calls 
“satisficing”. Normally it is predetermined routines, policies or “culture” that 
guide the decision-maker, not necessarily the facts.
9.3. Policy questions
Tying back to Allison (Allison, 1971; Allison and Zelikow, 1999), the find-
ings in chapter 8 and the perspective of the Theory of Constraints, there is 
one more question that needs to be asked:
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 3) If the Transport Providers’ policies have such a crucial role in the 
development of their capabilities and competitiveness, why is the 
performance not better?
9.3.1. The rational actor answers
A conceivable explanation of how a rational actor would answer the ques-
tion:
…Top management must have full overview and control of what is going 
on, therefore only company policies are needed. This is a kind of standardi-
zation of decisions and actions, which makes efficiency very high, no one 
really needs to think, just execute orders, a kind of assembly-line thinking. 
And it is in line with lean thinking. Competitiveness will be worked up by 
having the lowest costs, or by outcompeting everyone else. However, if these 
policies are not followed properly, the desired results will not substantiate. 
And that is what must have happened.
9.3.2. The bounded rational actor answers
A conceivable explanation of how a bounded rational actor would answer 
the question:
…Time is the limiting factor and there is less and less of it. At least the 
Buyers think it is possible to increase speed and shorten lead-times infinitely. 
This constrains the time for problem solving.
There are also a considerable number of changes in the market, since the 
development is very fast for Buyers being served. Their customers also have 
increasing demand for timing, more service flexibility, and lower price. 
This means there are often fluctuations in the demand, and that makes it 
increasingly hard to plan. At the same time the major Transport Providers 
are increasingly bigger companies, which have instructions from owners and 
top management to utilize the production resources to the maximum since 
fixed cost is high. A lot of emphasis is on yield, minimised costs, and maxim-
ised productivity. Because of this more time has to be spent on the operative 
aspects of optimising the use of machines and personnel time, etc., especially 
when backlogs of orders are building up. Since customers furthermore want 
fast transport, some shipments have low load factor, and a lot of time has to 
be spent trying to find return cargo. Then there might not be time for e.g. 
maintenance or skill training.
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All this requires decisions, and it is not really possible to take in the flow 
of information, far less to analyse it and reflect on e.g. what all the changes 
mean. Sometimes customers complain and therefore some quick fixes have 
to be applied, otherwise it will have rippling effects on all the other custom-
ers. Thus most decisions are policy-driven, with focus on the shortest pos-
sible time, why simply standard solutions usually have to do. Had there been 
more time, and then policies could have been updated, which possibly could 
have improved performance.
9.3.3. Matters of policy
Policies are decision rules that govern the rates of flow (activity rate) in sys-
tems (Sterman, 2000:515). Sterman, 2000, describes a decision rule as an 
“information processing procedure”. Forrester, 1994:58, compares it to a 
form of “transfer function”, which in a decision process means the conver-
sion of information into action. Forrester, 1994, thus defines “policy” as “a 
formal statement giving the relationship between information inputs and 
resulting decision flows.” (p 58). The decision-maker can of course only act 
on the available information149, however that is sometimes time-delayed or 
distorted (e.g. Sterman, 1989a; Forrester, 1994; Sterman, 2000). But also 
the “mental models”150 of the decision-makers, as well as e.g. organizational 
and political factors, influence how information is selected (Morecroft, 
1994; Sterman, 2000).
To change the state of a system, the decision rules therefore have to be 
changed. Change of e.g. growth or reaching a target, is really only possible 
if there are no (bad, i.e. unwanted) constraints, including missing resources 
(Sterman, 2000:577). But decision rules can also be affected by information 
that is not fully understood, or misinterpreted, e.g. due to long time-delays, 
and that can lead to unintended side-effects. This is sometimes referred to 
as policy resistance (e.g. Sterman, 2000:11), which means that even though 
the policy is set for change, the system does not improve its performance151.
However, sometimes it could even be the decision-time that is the con-
straint, i.e. it takes some time to get information, to do calculations, to eval-
149 The Baker criterion, see Sterman, 2000 p 516-517.
150 See footnote 134.
151 An example of that could be when politicians try to get unemployment down by directed policies 
to stimulate employment or other activities, but the unemployment rate is still as high (or even 
higher than before). The medicine does not “take” because there are constraints in the system that 
counteracts the intended measures. More examples in Senge, 1990; Dörner, 1996; Sterman, 2000.
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uate information, to discuss, to make decisions (cf. Sterman, 2000). And if 
changes are fast, e.g. by the increase in demand, that decision-delay might 
be too long, with the result that an order or customer could be lost, or once 
the decision is made, the demand-situation has changed, and the decision 
cannot be carried out.
Uncertainty, sometimes due to inexperience, makes judgments and evalu-
ations difficult152, therefore decisions are delayed or do not happen at all 
(Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Gneezy, List et al., 2006). Dörner (1996) means 
that especially when people are faced with uncertainty under time pressure, 
sometimes behaviour gets distorted: they deal with the situation in either of 
the following ways:153
 1) “by acting hastily on the basis of minimal information” or
 2) “by gathering excessive information, which inhibits action and may 
even increase our uncertainty” (p. 104)
So Dörner means that under high time pressure our decision-making gets 
more prone to risk-taking or even recklessness because we simply ignore or 
suppress important information, in other words there is an inverse relation-
ship between readiness to act and the amount of information the decisions 
are based on, Figure 21. The less information, the quicker the action. Fail-
ures often do have logical explanations!
Figure 21 also implies that the importance for high quality information 
increases with growing complexity.
152 Weick, 1995, uses the expression equivocality, and means that reduced equivocality makes it easier 
to understand cause and effect, whereas with much equivocality, i.e. uncertainty, judgments and 
evaluations are difficult.
153 Dörner (p 100 ff) relates an experiment by Rüdiger von der Weth involving trading off profits 
in a production process with unwanted side effects of toxic emissions. The experiment showed 
two kinds of behaviour: 1) one category of the participants (ignoring the unwanted side effects) 
took in significantly less information initially and made many decisions, and 2) another category 
(conscious of the bad side effects) which initially in the process took in much more information 
and were cautious to act until they had secured a solid base of information.
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Figure	21:	Decision-making	under	time	pressure:	The	relationship	
between	information	gathering	and	readiness	to	act.	Based	on	
Dörner	1996,	pp.	98-101.
From the discussion so far I make the following propositions:
	 •		 Short	term:
  Building up problem-solving skill is necessary when complexity is 
high. Increasing complexity makes a system more vulnerable and less 
predictable. This means interruptions are more likely and can cause 
quality problems. Recurring problems need to be analysed and the 
operations of the system to be understood so the systemic root cause 
can be addressed.
	 •		 Long	term:
  Accumulation, and sharing, of problem-solving skill and knowledge 
is important for development of capabilities. Therefore e.g. high 
turnover of personnel, especially key ones, could in the long run 
affect the firm development negatively by organizational “brain-
drain”.
The point here is that policies are guiding or controlling decisions and 
actions (i.e. the flow rates in production), but policies can be based on more 
or less relevant and often incomplete information, and as implied above 
even wrong assumptions. The access and selection of information is there-
fore important, but also the application or conversion of it into action. So 
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apart from locating and removing constraints in processes another crucial 
factor is information processing in decision-making. This means acquiring 
information from the Information & Communication Systems, and syn-
chronization, i.e. coordinating phase-lagged information, but above all that 
the decision-makers have deep operational knowledge of how their system 
works.
9.3.3.1. Support from the findings
As shown in Table 5 there are considerable gaps between what the Buyers 
desire and what they perceive as their Transport Providers’ capabilities to 
perform. It is especially the Overall Satisfaction, the ability to deliver On 
Time, and Ability to solve problems, which show the biggest negative gaps. 
These gaps are significantly different for all seven industrial groups com-
pared. Concerning the Shipping Capacity on the other hand the Buyers 
overall feel the Providers perform to expectation or much better than they 
feel is necessary. When it comes to Information & Communication Systems 
all industries, except Food & Beverage wholesalers, express that performance 
is at least (on average) as they desire or better. However, Food & Beverage 
wholesalers show a negative gap, i.e. they are not satisfied with the Informa-
tion & Communication flow.
Looking at the effects of an increase by one unit (which could be a sce-
nario of pressures or demand increase) of the input154, constraining effects 
are visible for the Food & Beverage industry (especially wholesalers), B&C 
industry (wholesalers), Industrial manufacturers (electrical and mechanical 
equipment etc.), Industrial supplies’ wholesalers, and the Paper industry. It is 
especially the Information & Communication Systems and Ability to solve 
problems that show signs of constraints, sometimes also involving Shipping 
Capacity, and seriously affecting On-Time delivery, see Table 6.
Of the special cases related above155, two companies, BRIGHT and MACH, 
stand out, both which clearly illustrate communication, skill and relation-
ship problems with their Transport Providers. These are examples of quality 
erosion, i.e. when the service standard has been lowered (Oliva, 2001). Also 
the data for e.g. cases HARDWARE, and BUILD reveal feedback and qual-
ity problems.
154 That is the Buyers’ importance values and the pressures. This is shown in Saxin, 2012.
155 See section 6.3.
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BRIGHT is the company producing electrical equipment (“industrial man-
ufacturing” company), especially to the Building & Construction industry, 
whose transport chief was so frustrated over e.g. their biggest forwarder’s 
inability to communicate with them and their customers. The forwarder 
(according to the transport chief ) also gave BRIGHT wrong feedback about 
time precision, and they handled fragile goods carelessly.
MACH is the international wholesaler of industrial machines and supplies, 
which had relational problems with two of their major forwarders and espe-
cially with one, which did not even want to discuss delivery reliability (time 
precision) over 95%.
9.3.3.2. Interpretation of findings
As pressure increases, Information & Communication Systems appear to be 
involved in generating dissatisfaction and measurable failures or damages 
in several of the studied industries. Sometimes these effects are indirect by 
affecting the Ability to solve problems, and On-Time Delivery. Since Infor-
mation & Communication Systems represent the data and information flow 
from customers and operations, it indicates that there is a problem at the 
“interface” between that system and the decision-makers. But the Buyers 
own assessment of the state of the Information & Communication Systems 
did not indicate that (except for Food & Beverage wholesalers), so how logi-
cal is a conclusion like that? I would say it is very logical that the Buyers feel 
the Providers’ systems are even better than they want. What the Buyers could 
mean by that is that they feel the quantity of available information is ample. 
The problem is however the Problem-Solving. If there are limitations (i.e. 
constraints) in people’s ability to sift out, process, and synchronize all the 
information (e.g. lack of time, or vital information might be missing), that 
means there can be mistakes and failures because people don’t understand 
the information or it is uncertain. Or there is simply too much of it, there is 
not enough time to take it all in, or to pass it on to the managers. It is thus 
ignored or considered irrelevant, and the existing policy is applied instead. 
Limitations could be cognitive, but also a lack of skill due to missing knowl-
edge and understanding of how the system actually works.
This could be the case if a customer complains e.g. over late arrival. It is not 
likely that the information is passed on in the organization every time it 
occurs if time is short. This could also be the case e.g. when a new computer 
system is taken into use. Systems that are developed externally by computer 
system experts might not be totally understood by everyone who handles 
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them (e.g. complex ERP-systems156). People might learn what buttons to 
press to get access to certain information, but they do not necessarily know 
where the information comes from or why, or how the models and algo-
rithms are constructed. This means they learn a skill to follow procedure in 
handling the equipment, and how to tackle the bugs, but do not necessarily 
know what certain results really mean or what is the cause of a failure.
In some cases also the Shipping Capacity shows signs of constraints. That 
was seen e.g. for Paper industry and Machines & Tools manufacturers, 
which according to the data most likely is a lack of available containers. This 
obviously could have consequences for e.g. Problem-Solving and On-Time 
delivery.
How is this supported by theory?
As discussed above, information from the processes, customers, markets, etc. 
can have different quality, more or less complete, more or less relevant, more 
or less biased. There is also a quantity dimension involved, with either too 
much or too little information, described by e.g. Dörner, 1996.
Large quantities of information and data can be difficult to process and 
digest to allow interpretation. There is a link between growing complexity 
of an organizational environment and both quantity and range of informa-
tion, which affect performance negatively (Comfort et al., 2001). This is 
enhanced under time or work pressure or in situations of disruptions, or 
crises. For example Pettit et al., 2010, describe a number of factors that 
increase vulnerabilities and risks, such as resource constraints, external pres-
sures, and connectivity (connectedness). They mean that increasing vulner-
abilities have to be matched with increasing capabilities, but all this also 
increases the information flow. In other words, if delivery failures are many 
or serious, that in itself generates uncertainty157. The transfer of informa-
tion quantity into information quality158 thus requires capacity to process, 
communicate, and analyse information, i.e. to reduce uncertainties and to 
sift out relevant information that can lead to new insights, for example what 
156 ERP = Enterprise Resource Planning systems, often modularized information systems that are 
integrated with the business and accounting system. This market was literally ”mushrooming” in 
the 1990’s and early 2000’s. 
157 I.e. info quantity increases, e.g. through uncertainties about what causes the failures and what to 
do about it.
158 By info quality I mean here the reduced, relevant and digestible information that reaches the 
decision-maker. In information theory info quality can refer to the valence of the information, i.e. 
if it is positive or negative and how that affects the receiver. However, in this study I am limiting 
this discussion to the capacity aspects of information processing.
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is causing the problem, or even finding opportunities that will develop the 
business. Factors that constrain this process could be time available, costs to 
retrieve the information (for example from the ERP-system, or communi-
cating with customers or potential customers), or even the cognitive limi-
tations of the decision-maker (Comfort et al., 2001)159. The crucial factor 
here is the information processing capacity160, which includes the ability to 
communicate. If this capacity is too low, the information search process will 
be very limited to the pre-set policies, or personal choice criteria, etc. There 
is a risk that new data and information will be ignored or denied, which in a 
resilience perspective will give low information quality.
To increase the capacity to process information, e.g. by improving the staff’s 
ability to communicate and skill to reduce uncertainty, the information 
retrieval will result in better information quality. Failing to increase this 
capacity, or worse, to cut it down could create constraints in the Informa-
tion & Communication-System and the Ability to solve problems, i.e. the 
incoming information causes “flooding”161 of information. This “flooding” 
is experienced as uncertainty, and can lead to rash decisions which tempo-
rarily reduces the uncertainty, however can explain some relational prob-
lems, for example when the customer questions why a problem still persists 
(Dörner, 1996, also Deming, 1986).
It could also be lack of information that causes the uncertainty or conflicting 
information (Dörner, 1996). The reason for this is often that information 
in supply networks simply is not passed on or shared, due to competitive 
reasons or that the information is uncertain (i.e. they don’t know). That 
might instead be the time to actively search for information. My point is 
that people’s process capacity cannot be substituted with computerised sys-
tems when complexity grows. Both too much and too little information can 
cause problems, and it requires skills to sift out information or to find new 
information. Sometimes uncertainties simply can be cleared by good com-
munication. That is when people’s ability to communicate and to process 
information instead has to increase.
159 Polesie, 1991, gives an example from a longitudinal study of a transport company (“Helios”), 
which was a part of a company group. Helios introduced a new computerised accounting system, 
which generated relevant information about the financial development and their transport flows. 
However, bad communication within their own company group led to that they did not take 
action to find alternative uses for their capacity, as their company group in fact was in dissolution.
160 I am here primarily talking about people’s capacity, not the computer system capacity, even though 
that is highly important as well.
161 Comparing it to the flooding of a river.
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Another way would be to reduce uncertainty is to reduce and manage fluc-
tuations of processes and demand (e.g. Deming, 1986; Stratton and War-
burton, 2006).
In the following sections I will describe and discuss the importance of reduc-
ing fluctuations, to have protective capacity, and to develop the ability to 
solve problems.
The improved information quality will increase learning, the ability to 
handle situations and to solve problems. This will be discussed further in 
section 9.6.
9.4. Reserve capacity gives flexibility
9.4.1. Reduction of fluctuations
Variability and uncertainty make predictions difficult (Stratton and War-
burton, 2006). Since complexity in itself can be a source for variability and 
uncertainty, it implicates that reduction in complexity also would reduce 
variability (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008:213f, referring to Frizelle and Wood-
cock, 1995), thus improve predictability.
Goldratt, 1990; Stratton and Warburton, 2003, mean that fluctuations are 
present in all systems. The fluctuations can be internal, stemming from the 
production process, or external, e.g. from the market demand (Stratton and 
Warburton 2003). Variability is considered to be “the number one enemy” 
(Leitch, 2001, p. 172).
Sterman, 2000, means that fluctuations or oscillations are induced in a 
system due to the following reasons:
“Oscillation requires both that there be time delays in the negative feedbacks 
regulating the state of a system and that decision makers fail to account for 
these delays — ignoring the supply line of corrective actions that have been 
initiated but not yet had their effect.” (p. 663f )162 
162 Negative feedback is the same as correction feedback, i.e. deviation from a desired result (target) or 
measure and it triggers a corrective action. An example of that is a thermostat, which switches on 
and off to keep a certain target temperature in a room. However, there are usually delays involved in 
negative feedback, i.e. it takes time for the system to respond to the corrective action. For example 
Sterman, 1989b; Dörner, 1996, describe through experimental tests (simulations) that some people, 
including professional decision makers and academics, fail to account for delays or inertia in systems, 
therefore rather amplify deviations than diminishing them. The result is oscillations or instability. 
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According to Sterman, 2000, it is stocks (e.g. inventories) that give systems 
their behaviour, not the flows. Inventories are stocks or accumulations of 
some sort, and these give their systems inertia, such as materials, compo-
nents, modules to be assembled, or finished products waiting for customers. 
An order backlog is thus a “stock of orders”.
Internal fluctuations can be due to “normal” disruptions, e.g. the break-
down of a machine, set-up time, maintenance, etc, but could also be a con-
sequence of misapplied lean management, removal of time buffers as waste, 
downsizing with the unintended side-effect of constraining the capability of 
sensitive processes. Bottlenecks affecting critical processes can also make the 
system very sensitive to demand fluctuations and disruptions (Stratton and 
Warburton, 2003).
External fluctuation is usually demand uncertainty or volatility due to vari-
ations in demand, market instabilities and business cycles. Difficulties to 
match supply with demand, as discussed above, often lead to accumulations 
of inventories and information distortions in the supply network, in other 
words affect other companies as well (especially bullwhip effects; e.g. For-
rester, 1958; Towil, 1996; Lee et al., 1997).
As described above, service supply chains are especially vulnerable to demand 
volatility (Armistead and Clark, 1994; Akkermans and Vos, 2003; Anderson 
et al., 2005; Jacobs and Chase, 2008). The reason appears to be that service 
operations are “pull-systems”, and it is the capacity that is the buffer (Akker-
mans and Vos, 2003; Anderson et al., 2005), not inventory as in manu-
facturing networks operating as “push”-systems. This is especially obvious 
when the service is capacity-constrained, which is normal e.g. for airlines, 
and hotels (Armistead and Clark, 1994). This could also be the case in goods 
transport services, when shipping capacity is limited.
Leitch, 2001, points out that variability actually also can increase Work-in-
process as well as cause delay (i.e. longer lead-times, totally in agreement 
with Little’s law). Increased delays, especially in combination with increased 
uncertainty, would decrease the time available for analysing, reflecting and 
learning.
9.4.2. Capacity buffers
Sources of process disruptions could e.g. be due to poor maintenance, skill 
and quality problems in production, or accidents (e.g. Peck, 2005; Pettit 
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et al., 2010). So according to the theory of constraints (Goldratt and Fox, 
1986) there has to be some reserve capacity, or buffers, in front of the con-
straint to absorb variations or disruptions in order to protect the flow, i.e. 
to make the flow smooth and more predictable163. Such a system is flexible, 
i.e. it can change and adjust to normal (random) variations and disruptions 
(Goldratt and Fox, 1986; Sterman, 2000). This means that a system cannot 
just be followed up and corrected once, but there has to be continual moni-
toring and management of the stocks164. What is important to remember 
here, though, is that Goldratt is primarily considering manufacturing com-
panies. As was pointed out above, service companies do not handle invento-
ries, but stocks of orders, which under demand uncertainty acts as buffers. 
As the order backlog decreases something else has to buffer, and that is the 
performance capacity (Anderson et al., 2005:229). In goods transport that 
means the available shipment capacity and people’s work hours and skills.
As also pointed out above, capacity in services is usually not possible to 
increase in a short time, since there are delays in recruiting and training 
new personnel. It is therefore important to know what demand variability 
to expect, and to plan staff and needed skills with a longer time horizon 
(Akkermans and Vos, 2003; Anderson et al., 2005) in order to get less fluc-
tuation in performance quality. Here is where the ability to increase infor-
mation and communication quality (i.e. ability to reduce uncertainty) is of 
special importance, which might require reserve capacity.
However, intense competition and complexity sometimes lead to compro-
mises, visible e.g. through quality problems, and throughput unreliability. 
Local cost optimisation of processes (sub-optimising) and trade-offs still 
seem to be strong drivers of business development in manufacturing indus-
tries, but increasingly also in service industries (Stratton and Warburton, 
2006).
The original (“Toyota”) lean, did however not intend reserve capacity to be 
considered as “waste”, but as a protective buffer. The westernised version of 
lean (“Fordism”), on the other hand, minimizes capacity margins and uses 
instead (in manufacturing) level scheduling and finished products’ inven-
tories as buffers (Stratton and Warburton, 2003). According to Chase and 
Apte, 2007, there is also a strong influence and increasing trend from Tay-
163 Cf. Schmenner and Swink, 1998, the “theory of Swift, Even Flow”.
164 Cf. Dörner, 1996, discussion on ”ballistic” behaviour in decision-making (p. 177ff).
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lor’s philosophy165 in service industries, such as health care, fast foods, finan-
cial services, and airlines.
However, the cost–quality trade-off is problematic. Ferdows and De Meyer, 
1990, show e.g. that it is primarily improvements in 1) quality, 2) depend-
ability, 3) flexibility (there defined as “reaction speed”), in that order, that 
need to be addressed before cost efficiency should even be considered. This is 
in line with the original lean thinking based on Deming’s and Ohno’s work, 
that the causes for variability have to be removed or minimised, and that will 
in itself, long-term, lead to better efficiency and lower costs. Just to focus 
on minimising cost (or maximising profits) through local and short-term 
productivity gains do not necessarily lead to an improvement in quality, thus 
value for the customers.
On the contrary, according to Oliva and Sterman, 2010:354:
“It is common for managers at all levels, from supervisors to the CIO, to be 
told ‘technology is improving, and our shareholders expect double digit net 
income growth. You have to do more with less.’ The long delays in adjust-
ing service capacity coupled with unpredictable variations in service demand 
mean an organization must maintain a strategic margin of reserve capacity to 
avoid the corner cutting, standard erosion, and other behaviors that trigger 
the death spirals. However, to many senior managers, reserve capacity looks 
like waste, leading to continual pressure to reduce budgets and headcount. 
Worse, financial stringency often prevents organizations from undertaking 
the process improvement initiatives that could lead to genuine improve-
ments in productivity (Repenning and Sterman, 2001, 2002).”
So, the long delays to adjust capacity to fluctuating demand generate inertia 
in service systems. This is because it requires time to discover deficiencies, to 
react, to analyse, to assess and reflect over consequences, to decide, to imple-
ment. Therefore it is necessary to have some reserve capacity in the systems. 
Not all decisions done under time-pressure lead to productivity gains. Long-
term development sometimes takes monitoring, testing, following up, and 
reflection before decisions can (or at least should) be made.
9.4.3. Quality protecting zone
A strategic reserve capacity could thus be described as a “quality protect-
ing zone”. This is what Armistead and Clark, 1994, call the “coping zone”. 
165 Frederick Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management, 1911 originally (now also available on-line).
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Zeithaml, Berry et al., 1996, talk about a “zone of tolerance” but that is seen 
from the customer’s point of view, the zone between desired and adequate 
service quality. The Quality Protecting Zone is instead the situation seen 
from the Transport Provider’s point of view, in a constraints’ perspective. The 
Quality Protecting Zone is the planned portion, or reserve capacity, which 
should be allocated for each service (this implies that it is not the same for all 
services) depending on demand stability, customer sensitivity, competition, 
etc. The Quality Protecting Zone primary function is thus e.g. to:
	 •		 “absorb”	difficult-to-foresee	demand	fluctuations
	 •		 deal	 with	 (unexpected,	 random)	 events,	 disruptions	 (as	 a	 contin-
gency system)
	 •		 perform	proactive	maintenance	(to	distinguish	from	reactive	mainte-
nance)
	 •		 monitor	quality
	 •		 keep	customer	records	and	follow	up
	 •		 enable	skill	and	knowledge	(i.e.	training	and	learning)	to	be	devel-
oped,
	 •	 improve	and	develop	processes,	and	design
For example Ng, Wirtz et al., 1999, found in a study of 36 service companies 
that reserve capacity can have a strategic purpose in developing and con-
solidating businesses, e.g. to strengthen customer relationship, and to keep 
quality up if something unforeseen happens.
Reserve capacity is in other words not waste, but should be used primar-
ily proactively to ensure future throughput and business development by 
improving capabilities.
So how much can and should the capacity utilization be (i.e. for the service 
delivery)? For manufacturing companies with highly predictable demand 
(i.e. with little variability in demand e.g. functional products) the utiliza-
tion rate can be fairly high, depending on the category of process, as “push” 
strategies are used166. However, services, as mentioned, normally have more 
166 Sometimes nowadays a combination of ”push” and ”pull”, or customized strategy where final 
assembly is postponed as much as possible, see e.g. Lampel and Mintzberg, 1996; Harrison and 
van Hoek, 2008; Simchi-Levi et al., 2008.
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volatile demand than manufacturing and ”pull” logic. Jacobs and Chase, 
2008 (p 69), referring to Haywood-Farmer & Nollet (1991), mean that 
approximately 70 % capacity utilization is the optimal (“best operating”) 
in service industries167. This figure must of course vary somewhat depend-
ing on what type of service it is. Services differ widely in, among others, the 
degree of direct customer contact the server has, and how standardized it is, 
see Figure 22. The more person-to-person contact or customization that is 
required, the more reserve capacity is needed to absorb fluctuations, since 
unplanned events are likely to occur. Also, the less the staff’s skills are, the 
more reserve capacity is needed. One example could be to give informa-
tion about a shipment. The length of e.g. phone calls could vary depending 
on how many questions the customer has, how often they use the service, 
etc., but also depending on the experience and problem-solving skill of the 
person answering the call.
Figure	22:	Service	categories	affect	how	much	reserve	capacity	is	
needed.	Figure	after	Armistead	and	Clark,	1994.
Even in operations-driven transport services (e.g. sending a parcel by postal 
services) require margins to deal with unforeseen events, and absorb fluctua-
tions in order to keep promised delivery times.
167 Jacobs and Chase, 2008:54 define ”Capacity utilization rate = Capacity used / Best operating level”.
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Armistead and Clark, 1994, discuss at some length the balancing act between 
capacity management and quality management, and coping strategies for 
various kinds of service operations.
9.5. Ability to solve problems
Standardization and often also automation are methods used to both 
improve quality and lower unit costs of products in manufacturing. Effects 
on services are not always the same, which will be illustrated in this section.
9.5.1. Work-pressure
A main finding of the above-mentioned study by Akkermans and Vos, 
2003168, is the importance of keeping process quality up in order to have 
workloads in check. Their explanation of that is that higher, extended, work-
loads have a deteriorating effect on process quality, which leads to more 
rework (p. 219). This is in line with the above mentioned findings by Oliva, 
2001, looking at different types of flexibilities that service firms have, in order 
to adapt to increasing workloads. Akkermans and Vos, 2003, also found 
in their case study that as the workloads pass a certain level and backlogs 
increase, not only do lead-times increase but process quality deteriorates as 
well (p. 214). They mean that this could be caused by an increasing number 
of errors, as more orders are processed per time unit169, which are added 
on to the workload. Not only that, they mean that “errors made upstream 
would cascade down to subsequent process stages” (ibid.).
They also illustrate the danger of heavy automation of service processes. 
Automation with reduction of staff clearly increased error rates and work-
loads in the case they studied. The staff’s major role became to correct errors 
(p. 221). They show by simulations that quality of performance can be 
affected along the service chain due to amplified workload upstream the 
service supply chain in so-called bullwhip fashion:
“Automation is a typical example of a two-edged sword in service companies. 
On the one hand, it increases the productivity of the operational process; 
on the other hand, automated systems tend to be more vulnerable to errors. 
168 Services in the telecom industry.
169 Cf. Time Per Order, (Oliva, 2001; Oliva and Sterman, 2001) discussion on flexibility in respond-
ing to work pressure, section 8.4.2. in this thesis.
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Automation often results in substantial layoffs of staff. The role of the remain-
ing employees becomes one of error correction. When quality problems arise 
and error rates double or triple, this smaller group easily becomes flooded 
with correction work. Subsequently, these errors often cascade throughout 
the entire supply chain, as we observed in our case company.” (p. 221)
However, they also found that strict quality control is very effective in reduc-
ing the negative effects of workload fluctuations (pp. 218, 220-221). Also 
e.g. Oliva and Sterman, 2001:913, suggest high quality pressure to counter-
act quality erosion. Monitoring of performance quality is therefore central. 
However, when negative signs are visible, such as quality problems, it could 
also, they point out, be a case of underinvestment:
“Underinvestment in service capacity is frequently masked by eroding oper-
ating standards, so that servers, their managers, and customers all come 
to expect mediocre service and justify current performance based on past 
performance. Because firms monitor and benchmark on each other’s per-
formance, industry norms reinforcing expense control and productivity 
become increasingly influential in shaping individual firm decisions, and 
entire industries become locked into a vicious cycle of underinvestment and 
standard erosion.” (p. 895)
This brings me to the question of problem solving when work-pressure is 
high and increasing.
A person under increasing stress might at first cope well. However, according 
to Rudolph and Repenning, 2002 (p. 18), if high work-pressure is extended 
over a long time, the ability to deal with disruptions and variability will 
decrease. For a person, increasing stress levels have at first a positive effect 
on resolving problems or coping, i.e. up to a certain point people improve 
their performance as shown by Rudolph and Repenning (ibid., pp. 3-4)170. 
However, as work-pressure increases the stress level beyond that, a negative 
effect of stress triggers, i.e. it counteracts the positive effect (Rudolph and 
Repenning, 2002; Rudolph, Morrison et al., 2009). As the optimal effect 
of work-pressure is passed, the system really gets into an unstable state, and 
the person has now less ability to handle disruptions. With further pressure, 
or especially higher frequency of disruptions, this goes on until the “tipping 
170 They analyse among others two airplane accidents: the Tenerife airport disaster in 1977, and the 
USS Vincennes incident of shooting down a passenger plane by mistake in 1988, see literature in 
Rudolph and Repenning, 2002. These are excellent examples of how many small interruptions 
of otherwise well-known processes combined with ambiguous information and novel situations 
under time constraints can cause a breakdown with disastrous effects. 
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point” is reached, over which the system can even be pushed into collapse 
or disaster by very small events (Rudolph and Repenning, 2002). As utili-
zation of the system capacity increases, the tipping point will come earlier 
(Rudolph and Repenning, 2002) since there is less (or no) reserve capacity 
to absorb disruptions and variability. They show by simulation, that, under 
stress, as disruption frequency grows in quantity, it is increasingly difficult to 
deal with variability (pp. 4, 21), in other words it is harder to cope and solve 
problems under such circumstances, which in turn can lead e.g. to increased 
error rate or postponed disruption handling, and in fact lower performance 
than expected (pp. 22-23).
The tipping point phenomenon describes the sudden loss of resilience as 
a system is pushed near or over its constraint; there is in fact a limit that 
cannot be transgressed without collapsing the whole system (p. 16).
9.5.2. Developing the ability to solve problems
From the above description it is clear that as complexity and pressures on the 
organization grow, so do the risks for mistakes and failures.
My findings of the studied companies in this thesis also confirm this. In 
chapter 6, I showed clear negative, constraining effects from various pres-
sures, especially time precision, speed and price, on failure rates, damages, 
and the Buyers’ satisfaction with performance.
Mistakes, as they occur during the delivery, usually have to be corrected 
directly as “fast fixes” or else be ignored. The latter obviously is risky and can 
erode quality.
This is a situation where most of the “problem-solving” is in the short run, 
error fixing, like “fire-fighting”171. That is not what Deming and Goldratt 
mean by problem solving. They mean solving the root cause of the prob-
lem, in other words the systemic cause (Deming, 1986; Goldratt, 1990). 
Womack and Jones, 2005, highlight the problem that lean production has 
not meant the same improvement in customer service as in manufacturing, 
and they want to extend the lean concept to include the customer’s perspec-
tive. Their six “principles of lean consumption” are:
171 Cf. Repenning, Goncalves et al., 2001, who discuss this phenomena in product development. Fire 
fighting can obviously be present in any kind of operation where disturbances have to be dealt 
with.
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“1. Solve the customer’s problem completely by insuring that all the goods 
and services work, and work together.
2. Don’t waste the customer’s time.
3. Provide exactly what the customer wants.
4. Provide what’s wanted exactly where it’s wanted.
5. Provide what’s wanted where it’s wanted exactly when it’s wanted.
6. Continually aggregate solutions to reduce the customer’s time and hassle.” 
(p. 61)
The idea is to increase the value of service to customers by reducing problems 
and hassle. Sometimes, however, companies’ automating or standardizing of 
services lead to more time wasting for the customers. What at first seems 
like a good idea because it increases productivity, does not really at all solve 
the customer’s problem, but rather makes it worse172. Therefore they suggest:
“Rather than assigning the least knowledgeable personnel to deal repetitively 
(but “efficiently”) with the same customer problems, a lean provider deploys 
highly trained personnel who not only solve the customer’s specific problem 
but also identify its systemic source. Management can then put permanent 
fixes in place, integrating the various elements of the solution, so that con-
sumers no longer need to complain.” (p. 61)
Deming’s (1986:315) estimation that most causes for faults, mistakes, acci-
dents was with the system (“common causes”, meaning management respon-
sibility). However, he meant that in most cases it is still the individual who 
gets the blame for the failure.
Highly trained personnel do not occur from anywhere, and it is not static. 
Since the scene changes with time, not the least due to competition, training 
and process development have to be continual. But what happens when the 
competitive pressures increase?
172 Womack and Jones, 2005:62, give a good example of this in how the company Fujitsu Services 
helped the airline BMI (previously BMI British Midlands) to improve their customer service and 
technical support helpdesk. Since the complaint volume for BMI at the time was high and caused 
serious problems with the operations, such as planes being delayed for take-off, missing their 
time-slots, etc., it affected BMI financially. By applying a problem-solving approach rather than a 
”help-desk-management-approach”, Fujitsu Services analysed and removed the root causes of the 
high failure rate complaints and costs connected to that which could be reduced drastically. The 
corollary of this is that even though Fujitsu Services reduced their potential revenues (they were 
paid per call), they made their service more valuable to the customer by improving the quality of 
their services, and on top of that cutting their customer’s costs.
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The question is if the focus on “Fordism”, also in the service sector, leads to 
this kind of capability building? Hines et al., 2004, say that value for the cus-
tomer used to mean “cost reduction” or cutting out waste. The value concept 
has in recent years developed to also include increasing the value by adding 
features or service, e.g. “shorter delivery cycle or smaller delivery batches” (p 
997), like the “principles of lean consumption” quoted above. This is also 
what has happened in the goods transport industry, since transport has been 
deregulated, especially road and air transport. However, the high failure rates 
found in this research indicate constraints in the system.
To build ability to solve problems, allocation of resources (especially time) 
may be necessary as pointed out above, see Figure 23.This could affect the 
policies (hopefully in a positive way). Policies affect the performance, both 
the throughput and the quality. When performance is competitive and gen-
erates enough financial resources, these can be allocated to building Ability 
to solve problems, which also leads to learning and is necessary for future 
capabilities. However, Ability to solve problems is dependent on insight, 
which usually is dependent on some kind of transmission of experience and 
knowledge, e.g. dialogue, i.e. communication, experimenting, and reflection 
(Senge, 1990; de Geus, 1997).
Figure	23:	Part	of	the	capability	model	in	Figure	19.	Resource	
allocation	(especially	time	for	reflection)	is	necessary	to	develop	
abilities	to	solve	problems.
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9.6. Resilience in the long term
The discussion so far has been about the nature of quality and efficiency 
problems: bad synchronization of information, variability and constraints. 
Disruptions and problems can be dealt with short-term as they occur by a 
contingency system. For recurring problems, this can also be done long-term 
by finding and removing the root cause, such as process or policy problems.
To survive in a highly competitive situation or to create sustainability a com-
pany needs to be adaptable to change. Adaptability is the ability a company 
has to respond and recover from disturbances, and alignment to long-term 
changes, which also could include dealing with opportunities (Ponomarov 
and Holcomb, 2009; Pettit et al., 2010), and this presupposes some kind of 
flexibility. There is also a short-term fluctuation from day-to-day, as well as 
season-to-season, e.g. it tends to be less transport of certain industrial goods 
in the summer holiday period, and more before Christmas. Transport Pro-
viders cannot design their capacity based on the maximum demand over the 
business cycle, but that level will be e.g. at the average demand of a certain 
period. At the same time, in a, (relatively speaking) fairly low-margin indus-
try like goods transport it is vital
 a)  to have a high load factor, i.e. to use the capacity as much as possible, 
and
 b)  not to lose market shares, i.e. to lose business because there is not the 
available capacity to serve when customers need extra service.
There is obviously a trade-off here that has to be addressed.
An increasing demand from a customer can be dealt with short-term by let-
ting the personnel increase work-intensity, i.e. by doing overtime. However, 
if increasing activity is persistent, it might not be possible for the Transport 
Provider to cope with the growing work-volumes without increasing ser-
vice capacity, i.e. employing more people, and /or to get more vehicles and 
load-carriers in operation. Adaptability is then more a long-term alignment 
or adjustment as a response to increased work-pressure, and is thus very 
much dependent on available network and market information. However, 
in services a quick response in handling situations when things go wrong is 
particularly important even in the short term since that affects quality per-
ceptions and overall customer satisfaction (Armistead and Clark, 1994:9).
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Arie de Geus, who was a coordinator of the planning for the Royal Dutch / 
Shell Group in the early 1980’s, relates how they studied 27 companies older 
than their own company to see if they could find explaining factors for their 
success to survive that long (de Geus, 1997). The findings were summarised 
in four key factors in common with the studied companies (p. 6 ff.). They 
were:
  sensitive to their environment
  cohesive with a strong sense of identity
  tolerant to the point of “decentralization”
  conservative in financing
Sensitivity to the environment is the company’s ability to learn and adapt. 
Cohesion and identity are intertwined, according to de Geus, which, among 
other things, means for people to have overview and to understand their 
own system. Tolerance is a measure of openness in the system and ability to 
build constructive relationships with other entities. By conservative financ-
ing de Geus meant an organization’s ability to control its own growth and 
development.
Polesie’s empirically based study of 18 companies, had the focus on organi-
zational identity (Polesie, 1991). He discussed in depth its interaction with 
the companies’ financial situation, and how this influenced their strategies. 
Identity in Polesie’s work is related to what de Geus referred to as connected 
to cohesion. However, it is not the purpose here to analyse the differences.
Tengblad et al., forthcoming, also use a number of longitudinal company 
studies. They discuss resilience based on a resource-based model of eco-
nomic, technical, and social perspectives. Technical resources they explain 
as products, production, and logistics, all resources necessary for producing 
products and services including “know-how”. They explain social resources 
as trust-based relations to owners, customers, employees, and external rela-
tions.
The risk perspective is important as interdependencies grow in complex 
networks. This perspective is included by Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009, 
in an even broader attempt to develop a conceptual model from various 
research perspectives mentioned above, and from emergency management. 
Emergency management is an interdisciplinary field that uses knowledge 
from both physical and social sciences, and deals with risks, disruptions, and 
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recovery at different levels, and in a very direct way (p. 130). In a business 
context, that is dealt with in risk management (ibid).
Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009, describe resilience in three successive 
phases: readiness, responsiveness, and recovery. Readiness means some kind 
of alertness for disturbing events, in order to reduce risks in supply networks. 
This is not talking about planning but more different scenarios, since distur-
bances cannot always be predicted. Responsiveness is to have the response 
capacity (e.g. flexibility, information sharing) to deal with a problem when 
something unforeseen happens. Recovery is the “repairing” after a disrup-
tion, i.e. the ability of restoring or “fixing” the problem.
Resilience is important in supply chain risk management, especially in times 
of uncertainty (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). From a resource-based 
view, resilience development is proposed to be linked to capabilities, which 
are coordinated by dynamically integrated logistics capabilities, and some 
important psychological principles that are also necessary in order to enable 
the flexibility and responsiveness173: control, coherence, and connectedness 
(Reich, 2006). Principles and logistical capabilities like that are described 
to be present in emergency situations like natural and man-made disasters 
(Reich, 2006; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009):
Control is to follow up, to be in charge of the situation, and to make neces-
sary correcting for e.g. efficiency and to keep quality up (Ponomarov and 
Holcomb, 2009:135-136).
Coherence is “the drive to know, the desire to remove uncertainty” (Reich, 
2006:795), by enhancing meaning, direction and understanding when 
something happens. It is a deeply embedded need in people to create order 
and structure. In other words, there has to be some kind of openness and 
understanding of what the situation is really like, which means there has to 
be knowledge about how the system works.
Connectedness is the ability “to band together” (ibid.) or in a supply network 
to coordinate and integrate actions effectively between different actors, e.g. 
to share relevant information, integrate systems, or cooperate. A synonym is 
”connectivity”, which Pettit et al., 2010, define as “Degree of interdepend-
ence and reliance on outside entities” (p. 11), i.e. organizational couplings 
173 Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009, point out that such concepts as flexibility, responsiveness, agility, 
visibility are by some authors considered to be logistical capabilities, whereas others view them as 
important to resilience (p. 133).
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within and outside of the organization. This increases the reliance on infor-
mation, but also the size of the information flow (e.g. Comfort et al., 2001; 
Pettit et al., 2010).
Risk mitigation through risk assessment and risk sharing in the supply chain 
is an important aspect in building resilience (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 
2009). Their suggested relationship of these factors is depicted in Figure 
24. This model has left out the capabilities since it is beyond my purpose to 
discuss them here.
In a recession it is usually difficult to perceive the turning points, and if an 
increased demand is a temporary fluke or if it is the start of an “upturn” in 
the business cycle. Therefore, it could take companies a long time to decide 
to begin hiring more labour, and once they have decided it might become 
more difficult to find the people with the right skills. In that situation, hiring 
of inexperienced people could result in an even bigger drop in the momen-
tum of aligning to the upsurge of the business cycle, thus also a drop in 
productivity. It also takes time to train people, and relatively inexperienced 
people will likely make more mistakes, or will not have the same skill to 
deal with disruptions and to solve problems, as those experienced ones who 
possibly were laid off in the downturn of the previous business cycle. So, 
the signals and the quality of the information from the customers and the 
market are vital, but the skill from performing problem solving in different 
situations is especially important in order to sense the shifts on the market. 
Ellis, Shockley et al., 2011, argue that information uncertainty could have 
drastic effect on risk assessment.
Figure	24:	Important	principles	for	resilience	development	and	long-
term	competitive	advantage	(acc.	to	Ponomarov	and	Holcomb,	2009)
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However, if more flexibility and adaptability to disruptions and change is 
needed to gain competitive advantages, why is so much focus on increas-
ing capacity utilization of production resources, which rather constrains 
flexibility? That raises the question: What should the resource allocation be 
between the short-term “quick” fix, or a “contingency approach”, and the 
long-term process improvement (in this study referred to as “ability to solve 
problems”)?
9.6.1. Response to increased work-load
To build capabilities and resilience requires some resource allocation to 
“reserve capacity”, if the rest of the allocation is for performing the actual 
work (i.e., in this study, the shipments). However, as shown both empiri-
cally and from theory, there are occasionally failures, and they need atten-
tion, which is the “Recovery Phase” described above. The recovery action, or 
rework, can either be a “fast fix”, or it can be a correction of the cause, i.e. 
process improvement and capability building.
Repenning and Sterman, 2002, address the question of short and long term 
resource allocation to deal with immediate problems and to develop capabil-
ities. They discuss the “capability trap” problem in a manufacturing process 
context, but it could also be applicable to service processes.
“The capability trap arises from the interactions between judgmental biases 
and the physical structure of work processes. For example, machine opera-
tors or design engineers facing a shortfall may initially work harder …, do 
more rework …, or focus on throughput …, all of which reduce the time 
available for improvement. These responses are tempting because they yield 
immediate gains, while their costs are distant in time and space, uncertain, 
and hard to detect. But, while throughput improves in the short run, the 
reduction in time dedicated to learning causes process capability to decline. 
Eventually, workers find themselves again falling short of their throughput 
target, forcing a further shift toward working and away from improving. 
Instead of making up for the improvement activity they skipped earlier, their 
own past actions, by causing the reinvestment loops … to work as vicious 
cycles, trap them in a downward spiral of eroding process capability, increas-
ing work hours, and less and less time for improvement.” (p. 282)
It is a matter of two contrasting ways of response. Repenning and Sterman, 
2001, call these “Work harder” and “Work smarter” respectively.
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The “Work harder” policy means that almost all time is focused on the 
throughput (and fast fixes of the errors). At first, this actually increases the 
yield considerably, but then after a while productivity falls, a “better-before-
worse” situation (p. 73). The reason for that is that since maintenance and 
improvement activities are cut back, capability eventually gradually erodes, 
however that affects output long-term (ibid). Why? Because high workloads 
and /or highly standardized or automated tasks make people perform with-
out really understanding how the system works. So when errors occur, it 
might not be obvious what is causing them or how to get rid of them more 
than temporarily. And eventually, neglected or procrastinated maintenance 
starts causing problems, such as equipment break down or give disturbances.
Time is then allocated from building capability to take care of the increasing 
number of errors. The increasing errors also push the total workload up. If 
maintenance is only done when there is an emergency or absolute neces-
sity (not shown), it increases disruptions even more (also the number of 
fast fixes), and costs. However, customers also eventually start noticing the 
increased failure rates, and above all, the increased lead-times for service, so 
they cancel some of their orders. This leads to less revenue. Less revenue and 
increasing costs means fewer resources, which means that allocation to do 
the work has to increase even more.
For the “Work smarter” policy it is the opposite, a “worse-before-better” 
situation (Repenning and Sterman, 2002). The investment in maintenance, 
process improvement, and skill building take some time, but eventually that 
will have an increasing effect on output. Total workload will then decrease. 
Why? Because of the learning and the increased skill-level, the performance 
will have less mistakes, and be faster, since people understand better how the 
system works, and can take better corrective actions. Or when it comes to 
proactive maintenance: machines and equipment will be more reliable than 
if service is performed only when they break down. And most importantly: 
Long-term capabilities will increase since time is allocated for that purpose.
9.6.2. A resilience and constraints framework
I have so far discussed constraints from a negative point of view, i.e. those 
constraints that cause unwanted bottlenecks, blockings. The reason for that 
has been to find a way to explain the opposite, i.e. how “good” constraints 
are linked to the development of long-term resilience in an organization. 
This will also be an explanation of my research question:
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In what way does high capacity utilization affect the development of long-
term resilience and competitive advantage of a service company?
In this section, I will develop a conceptual framework of the constraints – 
resilience relationship primarily based on the five grouped factors (described 
in section 5.3; they are also modelled in chapter 7).
As described in section 9.6, the three psychological principles are considered 
to be a requisite for the development of resilience in diverse situations, so 
also in the context of supply chains (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). My 
assumption is (as these concepts have been described above) that connect-
edness has to do with communication and information sharing, in other 
words, with the relationships and interdependencies in the supply network.
The coherence phase has to do with the “sense making”, to reduce uncer-
tainty174. A decision maker must have knowledge based on relevant infor-
mation about the situation before he can understand what is best to decide. 
Since the future can bring surprises, to create readiness there should be 
optional plans, for example what can be described as “scenario planning” (de 
Geus, 1997). These steps, more or less explicit, are a part of the information 
retrieval and processing for the decision and the action stage. The decision 
might mean to correct some previous beliefs, make necessary adjustments175, 
synchronize, assess quality, bottlenecks, etc. This then leads to what is called 
the Control phase, the action stage when the actual performance or work 
takes place. More communication with other actors in the chain (Connect-
edness phase) might have to take place before performance is carried out, 
and so on. This will complete a “cognitive circle”, which really describes the 
learning and adaption in the different phases of building resilience. This 
conceptualization is illustrated in Figure 25.
Connectedness represents the inter-organizational complexity, the network, 
the relationships, the cooperation, and the information retrieval. A reason 
for increasing interconnectedness is to improve availability and efficiency by 
sharing resources in business relationships and, according to the resource-
based view, could also be to achieve competitive advantages by novel or 
unique combinations of resources. But maybe the overriding reasons are to 
increase stability (improve “predictability”) and efficiency in resource use 
(economy of scale).
174 Compare the Enactment model by Weick, 1995.
175 To avoid ”ballistic behaviour”, see Dörner, 1996:177ff.
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Figure 25: The psychological principles in resilience building
But networks need coordinating, and to be continually followed up and 
assessed. However, this starts with control, ambitions and plans made to 
achieve cooperation or have some kind of partnership in the enterprise with 
another company (i.e. to create constraints that benefit both parties). So 
increasing planning, risk assessments, and coordinating, etc. should forego 
the connectedness. In other words, increasing control is proposed to increase 
connectedness. On the other hand growing connectedness increases com-
plexity, which in itself decreases control. As connectedness changes, the 
effect on production resources will be a change in the same direction for 
shipping capacity, and thus for performance. In other words, growing net-
work is suggested to increase the shipping capacity, which in turn will have 
an increasing effect on performance.
However, as discussed in section 9.6.1., there can be unplanned disrup-
tions, or process defects that can cause problems (deliveries can for example 
not be on time, there could be damages, or goods missing), thus the above 
described effects might not come about as planned. For example, increasing 
connectedness might contain a delay before shipping capacity increases. A 
lot of rework (“fast fixes”) might also slow down performance.
Increasing connectedness also means more information as complexity 
increases (e.g. Forrester, 1994; Comfort et al., 2001). More information 
should mean increasing coherence, better overview, and knowledge, but that 
is only if the information is transparent, comprehensive, condensed, and 
without ambiguity, i.e. if the information quality also increases. As described 
above, connectedness is really “to band together”. If there is, for some reason, 
network building with lower levels of “banding together,” the “cognitive 
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cycle” described above is also affected negatively. The result is, I propose, an 
increase in uncertainties due to too little relevant information (however a lot 
of irrelevant), too much ambiguous information, or bad synchronisation of 
the information (not enough communication, as if there are different agen-
das, not enough “banding”).
Therefore it takes more processing and assessment of information, which 
might require the receiver of the information to communicate with the 
sender. The receiver might also need additional information. My point is 
that it takes skilled “information processing capabilities”, probably also more 
capacity, to reduce the uncertainty and distortions in the information, so it 
will be understandable and useful. But, above all, it takes time, since there 
is inertia built into these processes. Figure 26 below depicts the process. If 
work pressure gets very high, it obviously will affect the information process-
ing and communication negatively (indicated by “o“, change in opposite 
direction, at the arrowheads going to “Reduce uncertainty” and “Ability to 
solve problems”). Also if e.g. “Information process capability” is allocated 
less capacity uncertainty will increase, since reduction also will decrease (“s” 
at arrowhead to “reduce uncertainty”).
If there is a bottleneck between the source and the receiver of the infor-
mation, it will affect the quality of the information, thus Ability to solve 
problems and everything that comes after it (according to the theory of con-
straints). The process of reducing uncertainties is thus crucial for the deci-
sion quality and how e.g. risk assessment is being done. Ellis et al., 2011, 
point this out and suggest that when ambiguity or uncertainty level is low, 
then individuals may take precautions if they can clearly relate an event to a 
known underlying risk pattern. However, when ambiguity level is high, then 
enactment precedes perception of the risk (i.e. trial-and-error behaviour176), 
but might only become apparent much later on when problems occur (ibid. 
p. 91).
176 That is, risk is not perceived at all since the decision maker does not have, or ignores, the available 
information. Cf. the discussion above in section 9.3.3. 
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Figure	26:	The	process	of	reducing	uncertainty	(the	process	goes	from	
right	to	left).	Large	quantities	of	incoming	information	are	processed	
so it can be understood and contribute to knowledge increase.
The quality of the information (i.e. what level of uncertainty there is in the 
information) in other words affects the Ability to solve problems and make 
decisions. The decision maker’s understanding (knowledge level) affects how 
resources (capacity) are going to be allocated in an organization. The alloca-
tion of capacity to work (performance), capability building, or maintenance 
decides the constraints, i.e. what the limitations are. This is shown in for 
example how much time (resources) can be spent on training skills, improv-
ing processes, or maintaining equipment. Figure 27 below is a conceptual 
explanation of the structural relationships between the resource allocation 
decision (i.e. the constraints), the information retrieval, and the resilience 
formation. The point numbers in the headings below refer to the numbers 
in the model.
Create stability and efficiency: Point 1 in model
Creating stability and efficiency is what I described above with control 
and connectedness. In this model they are shown as one variable (“Con-
trol & connect”). This is the interaction between control and connectedness 
to build up network resources to enable better predictability, and to use 
resources efficiently. As Control & connect changes, there will be a change 
in the same direction (“s” at the arrowhead) in performance, however with a 
delay due to inertia. However, as mentioned above, increasing connectivity 
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also increases complexity, thereby risk exposure and the quantity of informa-
tion. This could also be the case during performance if interruptions occur.
Reduce uncertainty: Point 2 in model
To reduce uncertainty is therefore necessary if effective problem solving is 
going to be possible. This is part of the Coherence stage, i.e. when under-
standing and insight is increased. To process large quantities of informa-
tion, good information processing capabilities are necessary. The uncertainty 
reduction process was described and illustrated above in Figure 26. As these 
capabilities increase, coherence also increases (change in the same direction, 
“s”), since uncertainty is reduced.
Learn and adapt: Point 3 in model
Learn & adapt is the outcome if coherence actually increases. If, for example, 
failures are detected and analysed, corrections can be made (adaptions). The 
better the information quality is, the more likely it is that knowledge levels 
increase.
Correct deviations to standards: Point 4 in model
This is a pivotal point: correct deviations (gaps) to standards. Guiding ethi-
cal principles and operative quality standards, in themselves constraints, 
influence the overall constraints, i.e. the conditions and resource limits, 
allowing a quality-protecting zone (see section 9.4.3.). These standards 
direct or “guide” the decisions and actions, i.e. deviations can be assessed to 
keep within the constraints, which saves resources. To know the constraints 
decreases the adjustments (the resource allocation). This lessens the risk that 
unwanted constraints, i.e. bottlenecks, form in the on-going or the future 
operations (i.e. forming of capabilities and resilience).
However, if the quality standards are missing, there is no guide for e.g. capac-
ity utilization, as discussed above.
Also, if the uncertainty level is high (e.g. a lot of complex, ambiguous infor-
mation) the capacity allocation might result in bottlenecks, simply because 
the decision-maker does not have a clear picture of the situation, and cor-
rections counteract or transgress the guiding constraints (knowingly or 
unknowingly). As discussed in section 9.6.1, if e.g. the backlog of orders 
is increasing, management could allocate more resources to “Work”, but 
cut down on “capabilities,” since there is not enough manpower available, 
eventually erosion of capabilities and skills will affect performance negatively 
(changes in the same direction, “s”).
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Generate resources: Point 5 in model
Generate resources: What resources are available to be allocated is, in the 
end, dependent on what performance has generated, here called “Finance” 
(money). Changes in finance affect the resources to be allocated (in absolute 
terms) in the same direction, “s”.
Build resilience: Point 6 in model
The building of resilience is long-term. It depends on capabilities. However, 
according to e.g. Gunderson, 2000; Holling, 2001, there is also a nega-
tive influence (i.e. a constraint) of increasing Connectedness on resilience 
building (due to, among others, standardization and economy-of-scale). As 
“Control & connect” (and complexity) grows, resilience therefore decreases 
(change in the opposite direction, “o”).
Lean (“Fordism”) has a strong focus on area 1. “Control & connect”, with 
heavy emphasis on standardisation and simplification to increase predict-
ability. This has thus a negative effect on the forming of resilience, since 
resilience requires flexibility. Lean has on the other hand high robustness 
(high resistance) to keep variability in the processes low, and to enable high 
capacity use (since “idle” capacity is considered waste). However, when it 
comes to dealing with complex problems lean is not well equipped, since 
that requires diversity according to the law of requisite variety (see below).
Figure	27:	Conceptual	model	explaining	the	relationship	between	information	
retrieval,	constraints,	and	resilience.	Arrows	show	proposed	influences.
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Long-term competitive advantage: Point 7 in model
The long-term result of increasing resilience is shown in Figure 27 above as 
the effects of resilience on performance (change in the same direction, “s”). 
With the same logic, a decrease in resilience lowers the performance, and 
generates less financial resources. Here is the “catch-22” of less resource allo-
cation to capabilities making sense: More utilization of the staff’s capacity to 
“Work”, lowers the time allocation to capability building, which lowers the 
resilience, which lowers the performance, which lowers the revenues (and 
increases costs), which puts the pressure on management to cut costs, e.g. 
by cutting down capability building, and utilizing staff capacity more to 
work (overtime, etc.). If e.g. the “information process capability” gets less 
capacity (more computers, however less human resources to do “uncertainty 
reduction”), increased uncertainty is likely to result, thereby more “risky” 
decisions. Disruptions or unexpected events can be very costly177.
9.6.3. The principle of requisite variety
As implied under point 6 above, this model also accommodates another 
crucial principle of building resilience: diversity or “requisite variety” (Ashby, 
2011 (1968)). This principle is based on the observation that the variety of 
a disturbance can only be dealt with by at least the same variety in the prob-
lem-solving, i.e. only “variety can destroy variety” (p. 207). That means that 
problems in complex environments always require complex solutions178.
Ashby, 2011 (1968), pp. 202ff., points out that constraints are all around 
us. They are very important so we can get some kind of direction, and that 
things can be done efficiently, as also shown in my conceptual framework 
model. Without these constraints things will appear chaotic (ibid). This is 
included in the “coherence” concept in the model, in other words the ability 
to solve problems is based on understanding the constraints (the conditions, 
the limitations), and to have good knowledge of the operations, customers’ 
satisfaction and opinions, and e.g. market and societal development.
177 An example of this is BP’s and Deepwater Horizon’s oil drilling failure in the Mexican Gulf 2010 
which lead to an oil catastrophy, due to e.g. a lot of ambiguous information, unclear communica-
tion, misunderstandings, low capabilities, low resilience, high connectedness, complexity and high 
time pressure, see Oudhuis and Tengblad, forthcoming. 
178 Illustrations of this is given by Edström, with examples from the Swedish textile industry (exam-
ples like the companies Algots and JC), Tengblad, consumer electronics wholesalers (example of 
Circuit City and OnOff), and Andersson, a supplier in the vehicle industry (all in Tengblad et al., 
forthcoming).
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The problem seems to arise when the operation becomes too complex, then 
communication and information processing have to increase, and over-
view becomes very difficult, especially if this is not matched with increasing 
capacity and / or requisite variety to deal with it. That is when the humanly 
induced mistakes or the “bottlenecks” are likely, and these decrease, rather 
than increase, overall productivity, and throughput.
The corollary of this is that there is a point in the growth (complexity) of 
operations, above which the operation will be “too big” and cause bottle-
necks in information retrieval, communication, and problems-solving abil-
ity. Such harmful bottlenecks cannot be tackled unless both the capacity and 
“requisite variety” will match this increased complexity of the task. Requisite 
variety rests on discernment and good judgment of contexts.
paRt 4
conclusions
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10. Conclusions
10.1. Reflections
Increased complexity in the operation, coupled with higher time pressure 
and restrictions, such as narrower time windows, naturally make transport 
planning and capacity allocation more challenging. If at the same time lean 
principles are applied, machines and equipment must be used more effi-
ciently, e.g. more hours per week, that is utilize the capacity (number of 
vehicles, staff, etc.) more.
Since the studied period was also in an upsurge of a business cycle (Konjunk-
turbarometern, 2004) obviously the increased demand situation must have 
exerted extra pressure on some transport companies. The staff situation, such 
as lack of drivers, seems at the time to have been a significant problem. This 
has also likely been the case with the skills of newly employed staff.
The data from the surveys indicate above all that there are constraining prob-
lems with communication, information, and skill or handling, and on-time 
delivery. But traces of time pressure are not only visible in the survey statis-
tics.
“Balancing” problems as Ahldén mentioned (Ahldén, 2011) from a Trans-
port Provider perspective, can obviously partly be a consequence of too short 
notification time. As I showed in Table 3 (section 4.6.) the customers’ noti-
fication time is often very short, e.g. on average 6-18 hours before delivery 
for B&C wholesalers, but in some industries it can be as short as 2 hours, 
and seldom more than a day. This leaves very little time for planning, and, if 
necessary, to find return freight. That operative planning can be under time 
pressure was exemplified above (Lundberg, 2001).
The findings from the survey of the Buyers’ horizon were supported by the 
cases BRIGHT, MACH, BUILD, and HARDWARE (see chapter 6). They 
experienced slow feedback or none at all from their main Transport Provid-
ers, and even uncertain information. It is apparent that bad communication 
is also possible within the transport chain. At least the first two are exam-
ples of quality standard erosion, which indicates that the matching problems 
could go a bit deeper.
As examples of observed resilience, BRIGHT’s comment can be noted that, 
in their experience, smaller transport companies had more flexibility and 
192
better performance than the larger. Also Ahldén’s (2011) comment of the 
development in recent years for smaller actors supports that.
Furthermore the interviews showed that some Transport Providers do give 
feedback about delivery precision, though they seem to have different meth-
ods in measuring. However most of those transport buying companies179 did 
not measure transport precision systematically, but got indications of deliv-
ery failures from their customers’ complaints (Saxin, 2002a). This underlines 
the importance of Buyers having good communication with their Transport 
Providers.
10.2. Synthesis
Bottlenecks
Findings in the data showed that error rates can be high in certain industries. 
In some cases increases are correlated to high time pressures.
There are also clear indications of bottlenecks in the factors Ability to solve 
problems, Information & Communication Systems, On-time delivery, and 
sometimes Shipping Capacity. This was summarized in Table 6 (section 6.3). 
The findings are more pronounced in some industries than others. From this 
can be concluded that there is a significant discrepancy between the quality 
pressure of the Buyers and the performance of the Transport Providers, and 
this can be explained by e.g. a lack of capacity, or possibly synchronization 
problem, or both, in other words, some kind of bottleneck or inertia. Inertia 
can e.g. increase due to increasing sizes of network and complexity.
Information and communication bottlenecks
The main conclusion from the findings is that it is primarily the problem-
solving ability, probably in combination with unsatisfactory availability of 
relevant information and / or communication that lies behind many perfor-
mance problems. This indicates a “blockage” or constraint in the informa-
tion or communication flow to the decision-makers and reveals that there is 
a lack in understanding of how the system operates or functions, or possibly 
a lack of time.
179 Buyers, n=20, medium- or large sized companies.
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The unsatisfactory ability to solve problems could in fact be explained by low 
information quality on which to base the decisions. This could be the case 
when there e.g. is:
	 •		 lack	of	relevant	information,	which	could	include	uncertain,	ambig-
uous, or distorted information due to the fluctuations in processes 
and especially the demand (e.g. “bullwhip-effects”),
	 •		 sufficient	information,	which	however	is	fractioned	and	spread	out,	
and time / resource consuming to retrieve or synthesize,
	 •		 too	much	information,	which,	with	lack	of	time,	is	not	possible	to	
process.
Considering that the Buyers themselves generally assessed the Information 
& Communication Systems as “better than needed”, it seems more likely 
that there is too much information available, but too little time to retrieve it, 
to reflect on and interpret it effectively.
High time pressure can cause cognitive bottlenecks when there is too little 
time to take in the information, or to evaluate it. Reflection is usually neces-
sary to turn data and information into useful knowledge.
Communication problems can also be relational, depending on reliability 
and trust, past performance, communication pattern or even communica-
tion system. Many customer problems can easily be solved by personal com-
munication instead of letting the customers find out themselves.
It could also be a case of not enough “requisite variety” to solve the problems, 
in other words that organizations have become so complex but production 
resources so lean that the sheer volume of information is too overwhelming 
to (cognitively) process. In other words, there are cognitive bottlenecks for 
one reason or other (policy, lack of time, lack of knowledge, lack of skill, or 
lack of motivation).
Understanding the system
According to a resource-based view it is the combination of resources that 
makes the product or service more or less valuable. That, however, often pre-
supposes that the companies already have well-developed capabilities. But is 
that always the case? In this study I have looked at how the resources are used 
in the sense of high utilization of capacity (i.e. in a constrained state of the 
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resource), how that can affect the quality of the performance (therefore also 
the value according to the resource-based view), and above all the develop-
ment of long-term resilience.
Thus an overall conclusion of this study is that it is not only the combina-
tion of resources, but also the understanding of how the system operates, 
the logistics of the system, the demands, the delays in the processes, the syn-
chronization of information and the allocation of resources between short- 
and long-term production supportive activities that are crucial, in order to 
improve its capability.
Resilience
To process large information flows takes special skill to retrieve and analyse 
information and to reduce possible uncertainties. Decisions and problem 
solving are dependent on reliable information, otherwise the risk is increas-
ing that there will be more disruptions and problems in the delivery process.
Some smaller disruptions, which can be foreseen or expected, can be taken 
care of by decision-rules and routines. That is the “resistance” of the system, 
the pre-planned contingency system, which is meant to give the system 
robustness. This is the technical control applied by tools, such as “six sigma 
quality” in lean, to handle fluctuations in the process, in themselves good 
methods. However, not all disruptions can be foreseen and be covered by 
pre-planned routines and control. Furthermore, when less frequent distur-
bances occur they can have a big impact. Also with high uncertainty levels 
in the information, then the importance of resilience increases. That is when 
people have to use their own judgments and capabilities to deal with the 
situation so that damage of the situation will be minimised.
Three principles necessary for resilience forming have been discussed above: 
connectedness, coherence, and control. These were described as psychologi-
cal principles necessary especially when uncertainty is high. There was also a 
fourth principle of resilience identified: requisite variety or diversity.
These principles supporting resilience building are:
	 •		 Connectedness:	The	 ability	 to	 “Band	 together”	 in	 order	 to	 create	
transparency, better communication, relationship, and thus better 
information quality, which favours trust, stability, quality and effi-
ciency.
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	 •		 Coherence:	The	 ability	 to	 provide	 order	 and	 structure,	 to	 reduce	
uncertainty in order to create more understanding and knowledge 
of the situation or the system, which will increase the ability to solve 
problems.
	 •		 Control:	The	ability	to	take	action,	to	have	a	direction,	to	coordi-
nate, follow up, to regulate, and to make adjustments. This is a part 
of carrying out commitments and to show reliability.
	 •		 Diversity:	Requisite	variety	in	problem	solving,	not	“one	size	fits	all”.	
The more connectedness grows, the more diversity is also needed as 
problems and disruptions get more complex. This also means that 
the capability of discernment (i.e. to distinguish information), and 
judgment has to match.
These principles are important in the adapting and learning process in keep-
ing up quality in the performance, but also in dealing with change, and to 
create the necessary resources for long-term capability building.
Quality Protecting Zone
Another conclusion is that reserve capacity is even more important for ser-
vices than for inventory chains. It is especially critical to understand the deli-
cate balance between high capacity utilization and service quality. Reserve 
capacity, or a quality-protecting zone, is an important aspect in forming 
resilience in service operations.
The reason is that manufacturers with planned production apply push 
strategy, i.e. products are made in advance (make-to-stock), whereas ser-
vices apply pull strategy (demand-driven, i.e. the customer waits for the 
service, perform-to-order situation). A service operation therefore cannot 
be buffered by inventories like in product chains, but only by the backlog 
of orders (queues) and that can only be regulated by the service capacity 
(usually meaning people). Services furthermore have comparatively volatile 
demands, and, generally speaking, disruptions are more likely, the more the 
service is customized.
Reserve capacity is essential
Another conclusion is therefore also that reserve capacity is not waste that 
should be used to increase short-term or local productivity. In fact, I have 
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shown that with a better resource allocation between production, main-
tenance, disruption handling, and problem solving, there are long-term 
potential overall productivity benefits due to the improvement in capabili-
ties. This would also reduce variability, which in turn reduces information 
uncertainty, another important aspect of resilience.
10.3. What have we learned?
Theoretical contribution
There is much to be observed out there. Data is turned into information by 
being reported back (or observed) by the decision maker. How useful that 
information is to the decision maker depends on the quality of it, i.e. how 
truthful or how distorted it is. How do distortions come about? Allison gave 
three explanations:
 1.  The decision maker is a rational actor. He thinks he has all the infor-
mation available, and carefully selects the optimal solution. In reality 
there is very little or narrow search for information or for lasting 
solutions to problems, and for example simple and linear models 
weigh more than real observations and evidence. (If the map is 
wrong, change the world to fit it.)
 2.  The real decision maker is a bounded rational actor. He is over-
whelmed by all the ambiguity and uncertainty in available informa-
tion, and there is simply not enough time to look into or analyse eve-
rything. Organizational policy and routines really is what determines 
how to solve problems. Therefore most new information is ignored, 
including warning signals in disturbances. It is BAU (“Business as 
usual”).
 3.  The negotiation game. The real decision maker is the leader of the 
company or group, either directly (sometimes with very little updat-
ing of the real situation), or as a result of negotiation with trade-
offs not based on reality but on “politics”, dependence, power, local 
monopoly, saving face, opportunism, position, or feelings. This could 
e.g. mean that the Transport Provider (the forwarder) has promised 
the Transport Buyer a certain service level that is not really possible 
to deliver (by the haulier, because the forwarder’s planning is too 
optimistic).
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Another explanation of perceived distortion of information could be misper-
ception of the information due to delays, inertia, or multiple information 
feedbacks (e.g. Sterman, 1989a), or the data is not compatible. Information 
like this is not easy to “simulate” in the head, but usually needs to be first 
analysed then possibly computer simulated and tested for different scenarios.
Another conceivable explanation is that the decision maker is informed with 
distorted information from the source, i.e. information that knowingly or 
unknowingly is simply misleading.
The conceptual framework constructed above (see section 9.6.2, Figure 27) 
is an attempt to operationalize the processes and structure that explains why 
resilience forms or erodes, and how that is important for a company’s long-
term development and survival. The model also shows the link from con-
straints to resilience, and the road goes via the resource allocation, and the 
capabilities.
Out of this crystalizes the insight that constraints have a short-term per-
spective180, whereas resilience has a long-term. They are interdependent. 
But increasing capabilities to retrieve and process information also helps the 
decision maker in forming or adjusting constraints. How do we know? By 
the data, e.g. signals of deviations (that cause disruptions or increase risk) 
from the operations, which are followed up and analysed. Bottlenecks, such 
as backlogs or queues, are typical signals of e.g. wrong capacity allocation.
Capabilities are the many operative skills and competences that have to be 
learnt over the years. But it takes the coordinating or “logistical capabilities”, 
i.e. capability to retrieve relevant information, and turn that into knowledge, 
and wisdom to implement any changes without causing unintended bottle-
necks, compromised quality, etc.
Constraints are the conditions, the limitations or restrictions, and guidelines 
we have to work within. They focus our attention, and initiates direction (e.g. 
Ashby, 2011 (1968)). That is how high productivity is achieved long-term.
However, as things change over time, external conditions and pressures usu-
ally make adjustments or adaptions necessary. Here is where learning comes 
in, which in the long term can lead to the forming of resilience. If adjust-
ments are not made there they can form bottlenecks instead, which throttles 
the flow.
180 Observation pointed out by Thomas Polesie in discussing the framework.
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Five categories of constraints have been identified from the data:
	 •		 Ability	to	solve	problems
	 •		 Information	&	Communication	Systems
	 •		 On-time	delivery
	 •		 Shipping	capacity
	 •		 Financial
The first three of these are “people-focused”, shipping capacity is “technical” 
or physical, and so is the financial. Bottlenecks were found in all of these to 
varying degrees in some of the industry groups (see chapter 6).
There is also a recruiting problem, described and discussed above. No doubt, 
that situation affects the capacity situation, especially the “people”-factors. 
These are all “capacity” that has to be in place when demand is increasing, 
and of course there will be bottleneck problems if any of them are missing. 
However, my discussion showed that behind all these circumstances there 
are decisions made by people, based on their best judgments. The judgments 
are based on available information, and much of that comes from monitor-
ing or measuring, but also through communication, signals from customers 
or from staff, or else perceptions of the Transport Provider’s performance, 
or possibly eventually through financial problems (which sometimes is too 
late).
My point is that there is a “ranking” of constraints, based on the theory of 
constraints, in the sense that the factor nearest the source of information is 
the most “important”, i.e. the capability factor I labelled “Information & 
Communication”. This is directly influencing the decision-maker’s / staff’s 
understanding of the situation, the “Ability to solve problems”, which in 
turn affects the decision quality and the performance result. If the informa-
tion retrieval / communication process is suppressed (i.e. constrained), dis-
ruptions will be dealt with as “quick fixes”, the action will just follow policy, 
and routines, or not be done at all.
I pointed out the underlying difference in “push” and “pull” strategy in 
supply situations. To know the constraints and how to balance capacity uti-
lization and service quality is crucial in many services where queuing is not 
appreciated. In such a situation “self-organization” is also important. Self-
organization is a built-in ability in the learning and adapting process of resil-
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ience. The point is that knowing the constraints empowers a person to act 
efficiently because limits are not transgressed. The problem with unintended 
constraints (bottlenecks) is that the methods used to overcome them are 
usually by increasing pressure, coercion, or to pretend they don’t exist. That 
is when the “system fights back” (there will be a “flooding” of the system181). 
Systems are dynamic, not always predictable, but constraints are “warning 
signals” of potential system instability that should not be ignored182.
This underlines the importance that the staff understand the system, its pro-
cesses, and are continually updated to be able to respond and make necessary 
adjustments, and to deal with disturbances, get feedback from customers. 
This also gives more opportunity to detect new trends and needs. Opportu-
nities for development can otherwise be missed when processes get too auto-
mated, or too time-trimmed. Rigidity increases, in other words resilience is 
reduced.
An overall conclusion of all this is that the people factor is the most impor-
tant, since it affects all the other factors. Effects of the people factor could 
have a considerable delay though, and this is why it is not at first obvi-
ous that a change in the factor hurts the business. The long-term effects of 
thwarting or constraining the people factor (i.e. the shrinking the reserve 
capacity of the “Quality Protecting Zone”) will be loss of capabilities, erod-
ing resilience, increasing vulnerability, thus higher risk, thus potential loss of 
the competitive advantage.
In the knowledge factory
The proposed conceptual framework (Figure 27, explained in section 9.6.2.) 
is an extended operationalization of Polesie’s resource-based model: People – 
Objects – Finance. In this thesis this is described with the following dimen-
sions: People-focused, technical, and financial (money) factors. I have shown 
above that there are interdependencies between these variables (section 9.6).
Input to the People-focused factors is information. As shown above informa-
tion can contain more or less uncertainty, which has to be reduced if it is 
going to be turned into new knowledge. The alternative is that the uncertain 
information is ignored; however then there is the risk that problem solving 
181 Compare this to the effect of the flooding of a river.
182 For example to ignore maintaining a system will sooner or later result in more failures, and proba-
bly also higher total costs.
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and decisions will lead to bottlenecks and other problems. The primary out-
puts of people-focused factors (over time) are knowledge (if learning takes 
place), and allocation of resources.
Knowledge, coupled with allocated resources (time), leads to skill develop-
ment, and competence building, capabilities that strengthen the competitive 
advantage. So increased capabilities of the personnel increase their capacity 
(less mistakes, higher quality performance, higher productivity). Better per-
formance and even (non-fluctuating) quality-levels build up reliability- and 
trust-levels with the customers (and improves reputation, which can attract 
more business). More trust also leads to better communication with cus-
tomers. When the customer knows the supplier is reliable, they are more 
tolerant of the occasional disruption, if the Service Provider communicates. 
With higher skill levels the personnel are also better equipped to solve prob-
lems, they have more response capacity (resilience in difficult disturbances). 
Better relationship also leads to more transparency in the communication, 
therefore information will be less uncertain, knowledge formation will lead 
to even more skill, etc.
Allocation decisions form the constraints. Input in the technical dimen-
sion (network, own production equipment, information systems, etc.) is 
some kind of investment (money, time, etc.). Output is technical produc-
tion capacity. Technical capacity can also substitute people capacity. This 
is shown below in Figure 28183. Financial input is then only the result of 
production, and revenues (addition of owner capital will not be considered 
here). Revenues though, are affected by people capacity and technical capac-
ity. People capacity is work hours and skill (productivity). Technical capacity 
can be shipment capacity per day e.g. for certain geographical areas. Output 
will be costs for operations, investments, and profit.
Time / money allocation represents the “constraint generator”. However, 
also the unintended constraints, the bottlenecks, start here. In complex busi-
ness situations, the problems start when people-focused resources are cut 
down or substituted by technology. This is shown by the “o” at the arrow-
head (change in the opposite direction, an increase in technical solution 
leads to decrease in people-focused resources). The loop from people-focused 
to allocation and back contains a time delay. However, decision makers regu-
late how capacity is to be allocated between people and technical factors.
183 By input I mean input of resources or information, by output any process result or outgoing 
influence. 
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According to e.g. de Geus, 1997, the business world has shifted in the last 
half century from being dominated by capital to one dominated by knowl-
edge. Knowledge is produced by people. Arie de Geus continues:
“With the capital easily available, the critical production factor shifted to 
people. But it did not shift to simple labor. Instead, knowledge displace capi-
tal as the scarce production factor — the key to corporate success.” (p.18, his 
emphasis)
However, management strategies (and the thinking and actions of many 
politicians) still continue today as if capital was the scarce production factor. 
Today, there are two major and genuinely scarce factors: raw materials, and 
knowledge. It is necessary to find sustainable ways to use raw materials, and 
that is through knowledge development. Knowledge is in other words the 
most critical factor — all categories!
Figure	28:	The	People-focused	factor.	184
184 Resilience not shown out of clarity, but is embedded in “Problem solving skill”. Change in Techni-
cal factor here proposed to give the opposite effect in the People-focused factor (broken line). 
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Also service operations with high complexity need knowledge and skill 
development to keep quality levels stable, and for the development of long-
term competitive advantage.
So instead of having a thinking model with the priority order: 1) Finance 
(capital), 2) Technical, 3) People, I mean the ranking order should be 
reversed, that is:
 1) People (knowledge-based)
 2) Technical
 3) Finance (capital)185
Obviously this can vary with the type of enterprise. I am discussing here 
businesses with some degree of complexity and need for skill.
This is made possible if there are quality standards with which to compare. I 
am not talking about international standards like ISO-9000, etc., which are 
good, if they are followed. However, if they are not they can even be destruc-
tive. An ISO-certification means that everyone trusts everyone else in the 
delivery chain. That relaxes people so they will not be observant about signs 
of deviations, quality deficiencies, and it shifts responsibility to “someone 
else”186. Standards like that are capability eroding if the company does not 
also have e.g. industry-based standards based on ethical and moral grounds 
(e.g. not cheating the customer, do they get value for what they are paying 
for?187). My point here is that there has to be some guiding definitions as to 
what is acceptable standard for product / service A, B, C, etc. If not, then 
standards will erode, which will affect people’s judgment, actions, and even-
tually capabilities.
The information – knowledge paradox
Lean management philosophy has the top-down view on what is the criti-
cal factor in production. It is organized around the mental model with the 
following ranking order of importance: 1) Money 2) Technology 3) People. 
185 Having said this, I realise that for the individual who starts and tries to build up a company 
(speaking also from my own experience) that the order of importance could be, depending on 
capital need, finance first, then people, and technical, but then the discussion is on the initial con-
straints level. For a business to develop, however, I maintain that the priority order is the above.
186 Illustrated by the BP and Deepwater Horizon disaster case mentioned in Footnote 177.
187 If e.g. a company sells 100 % beef hamburgers, it is unethical if someone in the supply chain 
mixes in horse or pig meat. 
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From a knowledge perspective on business development, that could explain 
why strategies to substitute people by technology are used.
The source of this thinking is Frederick Taylor’s “Scientific Management”. 
The focus in scientific management is on the design and management of 
individual jobs, not on the total (Morgan, 1986:30). Its carrying principles 
are, amongst others, that the thinking should be separated from the doing, 
in other words the thinking, and responsibility, should be reserved for the 
managers, everyone else just do what they are told or follow policy. Another 
is that the task and the worker’s performance, and processes, are to be highly 
specified and monitored. The bottom line of this is that work and tasks are 
to be fractioned and divided into small parts, task performance trimmed by 
time and motion studies. This is a standardisation model applied to assembly 
line work in order to achieve high productivity in task performance. This 
highly specialised and standardised fractioned thinking is designed for mass 
production of standardised components. It does not work as well with vari-
ety, and when complexity is involved. In services, for the reasons discussed 
above, it is even more problematic.
It is here the thinking and logic of lean philosophy breaks down, because 
it is normally not possible for a few decision makers at the top to know all 
the processes and disrupting events “below”, except in very limited and con-
trolled operations. This is not how knowledge and capabilities can be built, 
and developed in an organization into resilience. Resilience is formed over 
time if people in the organization have overview and understanding of the 
common purpose for their organization’s existence. This is called identity (cf. 
Polesie, 1991; de Geus, 1997). Resilience is accumulative, and grows with 
experience, learning, knowledge forming, skill-development, communica-
tion, honesty, reliability, ensuing trust, etc. It all starts out with constraints, 
which give the conditions, but also the chances to learn and develop. A 
strategy is required with a quality-protecting zone, which will result in good 
quality production or services, loyal customers, innovations or in finding 
new opportunities for business development.
So this is an illustration of what I want to call an information-knowledge 
paradox: Thinking that leads to more complexity generate more uncertain 
information, which leads to less knowledge production. Less knowledge 
production leads to more uncertain information, etc. Increasing time pres-
sure furthermore crowds out time to reflect on data and information. This is 
not the recipe for sustainable development.
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In lean thinking the technical substitution for people (automation, robotiza-
tion, etc.) or too rigid and tight control by policies, long term decreases the 
organizational knowledge production. Standardisation of production means 
economy of scale, i.e. mass production of e.g. components or services. The 
advantage of that could be high product quality188 – if everyone knows what 
they are doing and makes no mistakes. However if someone makes a mistake 
it can have far-reaching and quality- (and trust) destroying consequences.189 
Normally, though, lean leads to high resistance, (a kind of robustness that 
sometimes is confused with resilience), however, due to complexity from 
extensive control and tightly coupled interdependencies, resilience will be 
eroded.
This generates vulnerabilities in the processes, which also can increase busi-
ness risks. This is an example of an area that could be looked into in further 
research.
How can this be done? The framework given in this study can be the starting 
point, since it can explain how constraints are connected to resilience.
188 Large series, the learning curve gives that we learn the specific task better the more experience we 
get.
189 Example: all the problems Toyota has had recently with e.g. gas pedals, break pedals, rubber mats, 
etc. One reason for the big volume of problems is that standard components are used in many 
different cars.
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11. Implications for further research
11.1. Implications for Transport Buyers
There is a short term and a long-term perspective in all business. As de Geus 
pointed out, there is no reason why the average life expectancy of a company 
should not exceed 12.5 years190. Resilience is a way to make that happen 
and to create competitive advantage (e.g. Christopher and Peck, 2004; Pon-
omarov and Holcomb, 2009). Resilience does not just happen, but is built 
up by strategies to improve the business. In a highly interdependent supply 
network, companies cannot act selfishly and sub-optimize performance to 
satisfy only short-term goals. As de Geus, 1997, shows long-term perspective 
of learning can generate a lot of business, survival and development.
As has been shown and discussed in this study especially work pressure can 
worsen bottlenecks. It was also shown that e.g. notification time is often 
quite short. Sometimes maybe better customer contact and planning can 
make timing less pressing for shipments.
11.2. Implications for Transport Providers
“Leaning” in services cannot usually be done by the same logic as in product 
networks. Excess price pressure can lead to too much slimming of capacity 
by the service Provider, with the effects I have been trying to illustrate in 
this study. Excessive time pressure could make investment in equipment and 
staff inevitable, if the use approaches the carrying capacity.
However, maybe the most important, most constraints, as discussed above, 
are not necessarily due to reaching the carrying capacity of a specific resource, 
but due to synchronization, policy resistance, or ambiguous information. To 
find leverages for improved performance (i.e. overall efficiency) and long-
term development, I have attempted to highlight the importance of devel-
oping the long-term, systemic, problem-solving ability, but also to establish 
quality standards and a high quality pressure to avoid quality erosion, and 
to know where the constraints are and how to avoid creating bottlenecks.
190 According to the webpage Knowledge@Wharton, 2013, Standard & Poor’s 500 company estima-
tion life expectancy for a US company has decreased from an average of 75 years in 1937 to 15 
years in recent years.
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However, in a world where change is rapid, complexity is growing, and 
demand is progressively volatile, it is even more important to keep learning. 
To learn, heuristics or trial-and-error might not be enough. Especially in the 
presence of complexity, insight is needed about how things really work, get-
ting more than one perspective on problems. Trial-and-error is also a costly 
method to gain knowledge. Insight is sometimes dependent on dialogue and 
discussions, i.e. communication, partaking of other people’s experience and 
knowledge, then reflection (Senge, 1990; de Geus, 1997). A complement to 
this is to model the problems and to use computer simulation and scenario 
technique. These are good learning tools to improve the problem-solving 
ability.
An aim with this thesis has been to illustrate that too much cost-focus and 
local optimizations can have severe long-term effects on overall productivity, 
especially for a company that applies such a strategy, but also for other com-
panies in a supply network. Too much cutting out “waste” in capacity can 
lead to constraints with serious negative consequences for quality and loss 
of response flexibility. As customers eventually perceive this, they might take 
their business somewhere else, with the consequence that demand decreases, 
revenue decreases, cost increases, capacity has to be cut even more, and the 
process repeats itself. Long-term resilience suffers and makes it harder for the 
company to develop or even survive.
11.3. Further implications for Service  
Providers
It is thus clear that lean management has to be applied to services with 
great care. The more complex and customized the service is, the more atten-
tion has to be paid to capacity management. Reserve or protective capacity 
cannot generally be considered waste, and there has to be a balance between 
service delivery operations, pro-active maintenance, problem fixing, and 
process development – especially when competition is fierce.
Services that cannot be standardized or automated (e.g. for the operative 
focus and quality reasons) have to be designed to be agile rather than lean, 
i.e. response and flexibility is more important, especially if the customer 
expects high quality. This is achieved by having enough reserve capacity, 
partly to absorb the variability, but also to develop the problem-solving abil-
ity and resilience.
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The bottom line in this is that service operations with a certain amount of 
complexity require more flexibility and communication with customers and 
employees so that disturbances can be minimised or eliminated. A key in all 
this is knowledge development to increase capabilities. This is also important 
in avoiding increasing vulnerabilities and business risks.
In services there is an interaction between capacity and service quality man-
agement (Armistead and Clark, 1994; Oliva, 2001; Akkermans and Vos, 
2003), and the manager needs to be especially aware of the quality eroding 
effects of too high capacity utilization. However, research shows this is not 
always intuitive, the awareness and handling of constraining resources and 
situations is considered to be a key to better performance. Knowing and 
removing some bottlenecks could on the other hand be leverage points for 
better performance.
11.4. Further research
Follow-up constraint – resilience research
This study can be replicated and tailored to the purpose of interest. That 
means that relevant questions could be used, while others might not be 
needed or can be rephrased if the purpose is slightly different.
The proposed conceptual framework (described in section 9.6.2., Figure 27) 
needs to be empirically tested. The framework can also be used for studies 
at different levels, e.g. on a supply chain level, country level, industry group 
level, industry level, comparing sizes of companies within an industry, or 
even as comparisons between a number of cases.
Methodologically: the Principal Components Analysis can with this kind of 
data be used if the number of cases is at least 50, but it is better with more. 
The Partial Least Square can though be used with fewer cases, also when 
there are a lot of independent variables (X-variables). My experience is that 
perception-data (attitudinal data), such as was analysed in this thesis, should 
be analysed together with “real” output or production data (in this thesis 
statistics over failed or damaged deliveries). That will increase the validity, 
since that will show if there is correlation between perception and data, or if 
the respondent is uncertain (maybe doesn’t really know).
In my study the Information & Communication factor contains both 
people-focused attributes (like relationship aspects) and technical (such as 
IT system for the customer’s self-service). I suggest that factors like this is 
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“tagged” so people and technical and automated aspects can be distinguished 
in an analysis, if this is of interest.
There are two areas which I feel are especially interesting to follow up in fur-
ther research, information and communication bottlenecks, and to develop 
the knowledge around the role of the four principles involved in the forming 
of resilience.
Information and communication bottleneck problems
Bottlenecks due to the quantity and quality of information
A main finding of this study was that the ability to solve problems is affected 
by bottlenecks in the Information & Communication Systems. Especially 
relevant could be to assess information retrieving and the process to use the 
information to improve or keep up quality in performance. This would be 
to look at the quantity and quality of the information flow, communication 
flows, bottlenecks in this context, and how this affects decision-making and 
long-term results.
Can bottlenecks actually be perceived (e.g. large amounts of data that never 
gets analysed), or other blockages in the processes? What is the company’s 
view on this? Are they e.g. aware of missing to detect problems (e.g. fluctua-
tions in quality, getting longer lead times, missing deliveries, loosing cus-
tomers or sales), or opportunities because they are not updated?
The same thing can be studied with the customer contacts of the supplier. 
How does automation of communication (e.g. customers do their own 
bookings via internet, search for information themselves instead of being 
able to talk to personnel) affect the service level for business contacts and 
business results of such a company? Are their customers of the same opinion 
regarding the service level? Does it affect the customers’ overall satisfaction 
with the service? Is this an important aspect for the development of competi-
tive advantage for the supplying company?
Factors to explain bottlenecks have been described and discussed above in 
this study. The degree of complexity, and the type and size of company (for 
example task complexity, special skills or knowledge) are important param-
eters in this context. Also the degree and type of customer contact affect 
operations, complexity and thus information quality.
This type of project could be carried out using a qualitative research design, 
preferably a longitudinal study of different categories of companies. Inter-
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views and collecting some examples of operative data types used, if possible 
find out how communication between suppliers / customers and the focal 
company on different levels is performed, what prompts communication, 
and how does the focal company respond to its customers? Is it possible to 
get access to customers, make a random selection and ask them how they 
perceive the supplier’s communication? Do they get good service, does the 
supplier help them to solve their “problem”, what is the situation when there 
are disturbances? How compatible are information and communication sys-
tems within and between the companies?
Bottlenecks due to information quality
Another relevant study could be to compare how differences in information 
quality (i.e. what information actually is available and used in the decision) 
affect a company’s long-term competitive ability. In that context it would be 
of interest also to consider how the personnel situation, such as personnel 
turnover, influences results and to what degree that can explain differences in 
companies’ ability to solve problems and their respective competitive advan-
tage. This should be fairly easy to operationalize e.g. different kind of data 
sources (granted that companies give you access), e.g. how compatible dif-
ferent kinds of data are, what kind of information sources are used, or not 
used, how data is selected, and analysed. It is not a matter of gathering huge 
volumes of data, but more to look at the quality of some data and informa-
tion used. In that context interviews from a number of people might be of 
more importance, which should give clues to how data and other informa-
tion is retrieved and how it is used.
Bottlenecks across boundaries
Another interesting angle, not much researched, is to look for boundaries in 
organizations and between companies, since that can be natural bottlenecks 
for information and communication.
Wolstenholme, 2003, discusses this problem. Organizational boundaries 
can often “hide” unintended consequences of decisions from the decision-
makers because the information flow is blocked or distorted. Examples of 
this can be accounting boundaries, or management team boundaries, but it 
can also be inter-organizational boundaries (ibid). These boundaries often 
change or are moved without people being really aware of the change (ibid.). 
This makes cross-boundary communication even more important in order 
to increase the quality of the information. The finding in this study that 
feedback and communication between Buyer and Provider sometimes did 
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not work satisfactorily was an example of that. The question is why and what 
consequences that has on the performance and e.g. long-term profitability? 
Is it due to communication and / or information flow problems, or skill 
and capability problems, e.g. from too little training, knowledge, high staff 
turnover or simply too high work pressure, or both of those?
Is that important to find out? Loss of business due to quality problems and 
dissatisfied customers can be costly, because it can also stain or ruin a reputa-
tion. For a service industry like goods transport or logistics service it is for 
example vitally important to keep service lead times short, to avoid queues. 
However, sometimes things do happen that cause delay, and information 
sharing can give the customers options to act and also a feeling that the 
Provider is attentive and has response capacity and is capable of handling 
the disturbance.
Coherence, control, connectedness, and requisite variety
Knowledge and capability development
As was concluded: the people-focused factor is the most important one. 
Development of capabilities and resilience is based on continual learning, 
and increasing the ability to solve problems. The psychological principles 
of coherence, connectedness, and control, together with another principle, 
requisite variety or diversity, are central in the development of resilience, as 
described above. Very little research has been performed in the business or 
organizational context about these concepts, apart from emergency or crisis 
management. Here is room for conceptual development.
The constraints-resilience framework could also be used in this context. 
What importance has factors like personnel strategy, training, and experi-
ence for the development of capabilities? What are for example the effects 
on long-term learning and capability development of having own personnel, 
respectively insourced temporary staff? How does it influence communica-
tion and information flow in the company long-term? How does it affect 
innovation, the development of new business? How does it affect long-term 
identity with the permanent staff?
Many companies also have outsourcing strategies with the motivation that 
they focus on their “core” business. How does this affect these processes? 
Does the loss of a capability, which has been in-house before but is being 
outsourced, affect the development of other capabilities? How does it affect 
coherence and identity? How does it affect requisite variety? How does it 
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affect the personnel’s ability to solve problems? How does it affect the devel-
opment of new business?
If this is a big change, how long does it take until the personnel feel in con-
trol again? This is a resilience aspect that could be included.
If long-term resilience and competitive advantage is of interest, especially 
longitudinal case studies can therefore be suggested in this kind of project.
The importance of communication and customer perspective
This study has been done with data from a customer perspective. Many busi-
nesses and organizations, however, still apply “production perspective” in 
their management. With a customer perspective, i.e. to place yourself in 
your customer’s shoes, can give insights, which have been illustrated by this 
study. The findings in the data reveal that customers (the Transport Buyers) 
and suppliers (the Transport Providers) are not always on the same wave-
length and that communication is not always working. This was discussed 
also in the light of the lean thinking paradigm, which has clear production 
logic, even though there are indications of more customer-focused reflec-
tions (Womack and Jones, 2005). The question is, what are the effects of this 
in a constraint – resilience perspective?
Enquist discusses (e.g. Enquist, 2003; Enquist and Johnson, forthcoming) 
development of value in public transport, based on the development of 
dialogue between different interest groups in society (i.e. politicians, traffic 
authorities, operating traffic contractors, and customers, the users of public 
transport). The importance of developing the communication in that con-
text and use a more customer-oriented service perspective is another resil-
ience aspect that could be pursued in the context of my CORE-framework 
in further research. This is applicable also in the industrial business world. 
A deeper dialogue with customers can increase the quality of information, 
give better service value to customers, and reveal new opportunities for the 
Service Providers.
Recovery
Especially in services the recovery step is considered important, because it 
has been observed to considerably affect the customer’s perception of quality 
(Armistead and Clark, 1994). This is where resilience and reserve capacity are 
extra important. How do companies handle this situation when disturbances 
happen? How do they solve the problems? What role has communication 
in this, e.g. can the supplier solve the problem by contacting the customer?
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This study could also compare how different companies act in situations like 
this, and to what degree adaption and learning is achieved. Can differences 
in the long-term competitive position be observed?
Requisite variety
Requisite variety, or diversity, is also an important aspect of resilience, dis-
cussed above (section 9.6.2. and 9.6.3). This is especially important for 
growing businesses, since a change in connectedness and complexity can 
give problems with greater complexity. The following is one example of a 
study:
Can companies be found which allow or have allowed diversity191 and have 
good (or bad) track records? This should preferably be older companies. 
Comparisons can be made with companies that apply the opposite strat-
egy, i.e. highly controlled production, only very narrow training (for specific 
tasks), etc. (lean category).
Are there differences in how these different categories develop?
191 Should be understood as that they are not highly controlled, but allowing initiatives for problem 
solving, and personal capability development.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Some central concepts
Concept Short explanation
Agility Short-term	capability,	“the	ability	to	respond	rapidly	to	unpre-
dictable	changes	in	demand	or	supply”	(Christopher	and	Peck,	
2004:10)
Bottleneck A	“bad”	constraint,	usually	an	unintended	“side	effect”	of	a	
policy or strategy changes to deal with another problem.  
See	constraint.
Bullwhip	effect Information	distorting	effect	travelling	up	the	supply	chain	due	to	
uncertainties	(changes)	in	demand.
Capability “…complex	bundles	of	skills	and	accumulated	knowledge,	
exercised	through	organizational	processes,	that	enable	firms	to	
coordinate	activities	and	make	use	of	their	assets.”	(Day,	1994)	
Coherence This	is	the	“knowledge	factory”	of	the	system.	Coherence	is	a	
deeply	embedded	need	in	people,	“the	drive	to	know,	the	desire	
to	remove	uncertainty”	(Reich,	2006)	by	enhancing	meaning,	
direction,	and	understanding	when	something	happens.
Connectedness 	“Banding	together”	in	order	to	create	more	transparency,	trust,	
better	communication,	relationship,	and	thus	better	information	
quality,	which	favour	stability,	quality	and	efficiency.
Connectivity	is	a	synonym.
Constraint The	limitation	of	a	resource,	the	conditions,	rules,	laws,	or	any-
thing	limiting	the	flow	of	an	activity,	e.g.	in	production,	informa-
tion.	The	maximum	capacity	use	of	a	resource.
Control The	ability	to	take	action,	to	have	a	direction,	to	be	able	to	coor-
dinate,	and	follow	up,	and	to	make	regulations,	adjustments.	
Enterprise Resource 
Planning	(ERP)
Computerized	information	system	used	in	businesses,	to	keep	a	
track	of	production	flows,	planning	production,	material	supply,	
etc.	Usually	connected	to	business	transaction	data.
Just-In-Time	delivery	
(JIT)
Delivery	of	goods	when	it	is	needed,	i.e.	delivery	in	small	quanti-
ties,	but	more	frequently,	rather	than	a	big	batch.	
Lean	
thinking	/	production	
/	management
Production	philosophy	developed	in	the	automobile	industry	to	
eliminate	waste;	based	on	Just-In-Time	production	why	inventory	
buffers	are	minimized;	focus	on	productivity	and	costs.
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Logistics	management “Logistics	management	is	that	part	of	Supply	Chain	Manage-
ment	that	plans,	implements,	and	controls	the	efficient,	effective	
forward	and	reverse	flow	and	storage	of	goods,	services,	and	
related	information	between	the	point	of	origin	and	the	point	of	
consumption	in	order	to	meet	customer	requirements.”	(CSCMP	
2007)
Requisite variety The diversity or variety there has to be in the solving resource 
to	be	able	to	solve	a	problem.	Only	“variety	can	destroy	variety.”	
(Ashby,	2011	(1968))
Resilience The	system’s	capacity	to	recover	from	disturbances	(Gallopín,	
2006;	Bhamra	et	al.,	2011),
A	property	of	bouncing	back	in	face	of	adversity,	“the	capacity	for	
an	enterprise	to	survive,	adapt,	and	grow	in	the	face	of	turbulent	
change”	(Fiksel,	Pettit	et	al.,	2010).
Resource-based	com-
petition
Firm-level	strategic	theory,	that	it	is	the	firm’s	available	resources	
or	assets	coupled	with	its	capability	that	is	the	foundation	for	
growth,	innovation,	and	development.
Supply	chain	 “…	a	set	of	three	or	more	entities	(organizations	or	individu-
als)	directly	involved	in	the	upstream	and	downstream	flows	of	
products,	services,	finances,	and/or	information	from	a	source	to	
a	customer.”	(Mentzer	et	al.,	2001)
A	supply	chain	starts	upstream	(supplier),	the	customer	is	down-
stream. 
Supply	network Complex	web	of	different	supply	chains.
Theory	of	constraints	
(TOC)
Goldratt’s	theory,	see	section	2.4.	and	9.2.
Time	precision,	time	
window
Time	precision	means	delivery	within	a	certain	time	window,	e.g.	
12 o’clock ± 1 hour.
Transport Buyer The	industry,	in	this	thesis	the	manufacturer,	the	wholesaler,	
which has goods to ship. In this study it is only outgoing ship-
ments that has been studied.
Transport Provider Bigger	forwarders	often	subcontract	hauliers	to	perform	the	
actual	transport,	in	other	words	the	forwarders	sell	the	transport	
to the Transport Buyer, then hauliers carry out the shipment. 
More	about	this	in	section	8.2.	In	this	study	it	is	the	company	
that	does	the	business	transaction	with	the	Transport	Buyer	that	
is called Transport Provider. In some cases Transport Buyers have 
their own transport department or transport company. In this 
study	they	still	are	in	the	category	of	Providers.
Vulnerability The	capacity	to	preserve	the	structure	of	a	system	(Gallopín,	
2006;	Bhamra	et	al.,	2011).	Includes	sensitivity	to	external	stress,	
pressures,	disruptions,	response	capacity,	and	exposure	to	dis-
ruptions	(risk	aspects).
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Appendix 2: Interview guideTelefonintervjuunderlag, transportkunder APPENDIX 2 FrŒgemall 1 .xls
Interview questions Pre-study industrial Transport Buyers
Datum: Fšretag: Transportchef: Bransch / produkter:
ORT Tel OmsŠttning / ant anst
Kundkategorier? Industri                                             partihandel / grossist mot industri 
/ mot konsument?                  
detaljhandel                                               
Tillverkning • Kundorderstyrd?                 •Tillv. Mot lager? HUR STORT €R LAGRET?
S€NDNINGSTYP? Styckegods Partigods DIREKTLEVERANS eller via linjenŠt?
TransportsŠtt? Landtransporter genom Sverige Lastbil, tŒg, kombi, fartyg, flyg?
VART? Inom Sverige Export
VOLYMER? Inom Sverige Export
LASTB€RARE?
HUR? Fšrmedlare Egna transporter
BESLUT VEM ställer villkor för utlev kvalitet? Ni eller er kund? Vem i organisationen?
... för transportsätt? Ni eller er kund? Vem i organisationen?
IHOP MED TRANSPORTÖR?
Vilka kriterier pŒ service och kvalitet Šr 
viktiga eller avgšrande nŠr ni gšr 
transportupplŠgg fšr era sŠndningar?
 / olika typer av gods (om de har 
flera godstyper). 
• pålitlighet
• punktlighet / tidsprecision
• transporttid
• flexibilitet
• proffsigt uppträdande?
• hantering av godset
• pappersarbetet
• helhetssyn, logistiktjänster?
PÅLITLIGHET (t.ex. punktlighet ? / i rätt tid ?/  ser till att 
godset kommer till rŠtt stŠlle ? /  godset 
kommer fram oskadat?)
HUR MÄTER ni pålitlighet? Ankomsten till kund?
Mäter INTE TRANSPORTÖREN MÄTER?
TIDSFÖNSTER? Vecka                            Dag                               Tim
TIDSFÖNSTER I FÖRHÅLLANDE till HÄMTNINGSTILLFÄLLET?
•  TID - avvikelse i min /tim
•  ANTAL sena hämtningar / inlev HUR definieras isŒfall en avvikelse?
NIVÅ? Vilken nivŒ av pŒlitligheten Šr acceptabel?
FÖRÄNDRING? Hur stor fšrŠndring av detta Šr tŠnkbart? BŠttre / sŠmre 
UTBYTE isŒfall mot vad?
TRANSPORTTID €r transporterna tidsstyrda? Ledtid av totala ledtiden?
MILJÖ • Vilka miljöfrågor är viktigast kopplat till era transporter?    (lŒt dom fšreslŒ! Tex koldioxidutslŠpp, 
emissioner, energiŒtgŒng etc)
• Hur skulle man kunna mäta transporters miljöpåverkan bäst? SŠger % nŒgot?
• Om ska tänka dig en förändring av transportsätt och upplägg. Vad Šr en realistisk fšrŠndring av 
miljšpŒverkan? (%)
PRIS Pris i fšrhŒllande till varuvŠrde?  
• Tror ni det finns förhandlingsutrymme om priset med er transportör? (t.ex. pga ökad effektivitet?
• Isåfall hur mycket (%)
• Vad lägger ni för betydelse i begreppet "pålitlighet" beträffande en 
transportšr? 
Endast avsŠndningen, frŒn egna lastbryggan
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Appendix 3: Survey questions
Two questions (total of 30 main questions) from the survey are used in the 
study and shown here. In question 9 the respondents were to describe the 
mix of pressures they were under in choosing a transport solution.
Question 9 Description of pressure mix
 
Distribute 100 percent among the properties below, in 
accordance with their importance for your local unit 
when selecting transport solutions for your outgoing 
transport.  
 
Attribute of the transport solution  Weight of attribute 
   
Price           ………% 
Transport time door to door         ………% 
Time precision 1 door to door        ………% 
Environmental e
ciency (represented      ………% 
by carbon dioxide emissions) 
 
Total                              100 % 
 1 Pick-up and delivery within agreed me-window  
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Weight of the attribute for 
choice of transport 
provider    Attribute 
 
The transport provider… 
To what extent has your 
transport provider this 
attribute? 
  
small  
weight  
 
Very 
large 
weight 
 
To a very  
low  
extent 
 
To a very 
large  
extent 
 
Item 
# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1        …covers our market area geographically in a sufficient manner.        
2        …has a good IT support system for receiving our orders (e.g. EDI, internet orders)        
3        …has a good IT support system for tracking the goods (e.g. track and trace)        
4        …has a wide variety of complementary logistics services        
5        …knows how to handle our goods in order to avoid damage        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6        …is quality certified e.g. ISO 9000        
7        …has good routines for handling documents        
8        …has safety routines against theft and loss        
9        …can offer custom-made transport solutions         
10        …is  easily accessible regarding inquiries and bookings         
11        …is easily accessible regarding follow-up of transport        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12        …has many scheduled dispatches        
13        …can adjust to large variations in volume        
14        …can perform deliveries at short notice         
15        … performs transport in upon agreed time        
16        …fulfills its´ commitments        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17        …has well functioning routines for reporting deviations        
18        …has good manners at pick-up and delivery of goods         
19        …maintains an even quality level         
20        …has worked for us previously        
21        …has a good reputation        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22        …offers one of the lowest prices        
23        …gives us access to detachable load-carriers (e.g. swap-bodies and semi-trailers)         
24        
…can offer the modes of transport (truck, train, 
boat, aircraft or a combination of these) we 
desire  
       
Very
Question 24: Below the introduction of the question and an excerpt of the 
questionnaire (translated from Swedish). 
Opposite page, are the 33 attributes (33 importance questions and 33 per-
formance questions). 31 of the attributes (importance values) were used in 
the principal components analysis (see section 3.4).
Question 24. Below, state what weight each attribute of a transport provider 
has in the choice of transport service, and to what extent your present main 
transport provider has these properties.
State your opinion with a cross on each 7-grade scale, where 1 = very small 
weight / extent and 7 = very large weight / extent.
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 Attribute  
Item 
# The transport provider… 
1 …covers our market area geographically in a sufficient manner. 
2 …has a good IT support system for receiving our orders (e.g. EDI, internet orders) 
3 …has a good IT support system for tracking the goods (e.g. track and trace) 
4 …has a wide variety of complementary logistics services 
5 …knows how to handle our goods in order to avoid damage 
  
6 …is quality certified e.g. ISO 9000 
7 …has good routines for handling documents 
8 …has safety routines against theft and loss 
9 …can offer custom-made transport solutions  
10 …is  easily accessible regarding enquiries and bookings  
11 …is easily accessible regarding follow-up of transport 
  
12 …has many scheduled dispatches 
13 …can adjust to large variations in volume 
14 …can perform deliveries at short notice  
15 … performs transport in upon agreed time 
16 …fulfills its commitments 
  
17 …has well functioning routines for reporting deviations 
18 …has good manners at pick-up and delivery of goods  
19 …maintains an even quality level  
20 …has worked for us previously 
21 …has a good reputation 
  
22 …offers one of the lowest prices 
23 …gives us access to detachable load-carriers (e.g. swap-bodies and semi-trailers)  
24 …can offer the modes of transport (truck, train, boat, aircraft or a combination of these) we desire  
25 …can coordinate our inbound and outbound transport 
26 …offers coordinated shared deliveries with other companies in order to reduce empty load transport 
  
27 …can offer goods transport on rail 
28 …has a high loading factor of goods  
29 …uses other fuels than diesel. e.g. bi-fuel and gas  
30 …uses trucks with low emission standards 
31 …can offer combined transport truck-train  
32 …has implemented an Environmental Management System e.g. ISO 14001 
33 …has environmentally efficient transport 
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Appendix 4: Table 4 Principal Component Factors, in detail
How to read Table 4, next page:
In Table 4, the items or attributes192 are the rows, and the nine factors are 
shown in the columns. Those items that give high enough “factor loadings” 
form each factor. The factor loadings are the framed-in numbers shown in 
the matrix. These numbers are the correlations (the strength of the linear 
association) between each item and the factor.
The factor loading is a number between -1 and 1. 1 means there is total 
correlation (attribute and the factor co-vary in the exact same direction), 
-1 (item and factor have exact opposite directions). If there is no corre-
lation, i.e. no association between them, the correlation is near 0. This 
happens mostly when variations are random, i.e. there is no indication of 
possible association.
Hair, Anderson et al., 1992, mean that factor loadings greater than 0.30 
can be considered significant, and loadings of at least 0.40 are more impor-
tant, 0.50 and up is highly significant, but this varies somewhat with the 
number of variables and sample size (p. 239). As can be seen in Table 4 
most of the loadings in the survey are over 0.50. All loadings under 0.30 
have been excluded for clarity.
In the bottom of the matrix, data for each factor is summarized. It gives 
among others how much (in %) uncertainty is reduced193 by respective 
factor. The whole model thus reduces the uncertainty in the data by 62% 
(sum of “Uncertainty reduced (%)) for all the factors.
Cronbach’s alpha gives the internal reliability for each factor, i.e. it is a test 
that the variables are measuring the same thing. Should be at least 0.70, 
but in some cases could be lower.
The mean values for importance and performance respectively are the 
answers by the respondents (see Appendix 3, question 24).
Column furthest to the right shows communalities (variance explanation 
for	each	item).	They	are	high,	except	for	two	items	(item	#	1	and	#	4).	This	
extraction followed the criteria of the latent root of eigenvalues and a scree 
tail test to extract the ”best number” of factors (Hair et al 1992, p 236f ).194
192 Same questions as in Appendix 3, question 24.
193 The same as variance explained.
194 The latent-root-rule is to choose factors with eigenvalues (factor variance) of at least 1, since that is 
considered to be the limit for factor significance (Hair et al p 237). 
229
Table 4 in detail 
It
em
 #
 
Transport provider 
attribute 
F
1 
St
an
da
rd
s 
F
2 
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
of
 
Se
rv
ic
e 
F
3 
IC
T
 
F
4 
M
od
al
 
F
5 
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
F
6 
L
oa
d 
F
ac
to
r 
F
7 
N
et
w
or
k 
ca
pa
bi
lit
y 
F
8 
Sk
ill
 
F
9 
P
ri
ce
 
C
om
m
un
al
it
ie
s 
32 Environmental mgmt system  0.88                 0.83 
33 
Environmentally efficient 
transport 0.85                 0.81 
30 Low emission standards 0.80                 0.78 
 6 Quality certified (e.g. ISO 
9000) 0.70                 0.64 
29 Other fuels than diesel 0.58                 0.58 
10 Accessible for bookings   0.78               0.66 
15 Transport on time   0.69               0.59 
11 Accessible for follow-up   0.67               0.58 
17 Routines, disruption report   0.56               0.56 
 3 IT system, track & trace     0.83             0.74 
 2 IT system for ordering     0.75             0.64 
 4 Complementary logistics 
services     0.47             0.38 
31 Offers intermodal R/R        0.79           0.73 
27 Offers Rail transport       0.77           0.71 
23 Access to detachable load-
carriers       0.58           0.54 
24 Different transport modes       0.49           0.59 
21 Has good reputation         0.80         0.73 
20 Has worked for us before         0.76         0.63 
18 Good manners         0.53         0.59 
26 
Coordinated deliveries with 
other companies           0.74       0.61 
28 High loading factor           0.63       0.65 
25 Can coordinate our in- and 
outbound transport           0.44       0.59 
12 Many scheduled dispatches             0.68     0.56 
13 Can adjust to large variations 
in volume             0.61     0.58 
14 Deliveries at short notice             0.60     0.61 
 1 Geographic coverage             0.33     0.44 
 5 Can handle our goods               0.66   0.61 
 9 Customized transport               0.51   0.51 
 7 Routines document handling               0.37   0.49 
 8 Has safety routines               0.35   0.55 
22 One of the lowest prices                 0.88 0.81 
 Uncertainty reduced  3.5 3.2 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.1   
 Total uncertainty reduced % 11.4 10.4 7.6 7.2 5.8 5.7 5.3 5.3 3.6   
 Cum % 11.4 21.7 29.4 36.6 42.4 48.2 53.5 58.8 62.3   
 Cronbach's (Std) Importance 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.79 0.77 
 Cronbach's (Std), perform. 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.84 0.82 
 Performance, mean, total pop 4.99 5.50 4.09 3.93 5.72 4.64 5.44 5.45 5.21  
 Importance, mean, total pop 5.12 6.24 3.80 3.44 5.40 4.61 5.63 5.68 5.83  
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